Grsec/PaX: 2.9.1-{3.2.52,3.11.6}-20131102163520131102

4 files changed, 1690 insertions, 109 deletions

diff --git a/3.11.6/0000_README b/3.11.6/0000_README
index 2489326..358a97d 100644
--- a/3.11.6/0000_README
+++ b/3.11.6/0000_README
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ README
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Individual Patch Descriptions:
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Patch:	4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201310292050.patch
+Patch:	4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201311021635.patch
 From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
 Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity
 
diff --git a/3.11.6/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201310292050.patch b/3.11.6/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201311021635.patch
index 020c231..306363f 100644
--- a/3.11.6/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201310292050.patch
+++ b/3.11.6/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.11.6-201311021635.patch
@@ -46087,6 +46087,19 @@ index fcb0329..d77b7f2 100644
  
  	ret = sysfs_create_bin_file(&pdev->dev.kobj, &m48t59_nvram_attr);
  	if (ret)
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
+index 408a42e..f0d432c 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
+@@ -771,6 +771,8 @@ static long aac_compat_do_ioctl(struct aac_dev *dev, unsigned cmd, unsigned long
+ static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
+ {
+ 	struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
++	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		return -EPERM;
+ 	return aac_compat_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, (unsigned long)arg);
+ }
+ 
 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcpim.h b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcpim.h
 index e693af6..2e525b6 100644
 --- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcpim.h
@@ -47112,6 +47125,18 @@ index ee3a57f..18368c1 100644
  	tdev->dev = device_create(timed_output_class, NULL,
  		MKDEV(0, tdev->index), NULL, "%s", tdev->name);
  	if (IS_ERR(tdev->dev))
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
+index f67a225..756b634 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
+@@ -1960,6 +1960,7 @@ cntrlEnd:
+ 
+ 		BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Called IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO\n");
+ 
++		memset(&DevInfo, 0, sizeof(DevInfo));
+ 		DevInfo.MaxRDMBufferSize = BUFFER_4K;
+ 		DevInfo.u32DSDStartOffset = EEPROM_CALPARAM_START;
+ 		DevInfo.u32RxAlignmentCorrection = 0;
 diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/solo6x10/solo6x10-core.c b/drivers/staging/media/solo6x10/solo6x10-core.c
 index 3675020..e80d92c 100644
 --- a/drivers/staging/media/solo6x10/solo6x10-core.c
@@ -47203,6 +47228,20 @@ index c3a90e7..023619a 100644
  #endif
  	}
  
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c b/drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c
+index 374fdc3..ea5f9f3 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
+ 	struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
+ 	struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
+ 
++	if (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
+ 	pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
+ 	if (pd)
 diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_io.h b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_io.h
 index dc23395..cf7e9b1 100644
 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_io.h
@@ -47346,6 +47385,47 @@ index c699a30..b90a5fd 100644
  	pDevice->apdev->netdev_ops = &apdev_netdev_ops;
  
  	pDevice->apdev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211;
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c b/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
+index c97e0e1..7e10dcd 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
+@@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
+ 	ltv_t                   *pLtv;
+ 	bool_t                  ltvAllocated = FALSE;
+ 	ENCSTRCT                sEncryption;
++	size_t			len;
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_WDS
+ 	hcf_16                  hcfPort  = HCF_PORT_0;
+@@ -686,7 +687,8 @@ int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
+ 					break;
+ 				case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
+ 					memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
+-					memcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
++					len = min_t(size_t, pLtv->u.u16[0], sizeof(lp->StationName));
++					strlcpy(lp->StationName, &pLtv->u.u8[2], len);
+ 					pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
+ 					break;
+ 				case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
+@@ -1783,6 +1785,7 @@ int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
+ {
+ 	struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
+ 	unsigned long flags;
++	size_t len;
+ 	int         ret = 0;
+ 	/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+ 
+@@ -1793,8 +1796,8 @@ int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
+ 	wl_lock(lp, &flags);
+ 
+ 	memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
+-
+-	memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
++	len = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));
++	strlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);
+ 
+ 	/* Commit the adapter parameters */
+ 	wl_apply(lp);
 diff --git a/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.h b/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.h
 index d128ce2..fc1f9a1 100644
 --- a/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.h
@@ -85733,6 +85813,20 @@ index e796429..6e38f9f 100644
  
  static inline void *ptr_to_indirect(void *ptr)
  {
+diff --git a/lib/scatterlist.c b/lib/scatterlist.c
+index a685c8a..d16fa29 100644
+--- a/lib/scatterlist.c
++++ b/lib/scatterlist.c
+@@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ void sg_miter_stop(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter)
+ 		miter->__offset += miter->consumed;
+ 		miter->__remaining -= miter->consumed;
+ 
+-		if (miter->__flags & SG_MITER_TO_SG)
++		if ((miter->__flags & SG_MITER_TO_SG) &&
++		    !PageSlab(miter->page))
+ 			flush_kernel_dcache_page(miter->page);
+ 
+ 		if (miter->__flags & SG_MITER_ATOMIC) {
 diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
 index bb2b201..46abaf9 100644
 --- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
@@ -91613,6 +91707,19 @@ index dfa602c..3103d88 100644
  		if (!IS_ERR(flo))
  			fle->object = flo;
  		else
+diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+index 52d0f83..4a1d064 100644
+--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
++++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ again:
+ 		struct iphdr _iph;
+ ip:
+ 		iph = skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+-		if (!iph)
++		if (!iph || iph->ihl < 5)
+ 			return false;
+ 
+ 		if (ip_is_fragment(iph))
 diff --git a/net/core/iovec.c b/net/core/iovec.c
 index de178e4..1dabd8b 100644
 --- a/net/core/iovec.c
diff --git a/3.2.52/0000_README b/3.2.52/0000_README
index f3e1e87..7ddab2f 100644
--- a/3.2.52/0000_README
+++ b/3.2.52/0000_README
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Patch:	1051_linux-3.2.52.patch
 From:	http://www.kernel.org
 Desc:	Linux 3.2.52
 
-Patch:	4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201310292049.patch
+Patch:	4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201311021628.patch
 From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
 Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity
 
diff --git a/3.2.52/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201310292049.patch b/3.2.52/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201311021628.patch
index e09de55..398b6be 100644
--- a/3.2.52/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201310292049.patch
+++ b/3.2.52/4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.2.52-201311021628.patch
@@ -485,6 +485,39 @@ index 1dd2c09..6f850c4 100644
  	$(cmd_crmodverdir)
  	$(Q)$(MAKE) KBUILD_MODULES=$(if $(CONFIG_MODULES),1)   \
  	$(build)=$(build-dir) $(@:.ko=.o)
+diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
+index 4b0669c..7389b35 100644
+--- a/arch/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/Kconfig
+@@ -181,4 +181,28 @@ config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
+ config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
+ 	bool
+ 
++config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
++	bool
++	help
++	  An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
++	  - syscall_get_arch()
++	  - syscall_get_arguments()
++	  - syscall_rollback()
++	  - syscall_set_return_value()
++	  - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
++	  - uses __secure_computing_int() or secure_computing()
++	  - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
++	  - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
++	    results in the system call being skipped immediately.
++
++config SECCOMP_FILTER
++	def_bool y
++	depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
++	help
++	  Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
++	  in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
++	  task-defined system call filtering polices.
++
++	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
++
+ source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
 diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/atomic.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/atomic.h
 index 6f1aca7..fa956e0 100644
 --- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/atomic.h
@@ -8873,10 +8906,18 @@ index ad8f795..2c7eec6 100644
  /*
   * Memory returned by kmalloc() may be used for DMA, so we must make
 diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
+index fb2e69d..27ff8ca 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
 +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ config X86_HT
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ config X86
+ 	select HAVE_BPF_JIT if (X86_64 && NET)
+ 	select CLKEVT_I8253
+ 	select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
++	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ 
+ config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
+ 	def_bool (KPROBES || PERF_EVENTS)
+@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ config X86_HT
  
  config X86_32_LAZY_GS
  	def_bool y
@@ -8885,7 +8926,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  
  config ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS
  	string
-@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ config MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE
+@@ -999,6 +1000,7 @@ config MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE
  
  config X86_MSR
  	tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support"
@@ -8893,7 +8934,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	---help---
  	  This device gives privileged processes access to the x86
  	  Model-Specific Registers (MSRs).  It is a character device with
-@@ -1022,7 +1023,7 @@ choice
+@@ -1022,7 +1024,7 @@ choice
  
  config NOHIGHMEM
  	bool "off"
@@ -8902,7 +8943,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	---help---
  	  Linux can use up to 64 Gigabytes of physical memory on x86 systems.
  	  However, the address space of 32-bit x86 processors is only 4
-@@ -1059,7 +1060,7 @@ config NOHIGHMEM
+@@ -1059,7 +1061,7 @@ config NOHIGHMEM
  
  config HIGHMEM4G
  	bool "4GB"
@@ -8911,7 +8952,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	---help---
  	  Select this if you have a 32-bit processor and between 1 and 4
  	  gigabytes of physical RAM.
-@@ -1113,7 +1114,7 @@ config PAGE_OFFSET
+@@ -1113,7 +1115,7 @@ config PAGE_OFFSET
  	hex
  	default 0xB0000000 if VMSPLIT_3G_OPT
  	default 0x80000000 if VMSPLIT_2G
@@ -8920,7 +8961,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	default 0x40000000 if VMSPLIT_1G
  	default 0xC0000000
  	depends on X86_32
-@@ -1496,6 +1497,7 @@ config SECCOMP
+@@ -1496,6 +1498,7 @@ config SECCOMP
  
  config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
  	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
@@ -8928,7 +8969,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	---help---
  	  This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
  	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
-@@ -1616,6 +1618,8 @@ config X86_NEED_RELOCS
+@@ -1616,6 +1619,8 @@ config X86_NEED_RELOCS
  config PHYSICAL_ALIGN
  	hex "Alignment value to which kernel should be aligned" if X86_32
  	default "0x1000000"
@@ -8937,7 +8978,7 @@ index fb2e69d..9cd4eea 100644
  	range 0x2000 0x1000000
  	---help---
  	  This value puts the alignment restrictions on physical address
-@@ -1647,9 +1651,10 @@ config HOTPLUG_CPU
+@@ -1647,9 +1652,10 @@ config HOTPLUG_CPU
  	  Say N if you want to disable CPU hotplug.
  
  config COMPAT_VDSO
@@ -9766,10 +9807,21 @@ index fd84387..887aa7e 100644
  		(unsigned long)create_aout_tables((char __user *)bprm->p, bprm);
  	/* start thread */
 diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
-index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
+index 6557769..dfa8ead 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_sigaltstack(const stack_ia32_t __user *uss_ptr,
+@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
+ 			switch (from->si_code >> 16) {
+ 			case __SI_FAULT >> 16:
+ 				break;
++			case __SI_SYS >> 16:
++				put_user_ex(from->si_syscall, &to->si_syscall);
++				put_user_ex(from->si_arch, &to->si_arch);
++				break;
+ 			case __SI_CHLD >> 16:
+ 				put_user_ex(from->si_utime, &to->si_utime);
+ 				put_user_ex(from->si_stime, &to->si_stime);
+@@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_sigaltstack(const stack_ia32_t __user *uss_ptr,
  	}
  	seg = get_fs();
  	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
@@ -9778,7 +9830,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  	set_fs(seg);
  	if (ret >= 0 && uoss_ptr)  {
  		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uoss_ptr, sizeof(stack_ia32_t)))
-@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int ia32_setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext_ia32 __user *sc,
+@@ -370,7 +374,7 @@ static int ia32_setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext_ia32 __user *sc,
   */
  static void __user *get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs,
  				 size_t frame_size,
@@ -9787,7 +9839,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  {
  	unsigned long sp;
  
-@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs,
+@@ -391,7 +395,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs,
  
  	if (used_math()) {
  		sp = sp - sig_xstate_ia32_size;
@@ -9796,7 +9848,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  		if (save_i387_xstate_ia32(*fpstate) < 0)
  			return (void __user *) -1L;
  	}
-@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs,
+@@ -399,7 +403,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs,
  	sp -= frame_size;
  	/* Align the stack pointer according to the i386 ABI,
  	 * i.e. so that on function entry ((sp + 4) & 15) == 0. */
@@ -9805,7 +9857,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  	return (void __user *) sp;
  }
  
-@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
+@@ -457,7 +461,7 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
  		 * These are actually not used anymore, but left because some
  		 * gdb versions depend on them as a marker.
  		 */
@@ -9814,7 +9866,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  	} put_user_catch(err);
  
  	if (err)
-@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
+@@ -499,7 +503,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
  		0xb8,
  		__NR_ia32_rt_sigreturn,
  		0x80cd,
@@ -9823,7 +9875,7 @@ index 6557769..ef6ae89 100644
  	};
  
  	frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fpstate);
-@@ -529,16 +529,18 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
+@@ -529,16 +533,18 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
  
  		if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
  			restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
@@ -11945,6 +11997,23 @@ index a203659..9889f1c 100644
  
  extern struct legacy_pic *legacy_pic;
  extern struct legacy_pic null_legacy_pic;
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ia32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ia32.h
+index 1f7e625..541485f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ia32.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ia32.h
+@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ typedef struct compat_siginfo {
+ 			int _band;	/* POLL_IN, POLL_OUT, POLL_MSG */
+ 			int _fd;
+ 		} _sigpoll;
++
++		struct {
++			unsigned int _call_addr; /* calling insn */
++			int _syscall;	/* triggering system call number */
++			unsigned int _arch;	/* AUDIT_ARCH_* of syscall */
++		} _sigsys;
+ 	} _sifields;
+ } compat_siginfo_t;
+ 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
 index d8e8eef..1765f78 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -13832,6 +13901,54 @@ index cb23852..2dde194 100644
  asmlinkage long sys32_sysfs(int, u32, u32);
  
  asmlinkage long sys32_sched_rr_get_interval(compat_pid_t,
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+index c4a348f..e2ad7ea 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #ifndef _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
+ #define _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
+ 
++#include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ 
+@@ -86,6 +87,12 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
+ 	memcpy(&regs->bx + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
+ }
+ 
++static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
++				   struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++	return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
++}
++
+ #else	 /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+ 
+ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
+@@ -210,6 +217,22 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
+ 		}
+ }
+ 
++static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
++				   struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
++	/*
++	 * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then
++	 * remains set until we return to user mode.
++	 *
++	 * TIF_IA32 tasks should always have TS_COMPAT set at
++	 * system call time.
++	 */
++	if (task_thread_info(task)->status & TS_COMPAT)
++		return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
++#endif
++	return AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
++}
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+ 
+ #endif	/* _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H */
 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h
 index d75adff..c0cc78b 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h
@@ -20676,7 +20793,7 @@ index 6a364a6..b147d11 100644
  		ip = *(u64 *)(fp+8);
  		if (!in_sched_functions(ip))
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
-index 2dc4121..869e219 100644
+index 2dc4121..60e1086 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
 @@ -181,14 +181,13 @@ unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -20792,7 +20909,28 @@ index 2dc4121..869e219 100644
  	/*
  	 * If we stepped into a sysenter/syscall insn, it trapped in
  	 * kernel mode; do_debug() cleared TF and set TIF_SINGLESTEP.
-@@ -1443,6 +1451,11 @@ void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -1409,7 +1417,11 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ 		regs->flags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+ 
+ 	/* do the secure computing check first */
+-	secure_computing(regs->orig_ax);
++	if (secure_computing(regs->orig_ax)) {
++		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
++		ret = -1L;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)))
+ 		ret = -1L;
+@@ -1436,6 +1448,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 
++out:
+ 	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1443,6 +1456,11 @@ void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
  {
  	bool step;
  
@@ -42476,7 +42614,7 @@ index 2836538..30edf9d 100644
  	ret = sysfs_create_bin_file(&pdev->dev.kobj, &m48t59_nvram_attr);
  	if (ret) {
 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
-index 705e13e..91c873c 100644
+index 705e13e..46f4afb 100644
 --- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
 +++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
 @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static DECLARE_PCI_DEVICE_TABLE(aac_pci_tbl) = {
@@ -42488,6 +42626,15 @@ index 705e13e..91c873c 100644
  #endif
  	{ 0x1028, 0x0001, 0x1028, 0x0001, 0, 0, 0 }, /* PERC 2/Si (Iguana/PERC2Si) */
  	{ 0x1028, 0x0002, 0x1028, 0x0002, 0, 0, 1 }, /* PERC 3/Di (Opal/PERC3Di) */
+@@ -771,6 +771,8 @@ static long aac_compat_do_ioctl(struct aac_dev *dev, unsigned cmd, unsigned long
+ static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
+ {
+ 	struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
++	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		return -EPERM;
+ 	return aac_compat_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, (unsigned long)arg);
+ }
+ 
 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aic94xx/aic94xx_init.c b/drivers/scsi/aic94xx/aic94xx_init.c
 index d5ff142..49c0ebb 100644
 --- a/drivers/scsi/aic94xx/aic94xx_init.c
@@ -43447,6 +43594,18 @@ index b2ccdea..84cde75 100644
  
  static u8	*buf;
  
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
+index 2fa658e..391b768 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c
+@@ -1932,6 +1932,7 @@ cntrlEnd:
+ 
+ 		BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Called IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO\n");
+ 
++		memset(&DevInfo, 0, sizeof(DevInfo));
+ 		DevInfo.MaxRDMBufferSize = BUFFER_4K;
+ 		DevInfo.u32DSDStartOffset = EEPROM_CALPARAM_START;
+ 		DevInfo.u32RxAlignmentCorrection = 0;
 diff --git a/drivers/staging/gma500/power.c b/drivers/staging/gma500/power.c
 index 436fe97..4082570 100644
 --- a/drivers/staging/gma500/power.c
@@ -43809,6 +43968,59 @@ index df8ea25..47dd9c6 100644
  	pDevice->apdev->netdev_ops = &apdev_netdev_ops;
  
  	pDevice->apdev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211;
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c b/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
+index 260d4f0..ed836c2 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c
+@@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ int wvlan_uil_put_info( struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp )
+ 	ltv_t                   *pLtv;
+ 	bool_t                  ltvAllocated = FALSE;
+ 	ENCSTRCT                sEncryption;
++	size_t			len;
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_WDS
+ 	hcf_16                  hcfPort  = HCF_PORT_0;
+@@ -685,9 +686,10 @@ int wvlan_uil_put_info( struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp )
+ 					pLtv->u.u16[0]          = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE( pLtv->u.u16[0] );
+ 					break;
+ 				case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
+-					memset( lp->StationName, 0, sizeof( lp->StationName ));
+-					memcpy( (void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
+-					pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE( pLtv->u.u16[0] );
++					memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
++					len = min_t(size_t, pLtv->u.u16[0], sizeof(lp->StationName));
++					strlcpy(lp->StationName, &pLtv->u.u8[2], len);
++					pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
+ 					break;
+ 				case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
+ 					lp->loadBalancing       = pLtv->u.u16[0];
+@@ -1798,9 +1800,10 @@ int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
+ 		      union iwreq_data *wrqu,
+ 		      char *extra)
+ {
+-        struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
+-        unsigned long flags;
+-        int         ret = 0;
++	struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
++	unsigned long flags;
++	size_t len;
++	int         ret = 0;
+ 	/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1809,9 +1812,9 @@ int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
+ 
+         wl_lock(lp, &flags);
+ 
+-        memset( lp->StationName, 0, sizeof( lp->StationName ));
+-
+-        memcpy( lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
++	memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
++	len = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));
++	strlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);
+ 
+         /* Commit the adapter parameters */
+         wl_apply( lp );
 diff --git a/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.c b/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.c
 index 1ca66ea..76f1343 100644
 --- a/drivers/staging/zcache/tmem.c
@@ -51373,7 +51585,7 @@ index 451b9b8..12e5a03 100644
  
  out_free_fd:
 diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
+index a2d0e51..0d1143c 100644
 --- a/fs/exec.c
 +++ b/fs/exec.c
 @@ -55,12 +55,35 @@
@@ -51760,7 +51972,21 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  
  	/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
  	 * depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
-@@ -1268,7 +1347,7 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+@@ -1259,6 +1338,13 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 			bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to
++	 * mess up.
++	 */
++	if (current->no_new_privs)
++		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
++
+ 	n_fs = 1;
+ 	spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
+ 	rcu_read_lock();
+@@ -1268,7 +1354,7 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  	}
  	rcu_read_unlock();
  
@@ -51769,7 +51995,17 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
  	} else {
  		res = -EAGAIN;
-@@ -1463,6 +1542,31 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -1302,7 +1388,8 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
+ 	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
+ 
+-	if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
++	if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
++	    !current->no_new_privs) {
+ 		/* Set-uid? */
+ 		if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+ 			bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+@@ -1463,6 +1550,31 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
  
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
  
@@ -51801,7 +52037,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  /*
   * sys_execve() executes a new program.
   */
-@@ -1471,6 +1575,11 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
+@@ -1471,6 +1583,11 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
  				struct user_arg_ptr envp,
  				struct pt_regs *regs)
  {
@@ -51813,7 +52049,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
  	struct file *file;
  	struct files_struct *displaced;
-@@ -1478,6 +1587,8 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
+@@ -1478,6 +1595,8 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
  	int retval;
  	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
  
@@ -51822,7 +52058,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	/*
  	 * We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from
  	 * set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs
-@@ -1518,12 +1629,22 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
+@@ -1518,12 +1637,22 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
  	if (IS_ERR(file))
  		goto out_unmark;
  
@@ -51845,7 +52081,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
  	if (retval)
  		goto out_file;
-@@ -1540,24 +1661,70 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
+@@ -1540,24 +1669,70 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
  	if (retval < 0)
  		goto out;
  
@@ -51920,7 +52156,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
  	current->in_execve = 0;
  	acct_update_integrals(current);
-@@ -1566,6 +1733,14 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
+@@ -1566,6 +1741,14 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
  		put_files_struct(displaced);
  	return retval;
  
@@ -51935,7 +52171,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  out:
  	if (bprm->mm) {
  		acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
-@@ -1639,7 +1814,7 @@ static int expand_corename(struct core_name *cn)
+@@ -1639,7 +1822,7 @@ static int expand_corename(struct core_name *cn)
  {
  	char *old_corename = cn->corename;
  
@@ -51944,7 +52180,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	cn->corename = krealloc(old_corename, cn->size, GFP_KERNEL);
  
  	if (!cn->corename) {
-@@ -1736,7 +1911,7 @@ static int format_corename(struct core_name *cn, long signr)
+@@ -1736,7 +1919,7 @@ static int format_corename(struct core_name *cn, long signr)
  	int pid_in_pattern = 0;
  	int err = 0;
  
@@ -51953,7 +52189,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	cn->corename = kmalloc(cn->size, GFP_KERNEL);
  	cn->used = 0;
  
-@@ -1833,6 +2008,284 @@ out:
+@@ -1833,6 +2016,284 @@ out:
  	return ispipe;
  }
  
@@ -52238,7 +52474,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  static int zap_process(struct task_struct *start, int exit_code)
  {
  	struct task_struct *t;
-@@ -2006,17 +2459,17 @@ static void coredump_finish(struct mm_struct *mm)
+@@ -2006,17 +2467,17 @@ static void coredump_finish(struct mm_struct *mm)
  void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
  {
  	switch (value) {
@@ -52259,7 +52495,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  		set_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
  		smp_wmb();
  		set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
-@@ -2029,7 +2482,7 @@ static int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags)
+@@ -2029,7 +2490,7 @@ static int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags)
  	int ret;
  
  	ret = mm_flags & MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK;
@@ -52268,7 +52504,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  }
  
  int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm)
-@@ -2044,17 +2497,17 @@ static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct file *file)
+@@ -2044,17 +2505,17 @@ static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct file *file)
  	pipe = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_pipe;
  
  	pipe_lock(pipe);
@@ -52291,7 +52527,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	pipe_unlock(pipe);
  
  }
-@@ -2115,7 +2568,8 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -2115,7 +2576,8 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
  	int retval = 0;
  	int flag = 0;
  	int ispipe;
@@ -52301,7 +52537,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	struct coredump_params cprm = {
  		.signr = signr,
  		.regs = regs,
-@@ -2130,6 +2584,9 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -2130,6 +2592,9 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
  
  	audit_core_dumps(signr);
  
@@ -52311,7 +52547,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	binfmt = mm->binfmt;
  	if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
  		goto fail;
-@@ -2140,14 +2597,16 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -2140,14 +2605,16 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
  	if (!cred)
  		goto fail;
  	/*
@@ -52332,7 +52568,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  	}
  
  	retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state);
-@@ -2197,7 +2656,7 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -2197,7 +2664,7 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
  		}
  		cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
  
@@ -52341,7 +52577,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  		if (core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) {
  			printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) over core_pipe_limit\n",
  			       task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
-@@ -2224,9 +2683,19 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
+@@ -2224,9 +2691,19 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
  	} else {
  		struct inode *inode;
  
@@ -52361,7 +52597,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  		cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename,
  				 O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | flag,
  				 0600);
-@@ -2267,7 +2736,7 @@ close_fail:
+@@ -2267,7 +2744,7 @@ close_fail:
  		filp_close(cprm.file, NULL);
  fail_dropcount:
  	if (ispipe)
@@ -52370,7 +52606,7 @@ index a2d0e51..d46efb6 100644
  fail_unlock:
  	kfree(cn.corename);
  fail_corename:
-@@ -2286,7 +2755,7 @@ fail:
+@@ -2286,7 +2763,7 @@ fail:
   */
  int dump_write(struct file *file, const void *addr, int nr)
  {
@@ -70045,6 +70281,93 @@ index bc00876..9aa9b1f 100644
  #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
  
  #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+diff --git a/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+index 0dd4e87..af5d035 100644
+--- a/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
++++ b/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+@@ -90,9 +90,18 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
+ 			__ARCH_SI_BAND_T _band;	/* POLL_IN, POLL_OUT, POLL_MSG */
+ 			int _fd;
+ 		} _sigpoll;
++
++		/* SIGSYS */
++		struct {
++			void __user *_call_addr; /* calling user insn */
++			int _syscall;	/* triggering system call number */
++			unsigned int _arch;	/* AUDIT_ARCH_* of syscall */
++		} _sigsys;
+ 	} _sifields;
+ } siginfo_t;
+ 
++/* If the arch shares siginfo, then it has SIGSYS. */
++#define __ARCH_SIGSYS
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -116,6 +125,11 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
+ #define si_addr_lsb	_sifields._sigfault._addr_lsb
+ #define si_band		_sifields._sigpoll._band
+ #define si_fd		_sifields._sigpoll._fd
++#ifdef __ARCH_SIGSYS
++#define si_call_addr	_sifields._sigsys._call_addr
++#define si_syscall	_sifields._sigsys._syscall
++#define si_arch		_sifields._sigsys._arch
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ #define __SI_MASK	0xffff0000u
+@@ -126,6 +140,7 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
+ #define __SI_CHLD	(4 << 16)
+ #define __SI_RT		(5 << 16)
+ #define __SI_MESGQ	(6 << 16)
++#define __SI_SYS	(7 << 16)
+ #define __SI_CODE(T,N)	((T) | ((N) & 0xffff))
+ #else
+ #define __SI_KILL	0
+@@ -135,6 +150,7 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
+ #define __SI_CHLD	0
+ #define __SI_RT		0
+ #define __SI_MESGQ	0
++#define __SI_SYS	0
+ #define __SI_CODE(T,N)	(N)
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -232,6 +248,12 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
+ #define NSIGPOLL	6
+ 
+ /*
++ * SIGSYS si_codes
++ */
++#define SYS_SECCOMP		(__SI_SYS|1)	/* seccomp triggered */
++#define NSIGSYS	1
++
++/*
+  * sigevent definitions
+  * 
+  * It seems likely that SIGEV_THREAD will have to be handled from 
+diff --git a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
+index 5c122ae..a2c13dc 100644
+--- a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
++++ b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
+@@ -142,4 +142,18 @@ void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ 			   unsigned int i, unsigned int n,
+ 			   const unsigned long *args);
+ 
++/**
++ * syscall_get_arch - return the AUDIT_ARCH for the current system call
++ * @task:	task of interest, must be in system call entry tracing
++ * @regs:	task_pt_regs() of @task
++ *
++ * Returns the AUDIT_ARCH_* based on the system call convention in use.
++ *
++ * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped on entry to a system
++ * call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE, %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT, or %TIF_SECCOMP.
++ *
++ * Note, at present this function is only required with
++ * CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.
++ */
++int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs);
+ #endif	/* _ASM_SYSCALL_H */
 diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
 index b5e2e4c..6a5373e 100644
 --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -70207,6 +70530,18 @@ index 26c1f78..6722682 100644
  
  /**
   * struct ttm_mem_global - Global memory accounting structure.
+diff --git a/include/linux/Kbuild b/include/linux/Kbuild
+index a3ce901..fd50c75 100644
+--- a/include/linux/Kbuild
++++ b/include/linux/Kbuild
+@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ header-y += scc.h
+ header-y += sched.h
+ header-y += screen_info.h
+ header-y += sdla.h
++header-y += seccomp.h
+ header-y += securebits.h
+ header-y += selinux_netlink.h
+ header-y += sem.h
 diff --git a/include/linux/a.out.h b/include/linux/a.out.h
 index e86dfca..40cc55f 100644
 --- a/include/linux/a.out.h
@@ -70248,6 +70583,40 @@ index 49a83ca..d0a847e 100644
  
  struct atmphy_ops {
  	int (*start)(struct atm_dev *dev);
+diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
+index 2f81c6f..225b4e4 100644
+--- a/include/linux/audit.h
++++ b/include/linux/audit.h
+@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
+ extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry);
+ extern void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
+ 				const struct inode *parent);
++extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);
+ extern void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t);
+ 
+ static inline int audit_dummy_context(void)
+@@ -453,6 +454,12 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
+ }
+ void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
+ 
++static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
++		__audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
++}
++
+ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+@@ -558,6 +565,8 @@ extern int audit_signals;
+ #define audit_inode(n,d) do { (void)(d); } while (0)
+ #define audit_inode_child(i,p) do { ; } while (0)
+ #define audit_core_dumps(i) do { ; } while (0)
++#define audit_seccomp(i,s,c) do { ; } while (0)
++#define __audit_seccomp(i,s,c) do { ; } while (0)
+ #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) (0)
+ #define audit_get_loginuid(t) (-1)
+ #define audit_get_sessionid(t) (-1)
 diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
 index acd8d4b..f2defe2 100644
 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -71053,18 +71422,38 @@ index 82163c4..c4b3b50 100644
  extern struct kmem_cache *files_cachep;
  
 diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
-index 8eeb205..d59bfa2 100644
+index 8eeb205..13d571c 100644
 --- a/include/linux/filter.h
 +++ b/include/linux/filter.h
-@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct sock_fprog {	/* Required for SO_ATTACH_FILTER. */
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ #include <linux/atomic.h>
++#include <linux/compat.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -132,8 +133,19 @@ struct sock_fprog {	/* Required for SO_ATTACH_FILTER. */
+ 
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++/*
++ * A struct sock_filter is architecture independent.
++ */
++struct compat_sock_fprog {
++	u16		len;
++	compat_uptr_t	filter;		/* struct sock_filter * */
++};
++#endif
++
  struct sk_buff;
  struct sock;
 +struct bpf_jit_work;
  
  struct sk_filter
  {
-@@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ struct sk_filter
+@@ -141,6 +153,9 @@ struct sk_filter
  	unsigned int         	len;	/* Number of filter blocks */
  	unsigned int		(*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb,
  					    const struct sock_filter *filter);
@@ -71074,6 +71463,14 @@ index 8eeb205..d59bfa2 100644
  	struct rcu_head		rcu;
  	struct sock_filter     	insns[0];
  };
+@@ -228,6 +243,7 @@ enum {
+ 	BPF_S_ANC_HATYPE,
+ 	BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH,
+ 	BPF_S_ANC_CPU,
++	BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W,
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
 index a276817..ba31358 100644
 --- a/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -73967,6 +74364,30 @@ index b8d4ddd..bb59d8b 100644
  
  /*
   * The return value from decompress routine is the length of the
+diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
+index a3baeb2..b527252 100644
+--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
++++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
+@@ -102,4 +102,19 @@
+ 
+ #define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
+ 
++/*
++ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
++ * execve) will either fail or not grant them.  This affects suid/sgid,
++ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
++ *
++ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
++ * capset, etc.) will still work.  Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
++ *
++ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
++ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
++ * in execve returning -EPERM.
++ */
++#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
++#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
 diff --git a/include/linux/printk.h b/include/linux/printk.h
 index f0e22f7..82dd544 100644
 --- a/include/linux/printk.h
@@ -74022,10 +74443,40 @@ index 643b96c..9544c71 100644
  extern const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations;
  extern const struct proc_ns_operations ipcns_operations;
 diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
-index 800f113..12c82ec 100644
+index 800f113..13b3715 100644
 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
 +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
-@@ -129,10 +129,12 @@ extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
+@@ -62,8 +62,9 @@
+ #define PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC	0x00000010
+ #define PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE	0x00000020
+ #define PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT	0x00000040
++#define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP	0x00000080
+ 
+-#define PTRACE_O_MASK		0x0000007f
++#define PTRACE_O_MASK		0x000000ff
+ 
+ /* Wait extended result codes for the above trace options.  */
+ #define PTRACE_EVENT_FORK	1
+@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@
+ #define PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE	5
+ #define PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT	6
+ #define PTRACE_EVENT_STOP	7
++#define PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP	8
+ 
+ #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+ 
+@@ -101,8 +103,9 @@
+ #define PT_TRACE_EXEC		PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC)
+ #define PT_TRACE_VFORK_DONE	PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE)
+ #define PT_TRACE_EXIT		PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT)
++#define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP	PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
+ 
+-#define PT_TRACE_MASK	0x000003f4
++#define PT_TRACE_MASK	0x00000bf4
+ 
+ /* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */
+ #define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT	31
+@@ -129,10 +132,12 @@ extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
  extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer);
  #define PTRACE_MODE_READ   1
  #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
@@ -74040,7 +74491,7 @@ index 800f113..12c82ec 100644
  
  static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
  {
-@@ -197,9 +199,10 @@ static inline void ptrace_event(int event, unsigned long message)
+@@ -197,9 +202,10 @@ static inline void ptrace_event(int event, unsigned long message)
  	if (unlikely(ptrace_event_enabled(current, event))) {
  		current->ptrace_message = message;
  		ptrace_notify((event << 8) | SIGTRAP);
@@ -74267,7 +74718,7 @@ index 2148b12..519b820 100644
  
  static inline void anon_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
-index 8204898..76f518d 100644
+index 8204898..070429f 100644
 --- a/include/linux/sched.h
 +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
 @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ struct bio_list;
@@ -74365,7 +74816,16 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  
  struct load_weight {
  	unsigned long weight, inv_weight;
-@@ -1341,8 +1379,8 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1301,6 +1339,8 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 				 * execve */
+ 	unsigned in_iowait:1;
+ 
++	/* task may not gain privileges */
++	unsigned no_new_privs:1;
+ 
+ 	/* Revert to default priority/policy when forking */
+ 	unsigned sched_reset_on_fork:1;
+@@ -1341,8 +1381,8 @@ struct task_struct {
  	struct list_head thread_group;
  
  	struct completion *vfork_done;		/* for vfork() */
@@ -74376,7 +74836,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  
  	cputime_t utime, stime, utimescaled, stimescaled;
  	cputime_t gtime;
-@@ -1358,13 +1396,6 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1358,13 +1398,6 @@ struct task_struct {
  	struct task_cputime cputime_expires;
  	struct list_head cpu_timers[3];
  
@@ -74390,7 +74850,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  	char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
  				     - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock
  				       it with task_lock())
-@@ -1381,8 +1412,16 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1381,8 +1414,16 @@ struct task_struct {
  #endif
  /* CPU-specific state of this task */
  	struct thread_struct thread;
@@ -74407,7 +74867,16 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  /* open file information */
  	struct files_struct *files;
  /* namespaces */
-@@ -1429,6 +1468,11 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1405,7 +1446,7 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 	uid_t loginuid;
+ 	unsigned int sessionid;
+ #endif
+-	seccomp_t seccomp;
++	struct seccomp seccomp;
+ 
+ /* Thread group tracking */
+    	u32 parent_exec_id;
+@@ -1429,6 +1470,11 @@ struct task_struct {
  	struct rt_mutex_waiter *pi_blocked_on;
  #endif
  
@@ -74419,7 +74888,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
  	/* mutex deadlock detection */
  	struct mutex_waiter *blocked_on;
-@@ -1544,6 +1588,28 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1544,6 +1590,28 @@ struct task_struct {
  	unsigned long default_timer_slack_ns;
  
  	struct list_head	*scm_work_list;
@@ -74448,7 +74917,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
  	/* Index of current stored address in ret_stack */
  	int curr_ret_stack;
-@@ -1578,6 +1644,52 @@ struct task_struct {
+@@ -1578,6 +1646,52 @@ struct task_struct {
  #endif
  };
  
@@ -74501,7 +74970,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  /* Future-safe accessor for struct task_struct's cpus_allowed. */
  #define tsk_cpus_allowed(tsk) (&(tsk)->cpus_allowed)
  
-@@ -2093,7 +2205,9 @@ void yield(void);
+@@ -2093,7 +2207,9 @@ void yield(void);
  extern struct exec_domain	default_exec_domain;
  
  union thread_union {
@@ -74511,7 +74980,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  	unsigned long stack[THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(long)];
  };
  
-@@ -2126,6 +2240,7 @@ extern struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns;
+@@ -2126,6 +2242,7 @@ extern struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns;
   */
  
  extern struct task_struct *find_task_by_vpid(pid_t nr);
@@ -74519,7 +74988,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  extern struct task_struct *find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t nr,
  		struct pid_namespace *ns);
  
-@@ -2247,6 +2362,12 @@ static inline void mmdrop(struct mm_struct * mm)
+@@ -2247,6 +2364,12 @@ static inline void mmdrop(struct mm_struct * mm)
  extern void mmput(struct mm_struct *);
  /* Grab a reference to a task's mm, if it is not already going away */
  extern struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task);
@@ -74532,7 +75001,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  /* Remove the current tasks stale references to the old mm_struct */
  extern void mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
  /* Allocate a new mm structure and copy contents from tsk->mm */
-@@ -2263,7 +2384,7 @@ extern void __cleanup_sighand(struct sighand_struct *);
+@@ -2263,7 +2386,7 @@ extern void __cleanup_sighand(struct sighand_struct *);
  extern void exit_itimers(struct signal_struct *);
  extern void flush_itimer_signals(void);
  
@@ -74541,7 +75010,7 @@ index 8204898..76f518d 100644
  
  extern void daemonize(const char *, ...);
  extern int allow_signal(int);
-@@ -2428,9 +2549,9 @@ static inline unsigned long *end_of_stack(struct task_struct *p)
+@@ -2428,9 +2551,9 @@ static inline unsigned long *end_of_stack(struct task_struct *p)
  
  #endif
  
@@ -74567,8 +75036,154 @@ index 899fbb4..1cb4138 100644
  } __attribute__((packed));
  
  #define VIDEO_TYPE_MDA		0x10	/* Monochrome Text Display	*/
+diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
+index cc7a4e9..306733e 100644
+--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
++++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
+@@ -1,25 +1,89 @@
+ #ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+ #define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+ 
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
+ 
++
++/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */
++#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
++#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
++#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
++
++/*
++ * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
++ * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
++ * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
++ *
++ * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
++ * selects the least permissive choice.
++ */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
++
++/* Masks for the return value sections. */
++#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION	0xffff0000U
++#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA	0x0000ffffU
++
++/**
++ * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over.
++ * @nr: the system call number
++ * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value
++ *        as defined in <linux/audit.h>.
++ * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
++ * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
++ *        regardless of the architecture.
++ */
++struct seccomp_data {
++	int nr;
++	__u32 arch;
++	__u64 instruction_pointer;
++	__u64 args[6];
++};
++
++#ifdef __KERNEL__
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+ 
+ #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+ #include <asm/seccomp.h>
+ 
+-typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
++struct seccomp_filter;
++/**
++ * struct seccomp - the state of a seccomp'ed process
++ *
++ * @mode:  indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
++ *         system calls available to a process.
++ * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
++ *          are allowed for a task.
++ *
++ *          @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
++ *          is no locking.
++ */
++struct seccomp {
++	int mode;
++	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
++};
+ 
+-extern void __secure_computing(int);
+-static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
++/*
++ * Direct callers to __secure_computing should be updated as
++ * CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER propagates.
++ */
++extern void __secure_computing(int) __deprecated;
++extern int __secure_computing_int(int);
++static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+ {
+ 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
+-		__secure_computing(this_syscall);
++		return  __secure_computing_int(this_syscall);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
+-extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long);
++extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
+ 
+-static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
++static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
+ {
+ 	return s->mode;
+ }
+@@ -28,25 +92,40 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
+ 
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ 
+-typedef struct { } seccomp_t;
++struct seccomp { };
++struct seccomp_filter { };
+ 
+-#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
++#define secure_computing(x) 0
+ 
+ static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
+ {
+ 	return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2)
++static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2, char __user *arg3)
+ {
+ 	return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
++static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
+ {
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
++extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off);
++#else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
++static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return;
++}
++static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
++#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
 diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index e8c619d..ff41b06 100644
+index e8c619d..99d0f1f 100644
 --- a/include/linux/security.h
 +++ b/include/linux/security.h
 @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
@@ -74588,7 +75203,15 @@ index e8c619d..ff41b06 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
  extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
  extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;
-@@ -1676,6 +1675,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+@@ -130,6 +129,7 @@ struct request_sock;
+ #define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE	1
+ #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE	2
+ #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP	4
++#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS	8
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+ /*
+@@ -1676,6 +1676,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
  int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
  			int cap);
@@ -74597,7 +75220,7 @@ index e8c619d..ff41b06 100644
  int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
  			int cap);
  int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-@@ -1880,6 +1881,12 @@ static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
+@@ -1880,6 +1882,12 @@ static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
  	return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
  }
  
@@ -77495,10 +78118,18 @@ index d4bc594..efa193f 100644
  	return;
  }
 diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
-index 47b7fc1..c003c33 100644
+index 47b7fc1..9af0605 100644
 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
 +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
-@@ -1166,8 +1166,8 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/capability.h>
+ #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
++#include <linux/compat.h>
+ 
+ #include "audit.h"
+ 
+@@ -1166,8 +1167,8 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
  				  struct audit_buffer **ab,
  				  struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
  {
@@ -77509,7 +78140,7 @@ index 47b7fc1..c003c33 100644
  	const char __user *p;
  	char *buf;
  
-@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+@@ -2118,7 +2119,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  }
  
  /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
@@ -77518,7 +78149,7 @@ index 47b7fc1..c003c33 100644
  
  /**
   * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
-@@ -2131,7 +2131,7 @@ static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+@@ -2131,7 +2132,7 @@ static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
   */
  int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
  {
@@ -77527,6 +78158,97 @@ index 47b7fc1..c003c33 100644
  	struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
  
  	if (context && context->in_syscall) {
+@@ -2499,46 +2500,59 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
+ 	context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
+- * @signr: signal value
+- *
+- * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
+- * should record the event for investigation.
+- */
+-void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
++static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
+ {
+-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+-	u32 sid;
+-	uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
++	uid_t auid, uid;
+ 	gid_t gid;
+-	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
++	unsigned int sessionid;
+ 
+-	if (!audit_enabled)
+-		return;
+-
+-	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
+-		return;
+-
+-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
++	auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
++	sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ 	current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
++
+ 	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+ 			 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
+-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+-	if (sid) {
+-		char *ctx = NULL;
+-		u32 len;
+-
+-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
+-			audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+-		else {
+-			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+-		}
+-	}
++	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ 	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+ 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
++	audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
++	audit_log_string(ab, reason);
+ 	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
++}
++/**
++ * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
++ * @signr: signal value
++ *
++ * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
++ * should record the event for investigation.
++ */
++void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
++{
++	struct audit_buffer *ab;
++
++	if (!audit_enabled)
++		return;
++
++	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
++		return;
++
++	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
++	audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
++	audit_log_end(ab);
++}
++
++void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
++{
++	struct audit_buffer *ab;
++
++	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
++	audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
++	audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++	audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
++#endif
++	audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
++	audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
+ 	audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+ 
 diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
 index b463871..59495fd 100644
 --- a/kernel/capability.c
@@ -78224,10 +78946,26 @@ index 234e152..0ae0243 100644
  {
  	struct signal_struct *sig = current->signal;
 diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
-index ce0c182..360568a 100644
+index ce0c182..c6ec99a 100644
 --- a/kernel/fork.c
 +++ b/kernel/fork.c
-@@ -270,19 +270,24 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <linux/cgroup.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
++#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ #include <linux/swap.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+@@ -168,6 +169,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+ 	free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
+ 	rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
+ 	ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
++	put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
+ 	free_task_struct(tsk);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
+@@ -270,19 +272,24 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
  	}
  
  	err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
@@ -78256,7 +78994,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  #endif
  
  	/*
-@@ -306,13 +311,78 @@ out:
+@@ -306,13 +313,78 @@ out:
  }
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
@@ -78339,7 +79077,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  
  	down_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
  	flush_cache_dup_mm(oldmm);
-@@ -324,8 +394,8 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
+@@ -324,8 +396,8 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
  	mm->locked_vm = 0;
  	mm->mmap = NULL;
  	mm->mmap_cache = NULL;
@@ -78350,7 +79088,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	mm->map_count = 0;
  	cpumask_clear(mm_cpumask(mm));
  	mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
-@@ -341,63 +411,16 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
+@@ -341,63 +413,16 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
  
  	prev = NULL;
  	for (mpnt = oldmm->mmap; mpnt; mpnt = mpnt->vm_next) {
@@ -78419,7 +79157,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  
  		/*
  		 * Link in the new vma and copy the page table entries.
-@@ -420,6 +443,31 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
+@@ -420,6 +445,31 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
  		if (retval)
  			goto out;
  	}
@@ -78451,7 +79189,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	/* a new mm has just been created */
  	arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
  	retval = 0;
-@@ -428,14 +476,6 @@ out:
+@@ -428,14 +478,6 @@ out:
  	flush_tlb_mm(oldmm);
  	up_write(&oldmm->mmap_sem);
  	return retval;
@@ -78466,7 +79204,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  }
  
  static inline int mm_alloc_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
-@@ -647,6 +687,26 @@ struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task)
+@@ -647,6 +689,26 @@ struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task)
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_mm);
  
@@ -78493,7 +79231,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  /* Please note the differences between mmput and mm_release.
   * mmput is called whenever we stop holding onto a mm_struct,
   * error success whatever.
-@@ -832,13 +892,20 @@ static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+@@ -832,13 +894,20 @@ static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
  			spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
  			return -EAGAIN;
  		}
@@ -78515,7 +79253,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	return 0;
  }
  
-@@ -1047,7 +1114,7 @@ static void posix_cpu_timers_init(struct task_struct *tsk)
+@@ -1047,7 +1116,7 @@ static void posix_cpu_timers_init(struct task_struct *tsk)
   * parts of the process environment (as per the clone
   * flags). The actual kick-off is left to the caller.
   */
@@ -78524,7 +79262,15 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  					unsigned long stack_start,
  					struct pt_regs *regs,
  					unsigned long stack_size,
-@@ -1104,10 +1171,13 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
+@@ -1096,6 +1165,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ 		goto fork_out;
+ 
+ 	ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
++	get_seccomp_filter(p);
+ 
+ 	rt_mutex_init_task(p);
+ 
+@@ -1104,10 +1174,13 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  	DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
  #endif
  	retval = -EAGAIN;
@@ -78540,7 +79286,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  			goto bad_fork_free;
  	}
  	current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
-@@ -1341,6 +1411,11 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
+@@ -1341,6 +1414,11 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  		goto bad_fork_free_pid;
  	}
  
@@ -78552,7 +79298,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
  		current->signal->nr_threads++;
  		atomic_inc(&current->signal->live);
-@@ -1421,6 +1496,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
+@@ -1421,6 +1499,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
  bad_fork_free:
  	free_task(p);
  fork_out:
@@ -78561,7 +79307,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	return ERR_PTR(retval);
  }
  
-@@ -1507,6 +1584,7 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+@@ -1507,6 +1587,7 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
  
  	p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
  			 child_tidptr, NULL, trace);
@@ -78569,7 +79315,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	/*
  	 * Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
  	 * might get invalid after that point, if the thread exits quickly.
-@@ -1521,6 +1599,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+@@ -1521,6 +1602,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
  		if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
  			put_user(nr, parent_tidptr);
  
@@ -78578,7 +79324,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  		if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
  			p->vfork_done = &vfork;
  			init_completion(&vfork);
-@@ -1591,7 +1671,7 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
+@@ -1591,7 +1674,7 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
  	mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create("mm_struct",
  			sizeof(struct mm_struct), ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
  			SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
@@ -78587,7 +79333,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  	mmap_init();
  	nsproxy_cache_init();
  }
-@@ -1630,7 +1710,7 @@ static int unshare_fs(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct fs_struct **new_fsp)
+@@ -1630,7 +1713,7 @@ static int unshare_fs(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct fs_struct **new_fsp)
  		return 0;
  
  	/* don't need lock here; in the worst case we'll do useless copy */
@@ -78596,7 +79342,7 @@ index ce0c182..360568a 100644
  		return 0;
  
  	*new_fsp = copy_fs_struct(fs);
-@@ -1719,7 +1799,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
+@@ -1719,7 +1802,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
  			fs = current->fs;
  			spin_lock(&fs->lock);
  			current->fs = new_fs;
@@ -80543,7 +81289,7 @@ index 76b8e77..a2930e8 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
-index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
+index 67fedad..82362a6 100644
 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
 +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
 @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
@@ -80627,7 +81373,17 @@ index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
  			return -EFAULT;
  		copied += retval;
  		src += retval;
-@@ -719,7 +737,7 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
+@@ -582,6 +600,9 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
+ 	if (data & PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT)
+ 		child->ptrace |= PT_TRACE_EXIT;
+ 
++	if (data & PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP)
++		child->ptrace |= PT_TRACE_SECCOMP;
++
+ 	return (data & ~PTRACE_O_MASK) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -719,7 +740,7 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
  	bool seized = child->ptrace & PT_SEIZED;
  	int ret = -EIO;
  	siginfo_t siginfo, *si;
@@ -80636,7 +81392,7 @@ index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
  	unsigned long __user *datalp = datavp;
  	unsigned long flags;
  
-@@ -921,14 +939,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
+@@ -921,14 +942,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -80659,7 +81415,7 @@ index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
  		goto out_put_task_struct;
  	}
  
-@@ -956,7 +981,7 @@ int generic_ptrace_peekdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
+@@ -956,7 +984,7 @@ int generic_ptrace_peekdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
  	copied = access_process_vm(tsk, addr, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), 0);
  	if (copied != sizeof(tmp))
  		return -EIO;
@@ -80668,7 +81424,7 @@ index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
  }
  
  int generic_ptrace_pokedata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
-@@ -1050,7 +1075,7 @@ int compat_ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
+@@ -1050,7 +1078,7 @@ int compat_ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
  }
  
  asmlinkage long compat_sys_ptrace(compat_long_t request, compat_long_t pid,
@@ -80677,7 +81433,7 @@ index 67fedad..32d32a04 100644
  {
  	struct task_struct *child;
  	long ret;
-@@ -1066,14 +1091,21 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_ptrace(compat_long_t request, compat_long_t pid,
+@@ -1066,14 +1094,21 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_ptrace(compat_long_t request, compat_long_t pid,
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -81428,8 +82184,513 @@ index c261da7..4e5221ad 100644
  {
  	int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
  	struct rq *this_rq = cpu_rq(this_cpu);
+diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
+index 57d4b13..bc84054 100644
+--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
++++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
+@@ -3,15 +3,353 @@
+  *
+  * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
+  *
+- * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode.
++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
++ * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
++ *
++ * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
++ *
++ * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
++ * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
++ *        of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
+  */
+ 
+-#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+-#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/atomic.h>
++#include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
++#include <linux/filter.h>
++#include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/seccomp.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/uaccess.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
++#include <asm/syscall.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
+-#define NR_SECCOMP_MODES 1
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
++/**
++ * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
++ *
++ * @usage: reference count to manage the object liftime.
++ *         get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
++ *         outside of a lifetime-guarded section.  In general, this
++ *         is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
++ * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
++ * @len: the number of instructions in the program
++ * @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
++ *
++ * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
++ * pointer.  For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
++ * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
++ * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
++ * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory.  This is similar to
++ * how namespaces work.
++ *
++ * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
++ * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
++ */
++struct seccomp_filter {
++	atomic_t usage;
++	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
++	unsigned short len;  /* Instruction count */
++	struct sock_filter insns[];
++};
++
++/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
++#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
++
++/**
++ * get_u32 - returns a u32 offset into data
++ * @data: a unsigned 64 bit value
++ * @index: 0 or 1 to return the first or second 32-bits
++ *
++ * This inline exists to hide the length of unsigned long.
++ * If a 32-bit unsigned long is passed in, it will be extended
++ * and the top 32-bits will be 0. If it is a 64-bit unsigned
++ * long, then whatever data is resident will be properly returned.
++ */
++static inline u32 get_u32(u64 data, int index)
++{
++	return ((u32 *)&data)[index];
++}
++
++/* Helper for bpf_load below. */
++#define BPF_DATA(_name) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, _name)
++/**
++ * bpf_load: checks and returns a pointer to the requested offset
++ * @off: offset into struct seccomp_data to load from
++ *
++ * Returns the requested 32-bits of data.
++ * seccomp_chk_filter() should assure that @off is 32-bit aligned
++ * and not out of bounds.  Failure to do so is a BUG.
++ */
++u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off)
++{
++	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
++	if (off == BPF_DATA(nr))
++		return syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
++	if (off == BPF_DATA(arch))
++		return syscall_get_arch(current, regs);
++	if (off >= BPF_DATA(args[0]) && off < BPF_DATA(args[6])) {
++		unsigned long value;
++		int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(args[0])) / sizeof(u64);
++		int index = !!(off % sizeof(u64));
++		syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, arg, 1, &value);
++		return get_u32(value, index);
++	}
++	if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer))
++		return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 0);
++	if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer) + sizeof(u32))
++		return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 1);
++	/* seccomp_chk_filter should make this impossible. */
++	BUG();
++}
++
++/**
++ *	seccomp_chk_filter - verify seccomp filter code
++ *	@filter: filter to verify
++ *	@flen: length of filter
++ *
++ * Takes a previously checked filter (by sk_chk_filter) and
++ * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
++ * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load.  It also
++ * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
++ *
++ * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
++ */
++static int seccomp_chk_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
++{
++	int pc;
++	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
++		struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
++		u16 code = ftest->code;
++		u32 k = ftest->k;
++		switch (code) {
++		case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
++			ftest->code = BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W;
++			/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
++			if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
++				return -EINVAL;
++			continue;
++		case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
++			ftest->code = BPF_S_LD_IMM;
++			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
++			continue;
++		case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN:
++			ftest->code = BPF_S_LDX_IMM;
++			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
++			continue;
++		/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
++		case BPF_S_RET_K:
++		case BPF_S_RET_A:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
++		case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
++		case BPF_S_LDX_IMM:
++		case BPF_S_MISC_TAX:
++		case BPF_S_MISC_TXA:
++		case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K:
++		case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
++		case BPF_S_LDX_MEM:
++		case BPF_S_ST:
++		case BPF_S_STX:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
++		case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
++			continue;
++		default:
++			return -EINVAL;
++		}
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/**
++ * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
++ * @syscall: number of the current system call
++ *
++ * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
++ */
++static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
++{
++	struct seccomp_filter *f;
++	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
++
++	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
++	if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
++		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
++
++	/*
++	 * All filters are evaluated in order of youngest to oldest. The lowest
++	 * BPF return value (ignoring the DATA) always takes priority.
++	 */
++	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
++		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
++		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
++			ret = cur_ret;
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/**
++ * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
++ * @fprog: BPF program to install
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
++ */
++static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
++{
++	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
++	unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
++	unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len;
++	long ret;
++
++	if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
++		total_insns += filter->len + 4;  /* include a 4 instr penalty */
++	if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	/*
++	 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task have
++	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
++	 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
++	 * behavior of privileged children.
++	 */
++	if (!current->no_new_privs &&
++	    security_real_capable_noaudit(current, current_user_ns(),
++				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
++	filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + fp_size, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!filter)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++	atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
++	filter->len = fprog->len;
++
++	/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
++	ret = -EFAULT;
++	if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size))
++		goto fail;
++
++	/* Check and rewrite the fprog via the skb checker */
++	ret = sk_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
++	if (ret)
++		goto fail;
++
++	/* Check and rewrite the fprog for seccomp use */
++	ret = seccomp_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
++	if (ret)
++		goto fail;
++
++	/*
++	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
++	 * task reference.
++	 */
++	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
++	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
++	return 0;
++fail:
++	kfree(filter);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/**
++ * seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog
++ * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
++ */
++long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
++{
++	struct sock_fprog fprog;
++	long ret = -EFAULT;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++	if (is_compat_task()) {
++		struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
++		if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
++			goto out;
++		fprog.len = fprog32.len;
++		fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
++	} else /* falls through to the if below. */
++#endif
++	if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
++		goto out;
++	ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
++out:
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
++void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
++	if (!orig)
++		return;
++	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
++	atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
++}
++
++/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
++void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
++	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
++	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
++		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
++		orig = orig->prev;
++		kfree(freeme);
++	}
++}
++
++/**
++ * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
++ * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
++ * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
++ *
++ * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
++ */
++static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
++{
++	struct siginfo info;
++	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
++	info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
++	info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
++	info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
++	info.si_errno = reason;
++	info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(current, task_pt_regs(current));
++	info.si_syscall = syscall;
++	force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
++}
++#endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
+@@ -32,11 +370,21 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
+ 
+ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+ {
++	/* Filter calls should never use this function. */
++	BUG_ON(current->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
++	__secure_computing_int(this_syscall);
++}
++
++int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
++{
+ 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+-	int * syscall;
++	int exit_sig = 0;
++	int *syscall;
++	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
++	int data;
+ 
+ 	switch (mode) {
+-	case 1:
++	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+ 		syscall = mode1_syscalls;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ 		if (is_compat_task())
+@@ -44,9 +392,44 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+ #endif
+ 		do {
+ 			if (*syscall == this_syscall)
+-				return;
++				return 0;
+ 		} while (*++syscall);
++		exit_sig = SIGKILL;
+ 		break;
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
++	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
++		ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
++		data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
++		switch (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) {
++		case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
++			/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
++			syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
++						 -data, 0);
++			goto skip;
++		case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
++			/* Show the handler the original registers. */
++			syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
++			/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
++			seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
++			goto skip;
++		case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
++			/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
++			if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP))
++				goto skip;
++			/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
++			ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
++			if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
++				break;
++			return 0;
++		case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
++			return 0;
++		case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
++		default:
++			break;
++		}
++		exit_sig = SIGSYS;
++		break;
++#endif
+ 	default:
+ 		BUG();
+ 	}
+@@ -54,7 +437,11 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+ #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
+ 	dump_stack();
+ #endif
+-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
++	__audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
++	do_exit(exit_sig);
++skip:
++	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
++	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
+@@ -62,25 +449,48 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
+ 	return current->seccomp.mode;
+ }
+ 
+-long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
++/**
++ * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
++ * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
++ * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
++ *
++ * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
++ * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters.  Every filter
++ * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
++ * call the task makes.
++ *
++ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
++ */
++long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+ {
+-	long ret;
++	long ret = -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	/* can set it only once to be even more secure */
+-	ret = -EPERM;
+-	if (unlikely(current->seccomp.mode))
++	if (current->seccomp.mode &&
++	    current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	ret = -EINVAL;
+-	if (seccomp_mode && seccomp_mode <= NR_SECCOMP_MODES) {
+-		current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+-		set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
++	switch (seccomp_mode) {
++	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
++		ret = 0;
+ #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
+ 		disable_TSC();
+ #endif
+-		ret = 0;
++		break;
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
++	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
++		ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
++		if (ret)
++			goto out;
++		break;
++#endif
++	default:
++		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+- out:
++	current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
++	set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
++out:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
 diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
-index 3ecf574..7b5d245 100644
+index 3ecf574..0541e21 100644
 --- a/kernel/signal.c
 +++ b/kernel/signal.c
 @@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sigqueue_cachep;
@@ -81456,6 +82717,15 @@ index 3ecf574..7b5d245 100644
  
  	handler = sig_handler(t, sig);
  
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void recalc_sigpending(void)
+ 
+ #define SYNCHRONOUS_MASK \
+ 	(sigmask(SIGSEGV) | sigmask(SIGBUS) | sigmask(SIGILL) | \
+-	 sigmask(SIGTRAP) | sigmask(SIGFPE))
++	 sigmask(SIGTRAP) | sigmask(SIGFPE) | sigmask(SIGSYS))
+ 
+ int next_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask)
+ {
 @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ __sigqueue_alloc(int sig, struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags, int override_rlimi
  	atomic_inc(&user->sigpending);
  	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -81538,7 +82808,21 @@ index 3ecf574..7b5d245 100644
  
  	return ret;
  }
-@@ -2765,7 +2788,15 @@ do_send_specific(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, struct siginfo *info)
+@@ -2631,6 +2654,13 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
+ 		err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
+ 		err |= __put_user(from->si_ptr, &to->si_ptr);
+ 		break;
++#ifdef __ARCH_SIGSYS
++	case __SI_SYS:
++		err |= __put_user(from->si_call_addr, &to->si_call_addr);
++		err |= __put_user(from->si_syscall, &to->si_syscall);
++		err |= __put_user(from->si_arch, &to->si_arch);
++		break;
++#endif
+ 	default: /* this is just in case for now ... */
+ 		err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);
+ 		err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
+@@ -2765,7 +2795,15 @@ do_send_specific(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, struct siginfo *info)
  	int error = -ESRCH;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -81681,7 +82965,7 @@ index 2f194e9..2c05ea9 100644
  	.priority	= 10,
  };
 diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
-index 9d557df..691558c 100644
+index 9d557df..b2a5319 100644
 --- a/kernel/sys.c
 +++ b/kernel/sys.c
 @@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
@@ -81852,6 +83136,32 @@ index 9d557df..691558c 100644
  				error = -EINVAL;
  				break;
  			}
+@@ -1808,7 +1851,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
+ 			error = prctl_get_seccomp();
+ 			break;
+ 		case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
+-			error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
++			error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
+ 			break;
+ 		case PR_GET_TSC:
+ 			error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
+@@ -1868,6 +1911,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
+ 			else
+ 				error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
+ 			break;
++		case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
++			if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
++				return -EINVAL;
++
++			current->no_new_privs = 1;
++			break;
++		case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
++			if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
++				return -EINVAL;
++			return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0;
+ 		default:
+ 			error = -EINVAL;
+ 			break;
 diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
 index ea7ec7f..798623e 100644
 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -83724,6 +85034,20 @@ index d9df745..e73c2fe 100644
  
  static inline void *ptr_to_indirect(void *ptr)
  {
+diff --git a/lib/scatterlist.c b/lib/scatterlist.c
+index 4ceb05d..2ffcb3c 100644
+--- a/lib/scatterlist.c
++++ b/lib/scatterlist.c
+@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ void sg_miter_stop(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter)
+ 	if (miter->addr) {
+ 		miter->__offset += miter->consumed;
+ 
+-		if (miter->__flags & SG_MITER_TO_SG)
++		if ((miter->__flags & SG_MITER_TO_SG) &&
++		    !PageSlab(miter->page))
+ 			flush_kernel_dcache_page(miter->page);
+ 
+ 		if (miter->__flags & SG_MITER_ATOMIC) {
 diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
 index d74c317..1170419 100644
 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -89809,7 +91133,7 @@ index f78f898..d7aa843 100644
  
  	if (__rtnl_register(PF_CAN, RTM_GETROUTE, NULL, cgw_dump_jobs, NULL)) {
 diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
-index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
+index 8c979cc..453a165 100644
 --- a/net/compat.c
 +++ b/net/compat.c
 @@ -71,9 +71,11 @@ int get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct compat_msghdr __user *umsg)
@@ -89887,7 +91211,22 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  	int fdmax = (kmsg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
  	int fdnum = scm->fp->count;
  	struct file **fp = scm->fp->fp;
-@@ -370,7 +372,7 @@ static int do_set_sock_timeout(struct socket *sock, int level,
+@@ -326,14 +328,6 @@ void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+ 	__scm_destroy(scm);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * A struct sock_filter is architecture independent.
+- */
+-struct compat_sock_fprog {
+-	u16		len;
+-	compat_uptr_t	filter;		/* struct sock_filter * */
+-};
+-
+ static int do_set_attach_filter(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
+ 				char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
+ {
+@@ -370,7 +364,7 @@ static int do_set_sock_timeout(struct socket *sock, int level,
  		return -EFAULT;
  	old_fs = get_fs();
  	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
@@ -89896,7 +91235,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  	set_fs(old_fs);
  
  	return err;
-@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int do_get_sock_timeout(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
+@@ -431,7 +425,7 @@ static int do_get_sock_timeout(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
  	len = sizeof(ktime);
  	old_fs = get_fs();
  	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
@@ -89905,7 +91244,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  	set_fs(old_fs);
  
  	if (!err) {
-@@ -566,7 +568,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
+@@ -566,7 +560,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
  	case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
  	case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
  	{
@@ -89914,7 +91253,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  		struct group_req __user *kgr =
  			compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct group_req));
  		u32 interface;
-@@ -587,7 +589,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
+@@ -587,7 +581,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
  	case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
  	case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
  	{
@@ -89923,7 +91262,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  		struct group_source_req __user *kgsr = compat_alloc_user_space(
  			sizeof(struct group_source_req));
  		u32 interface;
-@@ -608,7 +610,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
+@@ -608,7 +602,7 @@ int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
  	}
  	case MCAST_MSFILTER:
  	{
@@ -89932,7 +91271,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  		struct group_filter __user *kgf;
  		u32 interface, fmode, numsrc;
  
-@@ -646,7 +648,7 @@ int compat_mc_getsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
+@@ -646,7 +640,7 @@ int compat_mc_getsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
  	char __user *optval, int __user *optlen,
  	int (*getsockopt)(struct sock *, int, int, char __user *, int __user *))
  {
@@ -89941,7 +91280,7 @@ index 8c979cc..2b1960c 100644
  	struct group_filter __user *kgf;
  	int __user	*koptlen;
  	u32 interface, fmode, numsrc;
-@@ -799,7 +801,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_socketcall(int call, u32 __user *args)
+@@ -799,7 +793,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_socketcall(int call, u32 __user *args)
  
  	if (call < SYS_SOCKET || call > SYS_SENDMMSG)
  		return -EINVAL;
@@ -90150,6 +91489,30 @@ index 2367246..4a0a677 100644
  	if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &dump, sizeof(dump))) {
  		ret = -EFAULT;
  		goto out;
+diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
+index 5dea452..d775edc 100644
+--- a/net/core/filter.c
++++ b/net/core/filter.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include <linux/filter.h>
+ #include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
+ #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
++#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ 
+ /* No hurry in this branch */
+ static void *__load_pointer(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, unsigned int size)
+@@ -350,6 +351,11 @@ load_b:
+ 				A = 0;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
++		case BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W:
++			A = seccomp_bpf_load(fentry->k);
++			continue;
++#endif
+ 		default:
+ 			WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "Unknown code:%u jt:%u tf:%u k:%u\n",
+ 				       fentry->code, fentry->jt,
 diff --git a/net/core/flow.c b/net/core/flow.c
 index e318c7e..168b1d0 100644
 --- a/net/core/flow.c
@@ -98042,6 +99405,73 @@ index 69ddb47..be0f0f9 100644
  	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
  	if (error)
  		goto error;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index c1e18ba..7316d77 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
+ 		if (!new_profile)
+ 			goto cleanup;
++		/*
++		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
++		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
++		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
++		 */
+ 		goto apply;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -455,6 +460,16 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 		/* fail exec */
+ 		error = -EACCES;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
++	 * fail the exec.
++	 */
++	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
++		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++		error = -EPERM;
++		goto cleanup;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!new_profile)
+ 		goto audit;
+ 
+@@ -609,6 +624,14 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
+ 	const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ 	int error = 0;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
++	 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
++	 * available.
++	 */
++	if (current->no_new_privs)
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	/* released below */
+ 	cred = get_current_cred();
+ 	cxt = cred->security;
+@@ -750,6 +773,18 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
+ 	cxt = cred->security;
+ 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
++	 * and not unconfined.
++	 * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
++	 * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
++	 * of permissions.
++	 */
++	if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) {
++		put_cred(cred);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++
+ 	if (ns_name) {
+ 		/* released below */
+ 		ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
 index cb1e93a..14f955c 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -98574,7 +100004,7 @@ index 741dd13..ee8043e 100644
  	profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
  	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
 diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
-index 12440ee..e16cba1 100644
+index 12440ee..2ec6d88 100644
 --- a/security/commoncap.c
 +++ b/security/commoncap.c
 @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
@@ -98640,7 +100070,27 @@ index 12440ee..e16cba1 100644
  /*
   * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
   * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
-@@ -585,6 +625,9 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+@@ -521,14 +561,17 @@ skip:
+ 
+ 
+ 	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
+-	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
++	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
++	 *
++	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
+ 	     new->egid != old->gid ||
+ 	     !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ 	    bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
+ 		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
+-		if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
++		if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
++		    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
+ 			new->euid = new->uid;
+ 			new->egid = new->gid;
+ 		}
+@@ -585,6 +628,9 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  {
  	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
  
@@ -98981,7 +100431,7 @@ index dca1c22..4fa4591 100644
  		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
  
 diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-index 1126c10..3684fc7 100644
+index 1126c10..e2dad6b 100644
 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
 +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
 @@ -94,8 +94,6 @@
@@ -98993,7 +100443,31 @@ index 1126c10..3684fc7 100644
  /* SECMARK reference count */
  static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
  
-@@ -5449,7 +5447,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+@@ -2000,6 +1998,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
+ 		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+ 		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
++
++		/*
++		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
++		 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
++		 */
++		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
++			return -EPERM;
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+ 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+@@ -2012,7 +2017,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+ 	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+ 
+-	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
++	if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
++	    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
+ 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+ 
+ 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
+@@ -5449,7 +5455,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
  
  #endif
  
@@ -99002,7 +100476,7 @@ index 1126c10..3684fc7 100644
  	.name =				"selinux",
  
  	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
-@@ -5795,6 +5793,9 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
+@@ -5795,6 +5801,9 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
  static int selinux_disabled;
  
@@ -99012,7 +100486,7 @@ index 1126c10..3684fc7 100644
  int selinux_disable(void)
  {
  	if (ss_initialized) {
-@@ -5812,7 +5813,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
+@@ -5812,7 +5821,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
  	selinux_disabled = 1;
  	selinux_enabled = 0;