Linux patch 5.10.1195.10-128

Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano@gentoo.org>

2 files changed, 6685 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README
index 51c56a3e..32647390 100644
--- a/0000_README
+++ b/0000_README
@@ -515,6 +515,10 @@ Patch:  1117_linux-5.10.118.patch
 From:   http://www.kernel.org
 Desc:   Linux 5.10.118
 
+Patch:  1118_linux-5.10.119.patch
+From:   http://www.kernel.org
+Desc:   Linux 5.10.119
+
 Patch:  1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch
 From:   https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644
 Desc:   Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs.
diff --git a/1118_linux-5.10.119.patch b/1118_linux-5.10.119.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7794e863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1118_linux-5.10.119.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,6681 @@
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+index 611172f68bb57..5e34deec819fa 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -4035,6 +4035,12 @@
+ 			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ 			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+ 
++	random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
++			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
++			seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
++			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
++			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
++
+ 	ras=option[,option,...]	[KNL] RAS-specific options
+ 
+ 		cec_disable	[X86]
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+index e338306f45873..a4b1ebc2e70b0 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+@@ -1006,28 +1006,22 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
+ * ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+   unvarying after that;
+ 
++* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
++  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
++
+ * ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+ 
+ * ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+ 
+ * ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+-  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding).
+-
+-* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+-  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
++  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
++  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
++  on any RNG behavior;
+ 
+ * ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+   (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+-  are woken up.
+-
+-If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
+-defined, these additional entries are present:
+-
+-* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
+-  interrupts used to feed the pool;
+-
+-* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
+-  number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
++  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
++  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+ 
+ 
+ randomize_va_space
+diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
+index c64c9354c287f..7c118b507912f 100644
+--- a/MAINTAINERS
++++ b/MAINTAINERS
+@@ -14671,6 +14671,8 @@ F:	arch/mips/generic/board-ranchu.c
+ 
+ RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
+ M:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
++M:	Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
++T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
+ S:	Maintained
+ F:	drivers/char/random.c
+ 
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index f9210e43121dc..b442cc5bbfc30 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ VERSION = 5
+ PATCHLEVEL = 10
+-SUBLEVEL = 118
++SUBLEVEL = 119
+ EXTRAVERSION =
+ NAME = Dare mighty things
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+index b565cc6f408e9..f89798da8a147 100644
+--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+index 7c3b3671d6c25..6d1337c169cd3 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
+ 
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+ #define get_cycles()	({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
++#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+index 869a3ac6bf23a..7ccc077a60bed 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
+ 	ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
+ extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
+diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+index 6a21d93582805..f4a7a340f4cae 100644
+--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+ {
+ 	if (mach_random_get_entropy)
+ 		return mach_random_get_entropy();
+-	return 0;
++	return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ }
+ #define random_get_entropy	random_get_entropy
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+index 8026baf46e729..2e107886f97ac 100644
+--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ 	else
+ 		return 0;	/* no usable counter */
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ /*
+  * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
+  * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
+- *
+- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
+- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
+  */
+ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
+-	unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
++	unsigned int c0_random;
+ 
+-	if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
++	if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
+ 		return read_c0_count();
+-	else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
+-		return read_c0_random();
++
++	if (cpu_has_3kex)
++		c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
+ 	else
+-		return 0;	/* no usable register */
++		c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
++	return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
+ }
+ #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+index a769f871b28d9..40a1adc9bd03e 100644
+--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -8,5 +8,8 @@
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+ 
+ extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
++
++#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+index 06b510f8172e3..b4622cb06a75e 100644
+--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
+ 
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+ 
+-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
++static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+ 	return mfctl(16);
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+index 95988870a57bc..171602fd358e1 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+ 	return mftb();
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ #endif	/* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif	/* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
+index 81de51e6aa32b..a06697846e695 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline u32 get_cycles_hi(void)
+ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+ {
+ 	if (unlikely(clint_time_val == NULL))
+-		return 0;
++		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ 	return get_cycles();
+ }
+ #define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy()
+diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+index 289aaff4d365f..588aa0f2c842c 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+ 	return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
+ void init_cpu_timer(void);
+diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+index 542915b462097..f86326a6f89e0 100644
+--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
++++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
+ 
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE	1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
+ 
+-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
+-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+-#define get_cycles()	(0)
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+index e392a9a5bc9bd..9f27176adb26d 100644
+--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
+ #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
+ #define __UM_TIMEX_H
+ 
+-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+-
+-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+-{
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
+ 
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+index a31de0c6ccde2..66f25c2938bfe 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
++++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3) += sha512-ssse3.o
+ sha512-ssse3-y := sha512-ssse3-asm.o sha512-avx-asm.o sha512-avx2-asm.o sha512_ssse3_glue.o
+ 
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86) += blake2s-x86_64.o
+-blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
++blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-shash.o
++obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86),y) += libblake2s-x86_64.o
++libblake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
+ 
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL) += ghash-clmulni-intel.o
+ ghash-clmulni-intel-y := ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.o ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.o
+diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
+index c025a01cf7084..69853c13e8fb0 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
++++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
+ 
+ #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+ #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+-#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/jump_label.h>
+@@ -28,9 +27,8 @@ asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
+ static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
+ 
+-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
+-			   const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
+-			   const u32 inc)
++void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
++		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+ {
+ 	/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
+ 	BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
+@@ -56,147 +54,12 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ 		block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ 	} while (nblocks);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
+-
+-static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+-				 unsigned int keylen)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+-
+-	if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
+-	tctx->keylen = keylen;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-	const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+-
+-	if (tctx->keylen)
+-		blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
+-	else
+-		blake2s_init(state, outlen);
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
+-				 unsigned int inlen)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+-
+-	if (unlikely(!inlen))
+-		return 0;
+-	if (inlen > fill) {
+-		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+-		blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		state->buflen = 0;
+-		in += fill;
+-		inlen -= fill;
+-	}
+-	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+-		blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+-		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+-	}
+-	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+-	state->buflen += inlen;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-
+-	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+-	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+-	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+-	blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+-	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+-	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+-	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-128",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-128-x86",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-160",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-160-x86",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-224",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-224-x86",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-256",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-256-x86",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}};
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);
+ 
+ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+ {
+-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+-		return 0;
+-
+-	static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
++	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
++		static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
+ 
+ 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
+ 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
+@@ -207,26 +70,9 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+ 			      XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
+ 		static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
+ 
+-	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+-		crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
+-					ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
+-}
+-
+-static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
+-{
+-	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+-		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
+-module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
+ 
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
+ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..59ae28abe35cc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
++ */
++
++#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
++#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
++#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
++
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sizes.h>
++
++#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
++#include <asm/processor.h>
++
++static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
++				     const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
++{
++	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
++}
++
++static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
++{
++	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
++}
++
++#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
++	{								\
++		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
++		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
++		.base.cra_priority	= 200,				\
++		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
++		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
++		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
++		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
++		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
++		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
++		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
++		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_x86,	\
++		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_x86,	\
++		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
++	}
++
++static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
++};
++
++static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
++{
++	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
++		return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
++{
++	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
++		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
++}
++
++module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
++module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
++
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
++MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+index a4a8b1b16c0c1..956e4145311b1 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <asm/tsc.h>
+ 
++static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
++{
++	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
++	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
++		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
++	return rdtsc();
++}
++#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
++
+ /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE		PIT_TICK_RATE
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+index 01a300a9700b9..fbdc3d9514943 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
+ 
+ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
+-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
++	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
++	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ 		return 0;
+-#endif
+-
+ 	return rdtsc();
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+ 
+ extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
+ extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+index 65d11711cd7bb..021cd067733e3 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_stimer0)
+ 	inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
+ 	if (hv_stimer0_handler)
+ 		hv_stimer0_handler();
+-	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
++	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
+ 	ack_APIC_irq();
+ 
+ 	set_irq_regs(old_regs);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+index a3ef793fce5f1..6ed6b090be941 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+@@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
+ 
+ 		atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+ 	}
++
++	/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
++	if (enabled)
++		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, apic->vcpu);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 id)
+@@ -2260,6 +2264,8 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
+ 		if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
+ 			kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+ 			static_key_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
++			/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
++			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
+ 		} else {
+ 			static_key_slow_inc(&apic_hw_disabled.key);
+ 			atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+index 306268f90455f..6096d0f1a62af 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+@@ -5178,14 +5178,16 @@ void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid)
+ 	uint i;
+ 
+ 	if (pcid == kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu)) {
+-		mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
++		if (mmu->invlpg)
++			mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
+ 		tlb_flush = true;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+ 		if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa) &&
+ 		    pcid == kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd)) {
+-			mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
++			if (mmu->invlpg)
++				mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
+ 			tlb_flush = true;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+index 4588f73bf59a4..ae18062c26a66 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+@@ -11146,7 +11146,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ 	if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
+ 		return true;
+ 	else
+-		return apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
++		return kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu) && apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
+ }
+ 
+ void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
+diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+index 233ec75e60c69..3f2462f2d0270 100644
+--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
+ 
+ extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
+ 
+-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
+-
+-#define get_cycles()	(0)
+-
+ void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
+ 	xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER);
+ }
+ 
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
++
+ #endif	/* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
+diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
+index 1157f82dc9cf4..0dee9242491cb 100644
+--- a/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1936,9 +1936,10 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
+ config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ 	bool
+ 
+-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
+ source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
+ source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
+ source "certs/Kconfig"
+ 
+ endif	# if CRYPTO
++
++source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
+diff --git a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
+index 005783ff45ad0..5f96a21f87883 100644
+--- a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
++++ b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
+@@ -1,149 +1,55 @@
+ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+ /*
++ * shash interface to the generic implementation of BLAKE2s
++ *
+  * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+  */
+ 
+ #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+-#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+ #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+-#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ 
+-static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+-				 unsigned int keylen)
++static int crypto_blake2s_update_generic(struct shash_desc *desc,
++					 const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
+ {
+-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+-
+-	if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
+-	tctx->keylen = keylen;
+-
+-	return 0;
++	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, true);
+ }
+ 
+-static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
++static int crypto_blake2s_final_generic(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+ {
+-	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-	const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+-
+-	if (tctx->keylen)
+-		blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
+-	else
+-		blake2s_init(state, outlen);
+-
+-	return 0;
++	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, true);
+ }
+ 
+-static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
+-				 unsigned int inlen)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+-
+-	if (unlikely(!inlen))
+-		return 0;
+-	if (inlen > fill) {
+-		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+-		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		state->buflen = 0;
+-		in += fill;
+-		inlen -= fill;
+-	}
+-	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+-		blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+-		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
++#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
++	{								\
++		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
++		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
++		.base.cra_priority	= 100,				\
++		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
++		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
++		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
++		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
++		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
++		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
++		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
++		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_generic, \
++		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_generic,	\
++		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
+ 	}
+-	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+-	state->buflen += inlen;
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+-
+-	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+-	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+-	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+-	blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+-	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+-	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+-	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+-
+-	return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-128",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-128-generic",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-160",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-160-generic",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-224",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-224-generic",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+-
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}, {
+-	.base.cra_name		= "blake2s-256",
+-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "blake2s-256-generic",
+-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+-	.base.cra_priority	= 200,
+-	.base.cra_blocksize     = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+ 
+-	.digestsize		= BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
+-	.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+-	.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,
+-	.update			= crypto_blake2s_update,
+-	.final			= crypto_blake2s_final,
+-	.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+-}};
++static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-generic",
++		    BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-generic",
++		    BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-generic",
++		    BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
++	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-generic",
++		    BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
++};
+ 
+ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+ {
+diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
+index 3132967a17497..19ea8d6628ffb 100644
+--- a/crypto/drbg.c
++++ b/crypto/drbg.c
+@@ -1490,12 +1490,13 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
++static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
+ {
+-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
++	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state,
+ 					       random_ready);
+ 
+ 	schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+@@ -1510,10 +1511,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ 
+ 	INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
+ 
+-	drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+-	drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
+-
+-	err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
++	drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
++	err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
+ 
+ 	switch (err) {
+ 	case 0:
+@@ -1524,7 +1523,7 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ 		fallthrough;
+ 
+ 	default:
+-		drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
++		drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL;
+ 		return err;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1628,8 +1627,8 @@ free_everything:
+  */
+ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ {
+-	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
+-		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
++	if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) {
++		unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
+ 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
+index a5cc4f3bb1e31..1d94c4625f365 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
+@@ -439,18 +439,29 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ {
+ 	struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr;
+ 	void __iomem *base;
+-	ssize_t rc;
++	ssize_t size;
+ 
+ 	data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
++	size = data_attr->attr.size;
++
++	if (offset < 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (offset >= size)
++		return 0;
+ 
+-	base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size);
++	if (count > size - offset)
++		count = size - offset;
++
++	base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size);
+ 	if (!base)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+-	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base,
+-				     data_attr->attr.size);
+-	acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
+ 
+-	return rc;
++	memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count);
++
++	acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size);
++
++	return count;
+ }
+ 
+ static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)
+diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+index d229a2d0c0174..3e2703a496328 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+@@ -495,4 +495,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
+ 	device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
+ 	booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
+ 	pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
+-	only mixes the entropy pool.
++	only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
++	"random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
+diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+index 8c1c47dd9f464..5749998feaa46 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
++++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/hw_random.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/kthread.h>
+ #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 5f541c9465598..00b50ccc9fae6 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1,310 +1,26 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+ /*
+- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
+- *
+- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All
+- * Rights Reserved.
+- *
++ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+  * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
+- *
+- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.  All
+- * rights reserved.
+- *
+- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+- * are met:
+- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+- *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+- *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+- *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+- *    written permission.
+- *
+- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+- *
+- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+- * DAMAGE.
+- */
+-
+-/*
+- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
+- *
+- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
+- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
+- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
+- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
+- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
+- * predict by an attacker.
+- *
+- * Theory of operation
+- * ===================
+- *
+- * Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
+- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
+- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
+- * algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
+- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
+- * applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
+- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
+- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
+- * generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
+- * from inside the kernel.
+- *
+- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
+- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
+- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
+- * outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
+- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
+- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
+- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
+- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
+- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
+- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
+- * the random number generator's internal state.
+- *
+- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
+- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool".  The SHA hash avoids
+- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool.  It is believed to
+- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
+- * about the input of SHA from its output.  Even if it is possible to
+- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
+- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
+- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable.  For this
+- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
+- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
+- * outputs random numbers.
+- *
+- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
+- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
+- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
+- * outputs.  This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
+- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
+- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
+- * of purposes.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- output
+- * ===============================
+- *
+- * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel,
+- * and two or use from userspace.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output
+- * -----------------------------------------
+- *
+- * The userspace interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
+- * /dev/urandom.  /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
+- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
+- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
+- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
+- * contained in the entropy pool.
+- *
+- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
+- * as many bytes as are requested.  As more and more random bytes are
+- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
+- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
+- * strong.  For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output
+- * --------------------------------------
+- *
+- * The primary kernel interface is
+- *
+- * 	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+- *
+- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
+- * and place it in the requested buffer.  This is equivalent to a
+- * read from /dev/urandom.
+- *
+- * For less critical applications, there are the functions:
+- *
+- * 	u32 get_random_u32()
+- * 	u64 get_random_u64()
+- * 	unsigned int get_random_int()
+- * 	unsigned long get_random_long()
+- *
+- * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
+- * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much.  These are recommended
+- * for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in
+- * the kernel*.
+- *
+- * Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do
+- * "anti-backtracking".  If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g.
+- * by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int()
+- * return values.  But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway,
+- * this is not a problem.
+- *
+- * It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as
+- * network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict
+- * outputs 0 or n+1.  The only concern is an attacker who breaks into
+- * the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as
+- * often as the get_random_bytes() one.
+- *
+- * get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after
+- * they are erased from the kernel.  For example, any key that will
+- * be wrapped and stored encrypted.  And session encryption keys: we'd
+- * like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased,
+- * the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext.
+- *
+- * But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address
+- * space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other
+- * applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in
+- * plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family
+- * is just fine.
+- *
+- * Consider ASLR.  We want to keep the address space secret from an
+- * outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address
+- * space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more.  And it's
+- * stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying
+- * about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int()
+- * CRNG is silly.
+- *
+- * Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int().
+- * In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine.  Here, knowledge
+- * of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject
+- * packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the
+- * key is stored with the object being protected.  Once it goes away,
+- * we no longer care if anyone knows the key.
+- *
+- * prandom_u32()
+- * -------------
+- *
+- * For even weaker applications, see the pseudorandom generator
+- * prandom_u32(), prandom_max(), and prandom_bytes().  If the random
+- * numbers aren't security-critical at all, these are *far* cheaper.
+- * Useful for self-tests, random error simulation, randomized backoffs,
+- * and any other application where you trust that nobody is trying to
+- * maliciously mess with you by guessing the "random" numbers.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- input
+- * ==============================
+- *
+- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
+- * from the devices are:
+- *
+- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
+- * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+- *                                unsigned int value);
+- *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
+- * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+- *
+- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
+- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
+- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+- *
+- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
+- * the event type information from the hardware.
+- *
+- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
+- *
+- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+- * times are usually fairly consistent.
+- *
+- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
+- * particular randomness source.  They do this by keeping track of the
+- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
+- *
+- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
+- * ============================================
+- *
+- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
+- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
+- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
+- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
+- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count.  In order to
+- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
+- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups.  To do this, put the
+- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
+- * sequence:
+- *
+- *	echo "Initializing random number generator..."
+- *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
+- *	# Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
+- *	# Load and then save the whole entropy pool
+- *	if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
+- *		cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
+- *	else
+- *		touch $random_seed
+- *	fi
+- *	chmod 600 $random_seed
+- *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
+- *
+- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
+- * the system is shutdown:
+- *
+- *	# Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
+- *	# Save the whole entropy pool
+- *	echo "Saving random seed..."
+- *	random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
+- *	touch $random_seed
+- *	chmod 600 $random_seed
+- *	dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
+- *
+- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
+- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
+- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random.  On older Linux systems, the correct script
+- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
+- *
+- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
+- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
+- * start-up.  (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
+- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
+- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.)  Even with
+- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
+- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
+- * the system.
+- *
+- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
+- * ==============================================
+- *
+- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
+- * the /dev/mem major number (#1).  So if your system does not have
+- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
+- * by using the commands:
+- *
+- * 	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
+- * 	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
+- *
+- * Acknowledgements:
+- * =================
+- *
+- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
+- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
+- * discussions with Phil Karn.  Colin Plumb provided a faster random
+- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
+- * pool, taken from PGPfone.  Dale Worley has also contributed many
+- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
+- *
+- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
+- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
+- *
+- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
+- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
+- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
++ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
++ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
++ *
++ *   - Initialization and readiness waiting.
++ *   - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
++ *   - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
++ *   - Entropy collection routines.
++ *   - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
++ *   - Sysctl interface.
++ *
++ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
++ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
++ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
++ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
++ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
++ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
++ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
+  */
+ 
+ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+@@ -327,7 +43,6 @@
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+ #include <linux/kthread.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
+-#include <linux/fips.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+ #include <linux/irq.h>
+@@ -335,1503 +50,1082 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/completion.h>
+ #include <linux/uuid.h>
++#include <linux/uaccess.h>
++#include <linux/siphash.h>
++#include <linux/uio.h>
+ #include <crypto/chacha.h>
+-#include <crypto/sha.h>
+-
++#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/irq.h>
+ #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+ 
+-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+-#include <trace/events/random.h>
+-
+-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
++/*********************************************************************
++ *
++ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
++ *
++ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
++ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
++ * is ready for safe consumption.
++ *
++ *********************************************************************/
+ 
+ /*
+- * Configuration information
++ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
++ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
+  */
+-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT	12
+-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT	10
+-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS	(1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+-#define EXTRACT_SIZE		10
+-
++static enum {
++	CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
++	CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
++	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
++} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
++static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
++#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
++/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
++static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
++static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
++static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
+ 
+-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
++/* Control how we warn userspace. */
++static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
++	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
++static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
++	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
++module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
++MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
+ 
+ /*
+- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
+- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
++ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
++ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
++ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
++ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+  *
+- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
+- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
++ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
++ *          false if the input pool has not been seeded.
+  */
+-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
++bool rng_is_initialized(void)
++{
++	return crng_ready();
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+ 
+-/*
+- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
+- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
+- * access to /dev/random.
+- */
+-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
++static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work)
++{
++	static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready);
++}
++
++/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
++static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
+ 
+ /*
+- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
+- * over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are defined below.  They
+- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
+- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
+- *
+- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
+- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
+- * Register.  (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR
+- * generators.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
+- * 2(3):179-194.  Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted
+- * GFSR generators II.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
+- * Simulation 4:254-266)
+- *
+- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
+- *
+- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
+- * where we use SHA-1.  All that we want of mixing operation is that
+- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
+- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see.  As long as
+- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
+- * input entropy and done a good job.  The fact that an intelligent
+- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
+- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
+- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness.  The only
+- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
+- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.  Since all
+- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
+- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
+- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
+- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
+- * decrease the uncertainty).
++ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
++ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
++ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
++ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
++ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+  *
+- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
+- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
+- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf).  In their
+- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
+- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
+- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
+- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
+- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
+- * GF(2**32).  They suggest a slight change to the generator
+- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
+- * irreducible, which we have made here.
++ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
++ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+  */
+-static const struct poolinfo {
+-	int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits;
+-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
+-	int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+-} poolinfo_table[] = {
+-	/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+-	/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+-	{ S(128),	104,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
+-};
++int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
++{
++	while (!crng_ready()) {
++		int ret;
++
++		try_to_generate_entropy();
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+ 
+ /*
+- * Static global variables
++ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
++ * pool is initialised.
++ *
++ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
++ *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+  */
+-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
+-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+-
+-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
+-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
++int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
++{
++	unsigned long flags;
++	int ret = -EALREADY;
+ 
+-struct crng_state {
+-	__u32		state[16];
+-	unsigned long	init_time;
+-	spinlock_t	lock;
+-};
++	if (crng_ready())
++		return ret;
+ 
+-static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
+-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
+-};
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++	if (!crng_ready())
++		ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++	return ret;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier);
+ 
+ /*
+- * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
+- *		1 --> Initialized
+- *		2 --> Initialized from input_pool
+- *
+- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
+- * its value (from 0->1->2).
++ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+  */
+-static int crng_init = 0;
+-static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
+-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
+-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
+-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
+-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
+-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
+-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-
+-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
+-	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
+-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+-	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
++int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
++{
++	unsigned long flags;
++	int ret;
+ 
+-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++	ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++	return ret;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier);
+ 
+-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
++static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
++{
++	unsigned long flags;
+ 
+-/**********************************************************************
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++	raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++}
++
++#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
++				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
++
++
++/*********************************************************************
+  *
+- * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
+- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
++ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+  *
+- **********************************************************************/
++ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
++ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
++ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
++ *
++ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
++ *
++ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
++ *	u32 get_random_u32()
++ *	u64 get_random_u64()
++ *	unsigned int get_random_int()
++ *	unsigned long get_random_long()
++ *
++ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
++ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
++ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
++ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
++ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
++ * until the buffer is emptied.
++ *
++ *********************************************************************/
+ 
+-struct entropy_store;
+-struct entropy_store {
+-	/* read-only data: */
+-	const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
+-	__u32 *pool;
+-	const char *name;
++enum {
++	CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
++	CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
++};
+ 
+-	/* read-write data: */
++static struct {
++	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
++	unsigned long birth;
++	unsigned long generation;
+ 	spinlock_t lock;
+-	unsigned short add_ptr;
+-	unsigned short input_rotate;
+-	int entropy_count;
+-	unsigned int initialized:1;
+-	unsigned int last_data_init:1;
+-	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
++} base_crng = {
++	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
+ };
+ 
+-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+-			       size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
+-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+-				size_t nbytes, int fips);
+-
+-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
+-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+-
+-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
+-	.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
+-	.name = "input",
+-	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+-	.pool = input_pool_data
++struct crng {
++	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
++	unsigned long generation;
++	local_lock_t lock;
+ };
+ 
+-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+-	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+-	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
+-
+-/*
+- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
+- * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
+- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
+- *
+- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
+- * degree, and then twisted.  We twist by three bits at a time because
+- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
+- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
+- */
+-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+-			    int nbytes)
+-{
+-	unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+-	int input_rotate;
+-	int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
+-	const char *bytes = in;
+-	__u32 w;
+-
+-	tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
+-	tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
+-	tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
+-	tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
+-	tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
+-
+-	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+-	i = r->add_ptr;
+-
+-	/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
+-	while (nbytes--) {
+-		w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
+-		i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
+-
+-		/* XOR in the various taps */
+-		w ^= r->pool[i];
+-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
+-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
+-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
+-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
+-		w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
+-
+-		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
+-		r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+-
+-		/*
+-		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
+-		 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
+-		 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
+-		 * input bits across the pool evenly.
+-		 */
+-		input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
+-	}
+-
+-	r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
+-	r->add_ptr = i;
+-}
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
++	.generation = ULONG_MAX,
++	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
++};
+ 
+-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+-			     int nbytes)
+-{
+-	trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
+-}
++/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
++static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
+ 
+-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+-			   int nbytes)
++/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
++static void crng_reseed(void)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long flags;
++	unsigned long next_gen;
++	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+ 
+-	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-}
++	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
+ 
+-struct fast_pool {
+-	__u32		pool[4];
+-	unsigned long	last;
+-	unsigned short	reg_idx;
+-	unsigned char	count;
+-};
++	/*
++	 * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
++	 * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
++	 * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
++	 * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
++	 */
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++	memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++	next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
++	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
++		++next_gen;
++	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
++	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
++	if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
++		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++	memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
++}
+ 
+ /*
+- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+- * collector.  It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
+- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
++ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
++ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
++ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
++ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
++ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
++ *
++ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
++ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
++ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
++ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
++ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
++ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
+  */
+-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
++static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
++				  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
++				  u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
+ {
+-	__u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
+-	__u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
+-
+-	a += b;			c += d;
+-	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
+-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
++	u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 
+-	a += b;			c += d;
+-	b = rol32(b, 16);	d = rol32(d, 14);
+-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
++	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
+ 
+-	a += b;			c += d;
+-	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
+-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
++	chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
++	memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
++	memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
++	chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
+ 
+-	a += b;			c += d;
+-	b = rol32(b, 16);	d = rol32(d, 14);
+-	d ^= a;			b ^= c;
+-
+-	f->pool[0] = a;  f->pool[1] = b;
+-	f->pool[2] = c;  f->pool[3] = d;
+-	f->count++;
++	memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
++	memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
++	memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
+ }
+ 
+-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+-{
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
+-
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+-	list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
+-		struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
+-
+-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+-		rdy->func(rdy);
+-		module_put(owner);
++/*
++ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
++ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
++ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
++ * proportional to the uptime.
++ */
++static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
++{
++	static bool early_boot = true;
++	unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
++
++	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
++		time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
++		if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
++			WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
++		else
++			interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
++					 (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
+ 	}
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
++	return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
+- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
+- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
++ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
++ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
++ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+  */
+-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
++static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
++			    u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
+ {
+-	int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized = 0;
+-	const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
+-	int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+-
+-	if (!nbits)
+-		return;
++	unsigned long flags;
++	struct crng *crng;
+ 
+-retry:
+-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+-	if (nfrac < 0) {
+-		/* Debit */
+-		entropy_count += nfrac;
+-	} else {
+-		/*
+-		 * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
+-		 * overwriting already present entropy.	 Even in the
+-		 * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
+-		 * approach the full value asymptotically:
+-		 *
+-		 * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
+-		 *	(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
+-		 *
+-		 * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
+-		 * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
+-		 *    (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
+-		 * so we can approximate the exponential with
+-		 * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
+-		 * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
+-		 *
+-		 * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
+-		 * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
+-		 * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
+-		 * turns no matter how large nbits is.
+-		 */
+-		int pnfrac = nfrac;
+-		const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
+-		/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
+-
+-		do {
+-			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+-			unsigned int add =
+-				((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
+-
+-			entropy_count += add;
+-			pnfrac -= anfrac;
+-		} while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
+-	}
++	BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
+ 
+-	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
+-		pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
+-			r->name, entropy_count);
+-		entropy_count = 0;
+-	} else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
+-		entropy_count = pool_size;
+-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+-		goto retry;
+-
+-	if (has_initialized) {
+-		r->initialized = 1;
+-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
++	/*
++	 * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
++	 * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
++	 * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
++	 * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
++	 */
++	if (!crng_ready()) {
++		bool ready;
++
++		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++		ready = crng_ready();
++		if (!ready) {
++			if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
++				extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++			crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
++					      random_data, random_data_len);
++		}
++		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++		if (!ready)
++			return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
+-				  entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
++	/*
++	 * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
++	 * generation counter that we check below.
++	 */
++	if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
++		crng_reseed();
+ 
+-	if (r == &input_pool) {
+-		int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
++	local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags);
++	crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
+ 
+-		if (crng_init < 2) {
+-			if (entropy_bits < 128)
+-				return;
+-			crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
+-			entropy_bits = ENTROPY_BITS(r);
+-		}
++	/*
++	 * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
++	 * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
++	 * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
++	 * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
++	 */
++	if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
++		spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
++		crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
++				      crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
++		crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
++		spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
+ 	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
++	 * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
++	 * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
++	 * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
++	 * should wind up here immediately.
++	 */
++	crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
++	local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags);
+ }
+ 
+-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
++static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
+-
+-	if (nbits < 0)
+-		return -EINVAL;
++	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
++	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	size_t first_block_len;
+ 
+-	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
+-	nbits = min(nbits,  nbits_max);
++	if (!len)
++		return;
+ 
+-	credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+-	return 0;
+-}
++	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
++	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
++	len -= first_block_len;
++	buf += first_block_len;
+ 
+-/*********************************************************************
+- *
+- * CRNG using CHACHA20
+- *
+- *********************************************************************/
++	while (len) {
++		if (len < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
++			memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
++			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
++			break;
++		}
+ 
+-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
++		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
++		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
++			++chacha_state[13];
++		len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	}
+ 
+-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
++	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
++}
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ /*
+- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
+- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel.  The programs are almost
+- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
+- * their brain damage.
++ * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
++ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
++ * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
++ * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
++ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
++ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
++ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
++ * at any point prior.
+  */
+-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
+-#endif
+-
+-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
+-static void numa_crng_init(void);
+-
+-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+-static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
++void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
++	warn_unseeded_randomness();
++	_get_random_bytes(buf, len);
+ }
+-early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+ 
+-static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
++static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+-	int		i;
+-	bool		arch_init = true;
+-	unsigned long	rv;
+-
+-	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
+-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
+-			rv = random_get_entropy();
+-			arch_init = false;
+-		}
+-		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
++	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
++	u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	size_t ret = 0, copied;
++
++	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
++		return 0;
++
++	/*
++	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
++	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
++	 * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
++	 */
++	crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
++	/*
++	 * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
++	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
++	 * the user directly.
++	 */
++	if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
++		ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, iter);
++		goto out_zero_chacha;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return arch_init;
+-}
++	for (;;) {
++		chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
++		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
++			++chacha_state[13];
+ 
+-static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
+-{
+-	int		i;
+-	bool		arch_init = true;
+-	unsigned long	rv;
+-
+-	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
+-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
+-		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
+-			rv = random_get_entropy();
+-			arch_init = false;
++		copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
++		ret += copied;
++		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
++			break;
++
++		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
++		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
++			if (signal_pending(current))
++				break;
++			cond_resched();
+ 		}
+-		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return arch_init;
++	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
++out_zero_chacha:
++	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
++	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+ }
+ 
+-static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
+-{
+-	chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
+-	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+-	crng_init_try_arch(crng);
+-	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+-}
++/*
++ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
++ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
++ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
++ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
++ */
+ 
+-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
++#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type)						\
++struct batch_ ##type {								\
++	/*									\
++	 * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the			\
++	 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full		\
++	 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase		\
++	 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the		\
++	 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.		\
++	 */									\
++	type entropy[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))];		\
++	local_lock_t lock;							\
++	unsigned long generation;						\
++	unsigned int position;							\
++};										\
++										\
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = {	\
++	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_ ##type.lock),			\
++	.position = UINT_MAX							\
++};										\
++										\
++type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
++{										\
++	type ret;								\
++	unsigned long flags;							\
++	struct batch_ ##type *batch;						\
++	unsigned long next_gen;							\
++										\
++	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
++										\
++	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
++		return ret;							\
++	}									\
++										\
++	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags);		\
++	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type);				\
++										\
++	next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);				\
++	if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) ||			\
++	    next_gen != batch->generation) {					\
++		_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy));	\
++		batch->position = 0;						\
++		batch->generation = next_gen;					\
++	}									\
++										\
++	ret = batch->entropy[batch->position];					\
++	batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0;					\
++	++batch->position;							\
++	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags);		\
++	return ret;								\
++}										\
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
++
++DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
++DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++/*
++ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
++ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
++ */
++int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+ {
+-	chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
+-	_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
+-	if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) {
+-		invalidate_batched_entropy();
+-		numa_crng_init();
+-		crng_init = 2;
+-		pr_notice("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
+-	}
+-	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+-}
+-
+-static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng)
+-{
+-	if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2)
+-		return;
+-	if (!system_wq) {
+-		/* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
+-		 * so mark this for processing later. */
+-		crng_need_final_init = true;
+-		return;
+-	}
+-
+-	invalidate_batched_entropy();
+-	numa_crng_init();
+-	crng_init = 2;
+-	process_random_ready_list();
+-	wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+-	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+-	pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+-	if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+-		pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+-			  unseeded_warning.missed);
+-		unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+-	}
+-	if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+-		pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+-			  urandom_warning.missed);
+-		urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
+-{
+-	int i;
+-	struct crng_state *crng;
+-	struct crng_state **pool;
+-
+-	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+-	for_each_online_node(i) {
+-		crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
+-				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
+-		spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
+-		crng_initialize_secondary(crng);
+-		pool[i] = crng;
+-	}
+-	/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
+-	if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
+-		for_each_node(i)
+-			kfree(pool[i]);
+-		kfree(pool);
+-	}
+-}
+-
+-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
+-
+-static void numa_crng_init(void)
+-{
+-	schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
+-}
+-
+-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
+-{
+-	struct crng_state **pool;
+-	int nid = numa_node_id();
+-
+-	/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
+-	pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
+-	if (pool && pool[nid])
+-		return pool[nid];
+-
+-	return &primary_crng;
+-}
+-#else
+-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
+-
+-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
+-{
+-	return &primary_crng;
++	/*
++	 * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
++	 * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
++	 * randomness.
++	 */
++	per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
++	per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
++	per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
+- * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
+- * bytes processed from cp.
+- */
+-static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+-{
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	char *p;
+-	size_t ret = 0;
+-
+-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+-		return 0;
+-	if (crng_init != 0) {
+-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+-		return 0;
+-	}
+-	p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+-	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+-		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
+-		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
+-	}
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+-	if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+-		invalidate_batched_entropy();
+-		crng_init = 1;
+-		pr_notice("fast init done\n");
+-	}
+-	return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
+- * attributes.  (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
+- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
+- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
+- * crng_fast_load().
+- *
+- * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
+- * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
+- * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm.  Finally, we do
+- * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
+- * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
+- * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
+- */
+-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+-{
+-	unsigned long		flags;
+-	static unsigned char	lfsr = 1;
+-	unsigned char		tmp;
+-	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
+-	const char *		src_buf = cp;
+-	char *			dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+-
+-	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+-		return 0;
+-	if (crng_init != 0) {
+-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+-		return 0;
+-	}
+-	if (len > max)
+-		max = len;
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+-		tmp = lfsr;
+-		lfsr >>= 1;
+-		if (tmp & 1)
+-			lfsr ^= 0xE1;
+-		tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+-		dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
+-		lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
+-	}
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+-	return 1;
+-}
+-
+-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
+-{
+-	unsigned long	flags;
+-	int		i, num;
+-	union {
+-		__u8	block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+-		__u32	key[8];
+-	} buf;
+-
+-	if (r) {
+-		num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
+-		if (num == 0)
+-			return;
+-	} else {
+-		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
+-		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
+-					CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+-	}
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+-		unsigned long	rv;
+-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+-			rv = random_get_entropy();
+-		crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
+-	}
+-	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
+-	WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+-	crng_finalize_init(crng);
+-}
+-
+-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
+-			  __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+-{
+-	unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
+-
+-	if (crng_ready()) {
+-		init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
+-		if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
+-		    time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+-			crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
+-				    &input_pool : NULL);
+-	}
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+-	if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
+-		crng->state[14] ^= v;
+-	chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
+-	if (crng->state[12] == 0)
+-		crng->state[13]++;
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+-}
+-
+-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+-{
+-	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
+- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
++ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
++ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
++ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
++ * bytes filled in.
+  */
+-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
+-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
++size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	unsigned long	flags;
+-	__u32		*s, *d;
+-	int		i;
+-
+-	used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
+-	if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		extract_crng(tmp);
+-		used = 0;
+-	}
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+-	s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
+-	d = &crng->state[4];
+-	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
+-		*d++ ^= *s++;
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+-}
++	size_t left = len;
++	u8 *p = buf;
+ 
+-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+-{
+-	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
+-}
+-
+-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+-{
+-	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+-	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
+-
+-	while (nbytes) {
+-		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
+-			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+-				if (ret == 0)
+-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+-				break;
+-			}
+-			schedule();
+-		}
++	while (left) {
++		unsigned long v;
++		size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+ 
+-		extract_crng(tmp);
+-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+-			ret = -EFAULT;
++		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ 			break;
+-		}
+ 
+-		nbytes -= i;
+-		buf += i;
+-		ret += i;
++		memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
++		p += block_len;
++		left -= block_len;
+ 	}
+-	crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
+-
+-	/* Wipe data just written to memory */
+-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ 
+-	return ret;
++	return len - left;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+ 
+ 
+-/*********************************************************************
++/**********************************************************************
+  *
+- * Entropy input management
++ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+  *
+- *********************************************************************/
++ * Callers may add entropy via:
++ *
++ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
++ *
++ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
++ *
++ *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
++ *
++ * Finally, extract entropy via:
++ *
++ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
+ 
+-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+-struct timer_rand_state {
+-	cycles_t last_time;
+-	long last_delta, last_delta2;
++enum {
++	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
++	POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
++	POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
+ };
+ 
+-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
++static struct {
++	struct blake2s_state hash;
++	spinlock_t lock;
++	unsigned int init_bits;
++} input_pool = {
++	.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
++		    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
++		    BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
++	.hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
++	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
++};
++
++static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
++}
+ 
+ /*
+- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+- * initialize it.
+- *
+- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+- * identical devices.
++ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
++ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
++ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
+  */
+-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
++static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && size)
+-		crng_slow_load(buf, size);
+-
+-	trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
+-	_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
++	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+-
+-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
+ 
+ /*
+- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+- * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
+- *
+- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
+- * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
+- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
+- *
++ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
++ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
+  */
+-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
++static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	struct entropy_store	*r;
++	unsigned long flags;
++	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+ 	struct {
+-		long jiffies;
+-		unsigned cycles;
+-		unsigned num;
+-	} sample;
+-	long delta, delta2, delta3;
+-
+-	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
+-	sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
+-	sample.num = num;
+-	r = &input_pool;
+-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+-	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+-	 * in order to make our estimate.
+-	 */
+-	delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies);
+-
+-	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+-
+-	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+-
+-	if (delta < 0)
+-		delta = -delta;
+-	if (delta2 < 0)
+-		delta2 = -delta2;
+-	if (delta3 < 0)
+-		delta3 = -delta3;
+-	if (delta > delta2)
+-		delta = delta2;
+-	if (delta > delta3)
+-		delta = delta3;
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
+-	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
+-	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
+-	 */
+-	credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+-}
+-
+-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+-				 unsigned int value)
+-{
+-	static unsigned char last_value;
+-
+-	/* ignore autorepeat and the like */
+-	if (value == last_value)
+-		return;
++		unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
++		size_t counter;
++	} block;
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
++		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
++		    !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
++			block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
++	}
+ 
+-	last_value = value;
+-	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+-			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+-	trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ 
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
++	/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
++	blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
+ 
+-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
+-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
++	/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
++	block.counter = 0;
++	blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
++	blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+ 
+-#define AVG_SHIFT 8     /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
+-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
++
++	while (len) {
++		i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
++		++block.counter;
++		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
++		len -= i;
++		buf += i;
++	}
+ 
+-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
+-{
+-        long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
+-
+-        /* Use a weighted moving average */
+-        delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+-        avg_cycles += delta;
+-        /* And average deviation */
+-        delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+-        avg_deviation += delta;
++	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
++	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
+ }
+-#else
+-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
+-#endif
+-
+-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
+-{
+-	__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+-	unsigned int idx;
+ 
+-	if (regs == NULL)
+-		return 0;
+-	idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
+-	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
+-		idx = 0;
+-	ptr += idx++;
+-	WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
+-	return *ptr;
+-}
++#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
+ 
+-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
++static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ {
+-	struct entropy_store	*r;
+-	struct fast_pool	*fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+-	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
+-	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
+-	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
+-	__u32			c_high, j_high;
+-	__u64			ip;
+-	unsigned long		seed;
+-	int			credit = 0;
+-
+-	if (cycles == 0)
+-		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+-	c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
+-	j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
+-	fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
+-	fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
+-	ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
+-	fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
+-	fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
+-		get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+-
+-	fast_mix(fast_pool);
+-	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
+-
+-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
+-		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
+-		    crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
+-				   sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
+-			fast_pool->count = 0;
+-			fast_pool->last = now;
+-		}
+-		return;
+-	}
+-
+-	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
+-	    !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+-		return;
++	static struct execute_work set_ready;
++	unsigned int new, orig, add;
++	unsigned long flags;
+ 
+-	r = &input_pool;
+-	if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
++	if (!bits)
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	fast_pool->last = now;
+-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
++	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
+-	 * add it to the pool.  For the sake of paranoia don't let the
+-	 * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
+-	 * interrupt noise.
+-	 */
+-	if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
+-		__mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
+-		credit = 1;
++	do {
++		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
++		new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
++	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
++
++	if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
++		crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
++		execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
++		process_random_ready_list();
++		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
++		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
++		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
++		if (urandom_warning.missed)
++			pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
++				  urandom_warning.missed);
++	} else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
++		spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++		/* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
++		if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
++			extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++			crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
++		}
++		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ 	}
+-	spin_unlock(&r->lock);
+-
+-	fast_pool->count = 0;
+-
+-	/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
+-	credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+-{
+-	if (!disk || !disk->random)
+-		return;
+-	/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
+-	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+-	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+-#endif
+ 
+-/*********************************************************************
++/**********************************************************************
+  *
+- * Entropy extraction routines
++ * Entropy collection routines.
+  *
+- *********************************************************************/
++ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
++ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
++ *
++ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
++ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++ *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
++ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
++ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
++ *
++ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
++ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
++ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
++ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
++ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
++ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
++ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
++ *
++ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
++ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
++ * block until more entropy is needed.
++ *
++ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
++ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
++ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
++ *
++ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
++ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
++ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
++ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
++ *
++ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
++ * as the event type information from the hardware.
++ *
++ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
++ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
++ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
++ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
++ * times are usually fairly consistent.
++ *
++ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
++ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
++ * order deltas of the event timings.
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
+ 
+-/*
+- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
+- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
+- */
+-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
+-		      int reserved)
++static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
++static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
++static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+ {
+-	int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
+-	size_t ibytes, nfrac;
+-
+-	BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
+-
+-	/* Can we pull enough? */
+-retry:
+-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+-	ibytes = nbytes;
+-	/* never pull more than available */
+-	have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+-
+-	if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
+-		have_bytes = 0;
+-	ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
+-	if (ibytes < min)
+-		ibytes = 0;
+-
+-	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
+-		pr_warn("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
+-			r->name, entropy_count);
+-		entropy_count = 0;
+-	}
+-	nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+-	if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
+-		entropy_count -= nfrac;
+-	else
+-		entropy_count = 0;
+-
+-	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+-		goto retry;
+-
+-	trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
+-	if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS(r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+-		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+-	}
+-
+-	return ibytes;
++	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
+- * extract_entropy_user.
+- *
+- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
+- */
+-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
++static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
+ {
+-	int i;
+-	union {
+-		__u32 w[5];
+-		unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
+-	} hash;
+-	__u32 workspace[SHA1_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * If we have an architectural hardware random number
+-	 * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
+-	 */
+-	sha1_init(hash.w);
+-	for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
+-		unsigned long v;
+-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+-			break;
+-		hash.l[i] = v;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-	for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
+-		sha1_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
+-	 * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
+-	 * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
+-	 * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
+-	 * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
+-	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
+-	 * hash.
+-	 */
+-	__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-
+-	memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
+-	 * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
+-	 * twice as much data as we output.
+-	 */
+-	hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
+-	hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
+-	hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
+-
+-	memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+-	memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
++	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
+ }
++early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
++early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
+ 
+-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+-				size_t nbytes, int fips)
++/*
++ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
++ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
++ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
++ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
++ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
++ * time we get here.
++ */
++int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
+ {
+-	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
+-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+-	unsigned long flags;
++	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
++	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
++	unsigned long entropy;
+ 
+-	while (nbytes) {
+-		extract_buf(r, tmp);
++#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
++	static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
++	_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
++#endif
+ 
+-		if (fips) {
+-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-			if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
+-				panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
+-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
++	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
++		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
++		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
++			entropy = random_get_entropy();
++			arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
+ 		}
+-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+-		memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
+-		nbytes -= i;
+-		buf += i;
+-		ret += i;
++		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ 	}
++	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
++	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
++	_mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
++	add_latent_entropy();
+ 
+-	/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
+-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
++	if (crng_ready())
++		crng_reseed();
++	else if (trust_cpu)
++		credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
+ 
+-	return ret;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
+- * returns it in a buffer.
++ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
++ * initialize it.
+  *
+- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
+- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
+- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
+- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
++ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
++ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
++ * identical devices.
+  */
+-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+-				 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
++void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
++	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 
+-	/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
+-	if (fips_enabled) {
+-		spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-		if (!r->last_data_init) {
+-			r->last_data_init = 1;
+-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-			trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
+-					      ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
+-			extract_buf(r, tmp);
+-			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+-			memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+-		}
+-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-	}
+-
+-	trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
+-	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
+-
+-	return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
++	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+ 
+-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+-
+-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
+-				      void **previous)
++/*
++ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
++ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
++ * when our pool is full.
++ */
++void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+ {
+-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+-	const bool print_once = false;
+-#else
+-	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+-#endif
++	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++	credit_init_bits(entropy);
+ 
+-	if (print_once ||
+-	    crng_ready() ||
+-	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+-		return;
+-	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+-	print_once = true;
+-#endif
+-	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
+-		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS "
+-				"with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller,
+-				crng_init);
++	/*
++	 * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
++	 * we're not yet initialized.
++	 */
++	if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
++		schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+ 
+ /*
+- * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
+- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+- * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
+- * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+- * at any point prior.
++ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
++ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+  */
+-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
++void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+-
+-	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+-
+-	while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		extract_crng(buf);
+-		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+-		nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (nbytes > 0) {
+-		extract_crng(tmp);
+-		memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
+-	} else
+-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
++	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++	if (trust_bootloader)
++		credit_init_bits(len * 8);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
+ 
+-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+-{
+-	static void *previous;
+-
+-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+-	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
++struct fast_pool {
++	struct work_struct mix;
++	unsigned long pool[4];
++	unsigned long last;
++	unsigned int count;
++};
+ 
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
++#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
++	.pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
++#else
++#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
++	.pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
++#endif
++};
+ 
+ /*
+- * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+- * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+- * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+- * generating entropy..
+- *
+- * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+- * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+- * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+- * entropy loop is running.
+- *
+- * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
++ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
++ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
++ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
++ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
+  */
+-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
++static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
+ {
+-	credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
++	s[3] ^= v1;
++	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
++	s[0] ^= v1;
++	s[3] ^= v2;
++	FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
++	s[0] ^= v2;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ /*
+- * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+- * generate enough entropy with timing noise
++ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
++ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
+  */
+-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
++int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+ {
+-	struct {
+-		unsigned long now;
+-		struct timer_list timer;
+-	} stack;
++	/*
++	 * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
++	 * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
++	 * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
++	 * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
++	 * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
++	 * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
++	 * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
++	 * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
++	 * are fresh.
++	 */
++	per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
+ 
+-	stack.now = random_get_entropy();
++static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
++{
++	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
++	/*
++	 * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
++	 * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
++	 * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
++	 * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
++	 * we don't wind up "losing" some.
++	 */
++	unsigned long pool[2];
++	unsigned int count;
+ 
+-	/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+-	if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
++	/* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
++	local_irq_disable();
++	if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
++		local_irq_enable();
+ 		return;
+-
+-	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
+-		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+-			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
+-		mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+-		schedule();
+-		stack.now = random_get_entropy();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+-	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+-	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+- *
+- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+- *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+- */
+-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+-{
+-	if (likely(crng_ready()))
+-		return 0;
+-
+-	do {
+-		int ret;
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+-		if (ret)
+-			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
++	/*
++	 * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
++	 * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
++	 */
++	memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
++	count = fast_pool->count;
++	fast_pool->count = 0;
++	fast_pool->last = jiffies;
++	local_irq_enable();
+ 
+-		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-	} while (!crng_ready());
++	mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
++	credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
+ 
+-	return 0;
++	memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+- *
+- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+- *          false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
+- */
+-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+-{
+-	return crng_ready();
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+-
+-/*
+- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
+- * pool is initialised.
+- *
+- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+- *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+- *	    -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+- */
+-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
++void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
+ {
+-	struct module *owner;
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	int err = -EALREADY;
++	enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
++	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
++	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
++	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
++	unsigned int new_count;
+ 
+-	if (crng_ready())
+-		return err;
++	fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
++		 (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
++	new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
+ 
+-	owner = rdy->owner;
+-	if (!try_module_get(owner))
+-		return -ENOENT;
+-
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+-	if (crng_ready())
+-		goto out;
+-
+-	owner = NULL;
+-
+-	list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
+-	err = 0;
+-
+-out:
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
++	if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
++		return;
+ 
+-	module_put(owner);
++	if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
++		return;
+ 
+-	return err;
++	if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
++		INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
++	fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
++	queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
++
++/* There is one of these per entropy source */
++struct timer_rand_state {
++	unsigned long last_time;
++	long last_delta, last_delta2;
++};
+ 
+ /*
+- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
++ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
++ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
++ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
++ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
++ * the type of event that just happened.
+  */
+-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
++static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
+ {
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	struct module *owner = NULL;
++	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
++	long delta, delta2, delta3;
++	unsigned int bits;
+ 
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+-	if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+-		owner = rdy->owner;
++	/*
++	 * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
++	 * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
++	 */
++	if (in_irq()) {
++		fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
++	} else {
++		spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
++		_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
++		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ 	}
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ 
+-	module_put(owner);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
++	if (crng_ready())
++		return;
+ 
+-/*
+- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+- * number generator if it is available.  The arch-specific hw RNG will
+- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
+- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
+- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
+- * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
+- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
+- * have put in a back door.
+- *
+- * Return number of bytes filled in.
+- */
+-int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+-{
+-	int left = nbytes;
+-	char *p = buf;
++	/*
++	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
++	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
++	 * in order to make our estimate.
++	 */
++	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
++	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+ 
+-	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
+-	while (left) {
+-		unsigned long v;
+-		int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
++	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
++	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+ 
+-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+-			break;
++	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
++	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+ 
+-		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
+-		p += chunk;
+-		left -= chunk;
+-	}
++	if (delta < 0)
++		delta = -delta;
++	if (delta2 < 0)
++		delta2 = -delta2;
++	if (delta3 < 0)
++		delta3 = -delta3;
++	if (delta > delta2)
++		delta = delta2;
++	if (delta > delta3)
++		delta = delta3;
++
++	/*
++	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
++	 * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
++	 */
++	bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
+ 
+-	return nbytes - left;
++	/*
++	 * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
++	 * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
++	 * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
++	 * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
++	 * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
++	 */
++	if (in_irq())
++		this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
++	else
++		_credit_init_bits(bits);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+ 
+-/*
+- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
+- *
+- * @r: pool to initialize
+- *
+- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
+- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
+- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
+- */
+-static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
++void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
+ {
+-	int i;
+-	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+-	unsigned long rv;
+-
+-	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
+-	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+-			rv = random_get_entropy();
+-		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
+-	}
+-	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
++	static unsigned char last_value;
++	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
++
++	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
++	if (value == last_value)
++		return;
++
++	last_value = value;
++	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
++			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+ 
+-/*
+- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
+- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
+- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
+- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
+- * statically allocated structures that already have all
+- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
+- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
+- * we were given.
+- */
+-int __init rand_initialize(void)
++#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
++void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+ {
+-	init_std_data(&input_pool);
+-	if (crng_need_final_init)
+-		crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng);
+-	crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng);
+-	crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
+-	if (ratelimit_disable) {
+-		urandom_warning.interval = 0;
+-		unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
+-	}
+-	return 0;
++	if (!disk || !disk->random)
++		return;
++	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
++	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
++void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+ {
+ 	struct timer_rand_state *state;
+ 
+@@ -1847,116 +1141,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-static ssize_t
+-urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+-		    loff_t *ppos)
++/*
++ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
++ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
++ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
++ * generating entropy..
++ *
++ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
++ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
++ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
++ * entropy loop is running.
++ *
++ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
++ */
++static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+ {
+-	int ret;
+-
+-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+-	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
+-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+-	return ret;
++	credit_init_bits(1);
+ }
+ 
+-static ssize_t
+-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
++/*
++ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
++ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
++ */
++static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	static int maxwarn = 10;
++	struct {
++		unsigned long entropy;
++		struct timer_list timer;
++	} stack;
++
++	stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
+-		maxwarn--;
+-		if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
+-			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
+-				  current->comm, nbytes);
+-		spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+-		crng_init_cnt = 0;
+-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
++	/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
++	if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
++		return;
++
++	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
++	while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
++		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
++			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
++		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
++		schedule();
++		stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
++	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
++	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
++	mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+ }
+ 
+-static ssize_t
+-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
++
++/**********************************************************************
++ *
++ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
++ *
++ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
++ * be used in preference to anything else.
++ *
++ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
++ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
++ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
++ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
++ *
++ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
++ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
++ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
++ *
++ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
++ * the input pool but does not credit it.
++ *
++ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
++ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
++ *
++ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
++ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
++ * reseeding the crng.
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
++
++SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
+ {
++	struct iov_iter iter;
++	struct iovec iov;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+-	if (ret != 0)
++	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/*
++	 * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
++	 * no sense.
++	 */
++	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
++			return -EAGAIN;
++		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
++		if (unlikely(ret))
++			return ret;
++	}
++
++	ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
++	if (unlikely(ret))
+ 		return ret;
+-	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
++	return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
+ }
+ 
+-static __poll_t
+-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
++static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
+-	__poll_t mask;
+-
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+-	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
+-	mask = 0;
+-	if (crng_ready())
+-		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+-	if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+-		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+-	return mask;
++	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
++static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+-	size_t bytes;
+-	__u32 t, buf[16];
+-	const char __user *p = buffer;
++	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	ssize_t ret = 0;
++	size_t copied;
+ 
+-	while (count > 0) {
+-		int b, i = 0;
++	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
++		return 0;
+ 
+-		bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
+-		if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
+-			return -EFAULT;
++	for (;;) {
++		copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
++		ret += copied;
++		mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
++		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
++			break;
+ 
+-		for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
+-			if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
++		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
++		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
++			if (signal_pending(current))
+ 				break;
+-			buf[i] ^= t;
++			cond_resched();
+ 		}
++	}
++
++	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
++	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
++}
++
++static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
++{
++	return write_pool_user(iter);
++}
+ 
+-		count -= bytes;
+-		p += bytes;
++static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
++{
++	static int maxwarn = 10;
+ 
+-		mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
+-		cond_resched();
++	if (!crng_ready()) {
++		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
++			++urandom_warning.missed;
++		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
++			--maxwarn;
++			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
++				  current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return 0;
++	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
+ }
+ 
+-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+-	size_t ret;
++	int ret;
+ 
+-	ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
+-	if (ret)
++	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
++	if (ret != 0)
+ 		return ret;
+-
+-	return (ssize_t)count;
++	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
+ }
+ 
+ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+ {
+-	int size, ent_count;
+ 	int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
+-	int retval;
++	int ent_count;
+ 
+ 	switch (cmd) {
+ 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
+-		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
+-		ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
+-		if (put_user(ent_count, p))
++		/* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
++		if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 		return 0;
+ 	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
+@@ -1964,41 +1331,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+-	case RNDADDENTROPY:
++		if (ent_count < 0)
++			return -EINVAL;
++		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
++		return 0;
++	case RNDADDENTROPY: {
++		struct iov_iter iter;
++		struct iovec iov;
++		ssize_t ret;
++		int len;
++
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 		if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 		if (ent_count < 0)
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+-		if (get_user(size, p++))
++		if (get_user(len, p++))
++			return -EFAULT;
++		ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
++		if (unlikely(ret))
++			return ret;
++		ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
++		if (unlikely(ret < 0))
++			return ret;
++		/* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
++		if (unlikely(ret != len))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+-		retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
+-				    size);
+-		if (retval < 0)
+-			return retval;
+-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
++		credit_init_bits(ent_count);
++		return 0;
++	}
+ 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
+ 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
+-		/*
+-		 * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
+-		 * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
+-		 */
++		/* No longer has any effect. */
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+-		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) && random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+-			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+-			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+-		}
+ 		return 0;
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+-		if (crng_init < 2)
++		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+-		WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
++		crng_reseed();
+ 		return 0;
+ 	default:
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -2011,55 +1385,56 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
+ }
+ 
+ const struct file_operations random_fops = {
+-	.read  = random_read,
+-	.write = random_write,
+-	.poll  = random_poll,
++	.read_iter = random_read_iter,
++	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
++	.poll = random_poll,
+ 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
+ 	.fasync = random_fasync,
+ 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
++	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
++	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
+ };
+ 
+ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
+-	.read  = urandom_read,
+-	.write = random_write,
++	.read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
++	.write_iter = random_write_iter,
+ 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
+ 	.fasync = random_fasync,
+ 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
++	.splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
++	.splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
+ };
+ 
+-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+-		unsigned int, flags)
+-{
+-	int ret;
+-
+-	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+-	 * no sense.
+-	 */
+-	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	if (count > INT_MAX)
+-		count = INT_MAX;
+-
+-	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
+-		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+-			return -EAGAIN;
+-		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+-		if (unlikely(ret))
+-			return ret;
+-	}
+-	return urandom_read_nowarn(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
+-}
+ 
+ /********************************************************************
+  *
+- * Sysctl interface
++ * Sysctl interface.
++ *
++ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
++ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
++ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
++ *
++ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
++ *
++ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
++ *
++ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
++ *   hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
++ *
++ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
++ *   input pool. Always <= poolsize.
++ *
++ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
++ *   below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
++ *   more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
++ *   to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
++ *   change any behavior of the RNG.
++ *
++ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
++ *   It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
++ *   to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
+  *
+  ********************************************************************/
+ 
+@@ -2067,25 +1442,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+ 
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ 
+-static int min_write_thresh;
+-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
++static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
++static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
++static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
++static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
+ 
+ /*
+  * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
+- * UUID.  The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
++ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+  * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
+- *
+- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
+- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
+- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
+  */
+-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+-			void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+-{
+-	struct ctl_table fake_table;
+-	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
++static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
++			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++	u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
++	char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
++	struct ctl_table fake_table = {
++		.data = uuid_string,
++		.maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
++	};
++
++	if (write)
++		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	uuid = table->data;
+ 	if (!uuid) {
+@@ -2100,32 +1478,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ 		spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
+-
+-	fake_table.data = buf;
+-	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
+-
+-	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++	snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
++	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
+- */
+-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+-			   void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
++static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
++			    size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+-	struct ctl_table fake_table;
+-	int entropy_count;
+-
+-	entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+-
+-	fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+-	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+-
+-	return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
+ }
+ 
+-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+ extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
+ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ 	{
+@@ -2137,222 +1500,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ 	},
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "entropy_avail",
++		.data		= &input_pool.init_bits,
+ 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+ 		.mode		= 0444,
+-		.proc_handler	= proc_do_entropy,
+-		.data		= &input_pool.entropy_count,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "write_wakeup_threshold",
+-		.data		= &random_write_wakeup_bits,
++		.data		= &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
+ 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+-		.extra1		= &min_write_thresh,
+-		.extra2		= &max_write_thresh,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_do_rointvec,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
+-		.data		= &random_min_urandom_seed,
++		.data		= &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
+ 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_do_rointvec,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "boot_id",
+ 		.data		= &sysctl_bootid,
+-		.maxlen		= 16,
+ 		.mode		= 0444,
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_do_uuid,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "uuid",
+-		.maxlen		= 16,
+ 		.mode		= 0444,
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_do_uuid,
+ 	},
+-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
+-	{
+-		.procname	= "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
+-		.data		= &avg_cycles,
+-		.maxlen		= sizeof(avg_cycles),
+-		.mode		= 0444,
+-		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+-	},
+-	{
+-		.procname	= "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
+-		.data		= &avg_deviation,
+-		.maxlen		= sizeof(avg_deviation),
+-		.mode		= 0444,
+-		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+-	},
+-#endif
+ 	{ }
+ };
+-#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+-
+-struct batched_entropy {
+-	union {
+-		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
+-		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+-	};
+-	unsigned int position;
+-	spinlock_t batch_lock;
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
+- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
+- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
+- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
+- * point prior.
+- */
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
+-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+-};
+-
+-u64 get_random_u64(void)
+-{
+-	u64 ret;
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
+-	static void *previous;
+-
+-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+-
+-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
+-		batch->position = 0;
+-	}
+-	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+-	return ret;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
+-
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
+-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+-};
+-u32 get_random_u32(void)
+-{
+-	u32 ret;
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-	struct batched_entropy *batch;
+-	static void *previous;
+-
+-	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+-
+-	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
+-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
+-		batch->position = 0;
+-	}
+-	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+-	return ret;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
+-
+-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
+- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
+- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
+- * next usage. */
+-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
+-{
+-	int cpu;
+-	unsigned long flags;
+-
+-	for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
+-		struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
+-
+-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
+-		spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
+-		spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+-
+-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
+-		spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
+-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+-	}
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+- * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+- * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+- *		random address must fall.
+- *
+- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+- *
+- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+- * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
+- *
+- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
+- * @start is returned.
+- */
+-unsigned long
+-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+-{
+-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+-		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+-		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+-	}
+-
+-	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+-		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+-
+-	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+-
+-	if (range == 0)
+-		return start;
+-
+-	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+-}
+-
+-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+- * when our pool is full.
+- */
+-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
+-				size_t entropy)
+-{
+-	struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
+-
+-	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
+-		size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
+-		count -= ret;
+-		buffer += ret;
+-		if (!count || crng_init == 0)
+-			return;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
+-	 * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
+-	 * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
+-	 */
+-	wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait,
+-			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
+-			ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
+-	mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
+-	credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+-
+-/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
+- * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
+- * it would be regarded as device data.
+- * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+- */
+-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+-{
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
+-		add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
+-	else
+-		add_device_randomness(buf, size);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
++#endif	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+index b9ac357e465db..5d820037e2918 100644
+--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
+ 			tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector(), 0);
++	add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector());
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
+index a776bb8e0e093..a24624353f9ed 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
++++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
+@@ -1325,12 +1325,6 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ 	vfd->lock = &dev->dev_mutex;
+ 	vfd->v4l2_dev = &dev->v4l2_dev;
+ 
+-	ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
+-	if (ret) {
+-		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
+-		goto error_v4l2;
+-	}
+-
+ 	video_set_drvdata(vfd, dev);
+ 	v4l2_info(&dev->v4l2_dev,
+ 		  "Device registered as /dev/video%d\n", vfd->num);
+@@ -1353,12 +1347,20 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ 	media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
+ 	dev->mdev.ops = &m2m_media_ops;
+ 	dev->v4l2_dev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
++#endif
++
++	ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
++	if (ret) {
++		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
++		goto error_m2m;
++	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
+ 	ret = v4l2_m2m_register_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev, vfd,
+ 						 MEDIA_ENT_F_PROC_VIDEO_SCALER);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to init mem2mem media controller\n");
+-		goto error_dev;
++		goto error_v4l2;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = media_device_register(&dev->mdev);
+@@ -1373,11 +1375,13 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ error_m2m_mc:
+ 	v4l2_m2m_unregister_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev);
+ #endif
+-error_dev:
++error_v4l2:
+ 	video_unregister_device(&dev->vfd);
+ 	/* vim2m_device_release called by video_unregister_device to release various objects */
+ 	return ret;
+-error_v4l2:
++error_m2m:
++	v4l2_m2m_release(dev->m2m_dev);
++error_dev:
+ 	v4l2_device_unregister(&dev->v4l2_dev);
+ error_free:
+ 	kfree(dev);
+diff --git a/drivers/net/Kconfig b/drivers/net/Kconfig
+index cb865b7ec3750..f208080243055 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig
+@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config WIREGUARD
+ 	select CRYPTO
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
+-	select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
+ 	select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
+ 	select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
+ 	select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+index c0cfd9b36c0b5..720952b92e784 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
+ 		static_identity->static_public, private_key);
+ }
+ 
++static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
++{
++	struct blake2s_state state;
++	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
++	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
++	int i;
++
++	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
++		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
++	} else
++		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
++		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
++
++	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
++	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
++		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
++
++	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
++
++	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++}
++
+ /* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
+  *  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
+  *  - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
+@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
+ 		 ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
+ 
+ 	/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
+-	blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
++	hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ 
+ 	if (!first_dst || !first_len)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
+ 	output[0] = 1;
+-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ 	memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
+ 
+ 	if (!second_dst || !second_len)
+@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
+ 
+ 	/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
+ 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
+-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ 	memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
+ 
+ 	if (!third_dst || !third_len)
+@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
+ 
+ 	/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
+ 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
+-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ 	memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
+ 
+ out:
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+index 902ac81699484..083ff72976cf0 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+@@ -1351,9 +1351,11 @@ static int rtw_wx_set_scan(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_request_info *a,
+ 
+ 					sec_len = *(pos++); len -= 1;
+ 
+-					if (sec_len > 0 && sec_len <= len) {
++					if (sec_len > 0 &&
++					    sec_len <= len &&
++					    sec_len <= 32) {
+ 						ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength = sec_len;
+-						memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength);
++						memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, sec_len);
+ 						/* DBG_871X("%s COMBO_SCAN with specific ssid:%s, %d\n", __func__ */
+ 						/* 	, ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); */
+ 						ssid_index++;
+diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
+index b471deac28ff8..4e30e1799e614 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/blake2s.h
++++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
+@@ -3,15 +3,14 @@
+  * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+  */
+ 
+-#ifndef BLAKE2S_H
+-#define BLAKE2S_H
++#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
++#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+ 
++#include <linux/bug.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ 
+-#include <asm/bug.h>
+-
+ enum blake2s_lengths {
+ 	BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
+ 	BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@ enum blake2s_lengths {
+ };
+ 
+ struct blake2s_state {
++	/* 'h', 't', and 'f' are used in assembly code, so keep them as-is. */
+ 	u32 h[8];
+ 	u32 t[2];
+ 	u32 f[2];
+@@ -43,29 +43,34 @@ enum blake2s_iv {
+ 	BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
+ };
+ 
+-void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
+-void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
+-
+-static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
+-				      const u32 param)
++static inline void __blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state, size_t outlen,
++				  const void *key, size_t keylen)
+ {
+-	*state = (struct blake2s_state){{
+-		BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV1,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV2,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV3,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV4,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV5,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV6,
+-		BLAKE2S_IV7,
+-	}};
++	state->h[0] = BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
++	state->h[1] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
++	state->h[2] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
++	state->h[3] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
++	state->h[4] = BLAKE2S_IV4;
++	state->h[5] = BLAKE2S_IV5;
++	state->h[6] = BLAKE2S_IV6;
++	state->h[7] = BLAKE2S_IV7;
++	state->t[0] = 0;
++	state->t[1] = 0;
++	state->f[0] = 0;
++	state->f[1] = 0;
++	state->buflen = 0;
++	state->outlen = outlen;
++	if (keylen) {
++		memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
++		memset(&state->buf[keylen], 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - keylen);
++		state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ 				const size_t outlen)
+ {
+-	blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
+-	state->outlen = outlen;
++	__blake2s_init(state, outlen, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
+@@ -75,12 +80,12 @@ static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ 	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ 		!key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
+ 
+-	blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
+-	memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
+-	state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+-	state->outlen = outlen;
++	__blake2s_init(state, outlen, key, keylen);
+ }
+ 
++void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
++void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
++
+ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
+ 			   const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
+ 			   const size_t keylen)
+@@ -91,16 +96,9 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
+ 		outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
+ 		(!key && keylen)));
+ 
+-	if (keylen)
+-		blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
+-	else
+-		blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+-
++	__blake2s_init(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
+ 	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+ 	blake2s_final(&state, out);
+ }
+ 
+-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
+-		     const size_t keylen);
+-
+-#endif /* BLAKE2S_H */
++#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
+diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
+index dabaee6987186..b3ea73b819443 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
++++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
+@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds)
+ 		hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds);
+ }
+ 
++enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
++	CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
++	CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
++	CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
++	CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
++};
++
+ static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
+ {
+-	state[0]  = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
+-	state[1]  = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
+-	state[2]  = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
+-	state[3]  = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
++	state[0]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
++	state[1]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
++	state[2]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
++	state[3]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
+ }
+ 
+ void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv);
+diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
+index c4165126937e4..88e4d145f7cda 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
++++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct drbg_state {
+ 	const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
+ 	const struct drbg_core *core;
+ 	struct drbg_string test_data;
+-	struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
++	struct notifier_block random_ready;
+ };
+ 
+ static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+index 74ff77032e526..52363eee2b20e 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
++++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+@@ -1,24 +1,129 @@
+ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
++/*
++ * Helper functions for BLAKE2s implementations.
++ * Keep this in sync with the corresponding BLAKE2b header.
++ */
+ 
+-#ifndef BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H
+-#define BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H
++#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
++#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+ 
+ #include <crypto/blake2s.h>
++#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++
++void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
++			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++
++void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
++		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++
++bool blake2s_selftest(void);
++
++static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
++{
++	state->f[0] = -1;
++}
++
++/* Helper functions for BLAKE2s shared by the library and shash APIs */
++
++static __always_inline void
++__blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
++		 bool force_generic)
++{
++	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
++
++	if (unlikely(!inlen))
++		return;
++	if (inlen > fill) {
++		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
++		if (force_generic)
++			blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
++						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		else
++			blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1,
++					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		state->buflen = 0;
++		in += fill;
++		inlen -= fill;
++	}
++	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
++		if (force_generic)
++			blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
++						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		else
++			blake2s_compress(state, in, nblocks - 1,
++					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
++		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
++	}
++	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
++	state->buflen += inlen;
++}
++
++static __always_inline void
++__blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out, bool force_generic)
++{
++	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
++	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
++	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
++	if (force_generic)
++		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
++	else
++		blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
++	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
++	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
++}
++
++/* Helper functions for shash implementations of BLAKE2s */
+ 
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx {
+ 	u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+ 	unsigned int keylen;
+ };
+ 
+-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+-			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++static inline int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
++					const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
++{
++	struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+ 
+-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+-			   size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++	if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
++	memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
++	tctx->keylen = keylen;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+ {
+-	state->f[0] = -1;
++	const struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
++	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
++	unsigned int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
++
++	__blake2s_init(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
++					const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen,
++					bool force_generic)
++{
++	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
++
++	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, force_generic);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out,
++				       bool force_generic)
++{
++	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
++
++	__blake2s_final(state, out, force_generic);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-#endif /* BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H */
++#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+index 8fb893ed205e3..fc945f9df2c1d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
++++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
+ 	CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
+ 	CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
++	CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
+ 	CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
+ 	CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
+ 	CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
+@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
+ 	CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_GPCI_ONLINE,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
++	CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
+ 	CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
+index 8e6dd908da216..aa1d4da03538b 100644
+--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
++++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
+@@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
+ /** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
+ extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
+ extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
+-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
+-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
+ 
+ #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
+diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
+index 289c26f055cdd..5b4d88faf114a 100644
+--- a/include/linux/mm.h
++++ b/include/linux/mm.h
+@@ -2585,6 +2585,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ 				   unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
+ 
+ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top);
++unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+ 
+ extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+ 
+diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
+index 056d31317e499..a4aadd2dc153e 100644
+--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
++++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
++#include <linux/siphash.h>
+ 
+ u32 prandom_u32(void);
+ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+@@ -27,15 +28,10 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
+  * The core SipHash round function.  Each line can be executed in
+  * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+  */
+-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
+-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32)  \
+-)
++#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+ 
+-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
++#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
++#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
+ 
+ #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ /*
+@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
+  * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+  * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+  */
+-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1,  5),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  8), \
+-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
+-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  7),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16)  \
+-)
+-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
++#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
++#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
++#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
+ 
+ #else
+ #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+index f45b8be3e3c4e..917470c4490ac 100644
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
+ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+-/*
+- * include/linux/random.h
+- *
+- * Include file for the random number generator.
+- */
++
+ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+ #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+ 
+@@ -14,41 +10,26 @@
+ 
+ #include <uapi/linux/random.h>
+ 
+-struct random_ready_callback {
+-	struct list_head list;
+-	void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+-	struct module *owner;
+-};
++struct notifier_block;
+ 
+-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+-extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
++void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
++			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
++void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
++void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ 
+ #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
+ {
+-	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
+-			      sizeof(latent_entropy));
++	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
+ }
+ #else
+-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+-#endif
+-
+-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+-				 unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
+-
+-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+-extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
+-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-
+-#ifndef MODULE
+-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
++static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
+ #endif
+ 
++void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
++size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
+ u32 get_random_u32(void);
+ u64 get_random_u64(void);
+ static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+@@ -80,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+-
+-	return val & CANARY_MASK;
++	return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
+ }
+ 
++int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
++bool rng_is_initialized(void);
++int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
++int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
++int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
++
+ /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
+  * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
+-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
++static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ {
+ 	int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ 	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
+-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
++#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
++	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
+ 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
+ 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
+ 			return ret; \
+-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
++		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
+ 		return 0; \
+ 	}
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
+ #undef declare_get_random_var
+ 
+-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+-
+ /*
+  * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
+  * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
+@@ -120,22 +103,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+ # include <asm/archrandom.h>
+ #else
+-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+-{
+-	return false;
+-}
+-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+-{
+-	return false;
+-}
+-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+-{
+-	return false;
+-}
+-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+-{
+-	return false;
+-}
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -158,4 +129,13 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
++int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
++#endif
++
++#ifndef MODULE
++extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
+index 35355429648e3..330029ef7e894 100644
+--- a/include/linux/security.h
++++ b/include/linux/security.h
+@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
+ 	LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
++	LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
++	LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
+ 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
+diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
+index 0cda61855d907..0bb5ecd507bef 100644
+--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
++++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
+@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
+ 	return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
++ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
++ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
++ */
++
++#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
++	(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
++	(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
++	(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
++	(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
++
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
++
++#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
++	(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
++	(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
++	(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
++	(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
++
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
+index ce08597636705..2efab9a806a9d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/timex.h
++++ b/include/linux/timex.h
+@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/param.h>
+ 
++unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
++
+ #include <asm/timex.h>
+ 
+ #ifndef random_get_entropy
+@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
+  *
+  * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
+  * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
++ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
++ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
+  */
+-#define random_get_entropy()	get_cycles()
++#ifdef get_cycles
++#define random_get_entropy()	((unsigned long)get_cycles())
++#else
++#define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy_fallback()
++#endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
+index ca6a3ea9057ec..d4d611064a76f 100644
+--- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
++++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
+@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr)
+ }
+ 
+ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+-			struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
++			struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
+ 			int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
+ 						 struct sock *, __u16,
+ 						 struct inet_timewait_sock **));
+diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+index d7d2495f83c27..dac91aa38c5af 100644
+--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
++++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ 
+-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
++u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ 			       __be16 dport);
+ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ 		   __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 9570a10cb949b..0000000000000
+--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
+-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
+-
+-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
+-
+-#include <linux/writeback.h>
+-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
+-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
+-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
+-		__entry->IP		= IP;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
+-		__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
+-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
+-		__entry->IP		= IP;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
+-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
+-		 unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	bits			)
+-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->bits		= bits;
+-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
+-		__entry->IP		= IP;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
+-		  __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	pool_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->pool_bits	= pool_bits;
+-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
+-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
+-		  __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	debit_bits		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->debit_bits	= debit_bits;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
+-		  __entry->debit_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
+-	TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
+-	TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	dev_t,	dev			)
+-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->dev		= dev;
+-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
+-		  MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
+-		 int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
+-		input_entropy),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	xfer_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	request_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	pool_entropy		)
+-		__field(	  int,	input_entropy		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->xfer_bits	= xfer_bits;
+-		__entry->request_bits	= request_bits;
+-		__entry->pool_entropy	= pool_entropy;
+-		__entry->input_entropy	= input_entropy;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
+-		  "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
+-		  __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
+-		  __entry->input_entropy)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
+-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
+-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
+-		__entry->IP		= IP;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
+-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
+-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+-		 unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
+-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
+-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
+-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
+-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
+-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
+-		__entry->IP		= IP;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
+-		  (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+-		 unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
+-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+-		 unsigned long IP),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
+-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	need_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
+-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
+-		__entry->need_bits	= need_bits;
+-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
+-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
+-		  "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
+-		  __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
+-		  __entry->input_left)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
+-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
+-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
+-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
+-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
+-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
+-		  "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
+-		  __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(prandom_u32,
+-
+-	TP_PROTO(unsigned int ret),
+-
+-	TP_ARGS(ret),
+-
+-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+-		__field(   unsigned int, ret)
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_fast_assign(
+-		__entry->ret = ret;
+-	),
+-
+-	TP_printk("ret=%u" , __entry->ret)
+-);
+-
+-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
+-
+-/* This part must be outside protection */
+-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
+diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
+index 3526eaec7508f..d8bfe61b5a889 100644
+--- a/init/main.c
++++ b/init/main.c
+@@ -952,21 +952,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
+ 	hrtimers_init();
+ 	softirq_init();
+ 	timekeeping_init();
++	time_init();
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
+ 	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
+-	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
+-	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
+-	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
+-	 * - adding command line entropy
++	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
++	 * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
++	 * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
+ 	 */
+-	rand_initialize();
+-	add_latent_entropy();
+-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
++	random_init(command_line);
+ 	boot_init_stack_canary();
+ 
+-	time_init();
+ 	perf_event_init();
+ 	profile_init();
+ 	call_function_init();
+diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
+index c06ced18f78ad..3c9ee966c56a5 100644
+--- a/kernel/cpu.c
++++ b/kernel/cpu.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <linux/scs.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/cpuset.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ 
+ #include <trace/events/power.h>
+ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+@@ -1581,6 +1582,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
+ 		.startup.single		= perf_event_init_cpu,
+ 		.teardown.single	= perf_event_exit_cpu,
+ 	},
++	[CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
++		.name			= "random:prepare",
++		.startup.single		= random_prepare_cpu,
++		.teardown.single	= NULL,
++	},
+ 	[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
+ 		.name			= "workqueue:prepare",
+ 		.startup.single		= workqueue_prepare_cpu,
+@@ -1697,6 +1703,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
+ 		.startup.single		= workqueue_online_cpu,
+ 		.teardown.single	= workqueue_offline_cpu,
+ 	},
++	[CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
++		.name			= "random:online",
++		.startup.single		= random_online_cpu,
++		.teardown.single	= NULL,
++	},
+ 	[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
+ 		.name			= "RCU/tree:online",
+ 		.startup.single		= rcutree_online_cpu,
+diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+index 8661eb2b17711..0f31b22abe8d9 100644
+--- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
++++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ #include <linux/vmacache.h>
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/irq.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+ #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+@@ -756,6 +757,29 @@ cpu_master_loop:
+ 				continue;
+ 			kgdb_connected = 0;
+ 		} else {
++			/*
++			 * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger
++			 * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory.
++			 * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when
++			 * there is already an active gdb session. For now the
++			 * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown
++			 * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started
++			 * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced
++			 * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully
++			 * they are sophisticated enough to take care of
++			 * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown
++			 * message printed on the console!
++			 */
++			if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) {
++				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) {
++					/* Switch back to kdb if possible... */
++					dbg_kdb_mode = 1;
++					continue;
++				} else {
++					/* ... otherwise just bail */
++					break;
++				}
++			}
+ 			error = gdb_serial_stub(ks);
+ 		}
+ 
+diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+index 930ac1b25ec7c..4e09fab52faf5 100644
+--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
++++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ #include "kdb_private.h"
+ 
+ #undef	MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+@@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions
+- * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run.
++ * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the
++ * current lockdown state.
++ *
++ * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We
++ * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes
++ * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check
++ * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write
++ * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to
++ * the user on first-time debugger entry.
++ *
++ * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following
++ * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE).
++ *
++ * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are
++ * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes
++ * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose
++ * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to
++ * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial,
++ * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already.
++ */
++static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void)
++{
++	const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE |
++				KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE |
++				KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL;
++	const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ |
++			       KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ;
++
++	bool need_to_lockdown_write = false;
++	bool need_to_lockdown_read = false;
++
++	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags))
++		need_to_lockdown_write =
++			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL);
++
++	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags))
++		need_to_lockdown_read =
++			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL);
++
++	/* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */
++	if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read)
++		if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL)
++			kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL;
++
++	if (need_to_lockdown_write)
++		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags;
++
++	if (need_to_lockdown_read)
++		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb
++ * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run.
+  */
+-static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
++static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
+ 				   bool no_args)
+ {
+ 	/* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */
+@@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ 		kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id());
+ 
+ 	KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason);
++
++	kdb_check_for_lockdown();
++
+ 	kdb_go_count = 0;
+ 	if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) {
+ 		/* special case below */
+diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
+index 762a928e18f92..8806444a68550 100644
+--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
++++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
+ 
+ 	retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
+ 
+-	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
++	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
+ 
+ 	if (!noirqdebug)
+ 		note_interrupt(desc, retval);
+diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+index cc4dc2857a870..e12ce2821dba5 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
++++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/clocksource.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/time.h>
++#include <linux/timex.h>
+ #include <linux/tick.h>
+ #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
+ #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
+@@ -2378,6 +2379,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
++ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
++ */
++unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
++{
++	struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
++	struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
++
++	if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
++		return 0;
++	return clock->read(clock);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
+ 
+ /**
+  * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
+diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+index 95f909540587c..3656fa8837834 100644
+--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
++++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+@@ -1426,8 +1426,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ 	  so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
+ 	  to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
+ 	  However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
+-	  address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
+-	  warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
++	  address this, by default this option is disabled.
+ 
+ 	  Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
+ 	  unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+index 14c032de276e6..af3da5a8bde8d 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
++++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ 
+-comment "Crypto library routines"
+-
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
+ 	tristate
+ 
+@@ -9,14 +7,14 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
+ 	tristate
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
+-	tristate
++	bool
+ 	help
+ 	  Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
+ 	  accelerated implementation of the Blake2s library interface,
+ 	  either builtin or as a module.
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
+-	tristate
++	def_bool !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
+ 	help
+ 	  This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
+ 	  Blake2s library interface that require the generic code as a
+@@ -24,15 +22,6 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
+ 	  implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
+ 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S.
+ 
+-config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
+-	tristate "BLAKE2s hash function library"
+-	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
+-	select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=n
+-	help
+-	  Enable the Blake2s library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
+-	  by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
+-	  is available and enabled.
+-
+ config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+ 	tristate
+ 	help
+@@ -51,7 +40,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
+ 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
+-	tristate "ChaCha library interface"
++	tristate
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
+ 	help
+@@ -76,7 +65,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
+ 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
+-	tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
++	tristate
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
+ 	help
+@@ -111,7 +100,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
+ 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
+-	tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
++	tristate
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
+ 	help
+@@ -120,7 +109,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
+ 	  is available and enabled.
+ 
+ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
+-	tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
++	tristate
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+ 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
+index 3a435629d9ce9..26be2bbe09c59 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
++++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
+@@ -10,11 +10,10 @@ libaes-y					:= aes.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4)			+= libarc4.o
+ libarc4-y					:= arc4.o
+ 
+-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC)	+= libblake2s-generic.o
+-libblake2s-generic-y				+= blake2s-generic.o
+-
+-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S)		+= libblake2s.o
+-libblake2s-y					+= blake2s.o
++# blake2s is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin
++obj-y						+= libblake2s.o
++libblake2s-y					:= blake2s.o
++libblake2s-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC)	+= blake2s-generic.o
+ 
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305)	+= libchacha20poly1305.o
+ libchacha20poly1305-y				+= chacha20poly1305.o
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
+index 04ff8df245136..75ccb3e633e65 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ 	state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
+ }
+ 
+-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
++void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
++		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
++		      __weak __alias(blake2s_compress_generic);
++
++void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+ 			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+ {
+ 	u32 m[16];
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
+index 79ef404a990d2..409e4b7287704 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+  * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+  */
+ 
+-#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
++#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
+  * #include <stdio.h>
+  *
+  * #include <openssl/evp.h>
+- * #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+  *
+  * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT	256
+  *
+@@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
+  *	}
+  *	printf("};\n\n");
+  *
+- *	printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
+- *
+- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
+- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
+- *
+- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
+- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
+- *
+- *	printf("};\n");
+- *
+  *	return 0;
+  *}
+  */
+@@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
+     0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
+ };
+ 
+-static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
+-  { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
+-    0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
+-    0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
+-  { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
+-    0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
+-    0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
+-};
+-
+ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
+ {
+ 	u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (success) {
+-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
+-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-
+-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
+-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-
+-		if (!success)
+-			pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
+-	}
+-
+ 	return success;
+ }
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
+index 41025a30c524c..80b194f9a0a09 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
+@@ -15,98 +15,21 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/bug.h>
+-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+-
+-bool blake2s_selftest(void);
+ 
+ void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+-	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+-
+-	if (unlikely(!inlen))
+-		return;
+-	if (inlen > fill) {
+-		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
+-			blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1,
+-					      BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		else
+-			blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+-						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		state->buflen = 0;
+-		in += fill;
+-		inlen -= fill;
+-	}
+-	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
+-			blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+-					      BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		else
+-			blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+-						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+-		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+-	}
+-	memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+-	state->buflen += inlen;
++	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, false);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
+ 
+ void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
+ {
+ 	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
+-	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+-	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+-	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
+-		blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+-	else
+-		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+-	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+-	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
++	__blake2s_final(state, out, false);
+ 	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
+ 
+-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
+-		     const size_t keylen)
+-{
+-	struct blake2s_state state;
+-	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
+-	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
+-	int i;
+-
+-	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+-		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
+-		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
+-	} else
+-		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+-		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+-
+-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+-
+-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+-		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
+-
+-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+-
+-	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+-	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
+-
+ static int __init mod_init(void)
+ {
+ 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
+diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
+index 4d0e05e471d72..f0ab17c2244be 100644
+--- a/lib/random32.c
++++ b/lib/random32.c
+@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@
+ #include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/bitops.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/notifier.h>
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+-#include <trace/events/random.h>
+ 
+ /**
+  *	prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
+@@ -386,7 +387,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32(void)
+ 	struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ 	u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
+ 
+-	trace_prandom_u32(res);
+ 	put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
+ 	return res;
+ }
+@@ -552,9 +552,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
+  * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+  * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+  */
+-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
++static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
++			       unsigned long action, void *data)
+ {
+ 	mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
+@@ -618,13 +620,13 @@ core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
+  */
+ static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+ {
+-	static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+-		.func = prandom_timer_start
++	static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
++		.notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
+ 	};
+-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
++	int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
+ 
+ 	if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+-		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
++		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 	}
+ 	return ret;
+diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
+index 49257a915bb60..5ad4e49482728 100644
+--- a/lib/sha1.c
++++ b/lib/sha1.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/export.h>
+ #include <linux/bitops.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <crypto/sha.h>
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+ 
+@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
+ #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
+ 	__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
+ 	E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
+-	B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
++	B = ror32(B, 2); \
++	TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
+ 
+ #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E)  SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
+ #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
+@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
+ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
+ {
+ 	__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
++	unsigned int i = 0;
+ 
+ 	A = digest[0];
+ 	B = digest[1];
+@@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
+ 	E = digest[4];
+ 
+ 	/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
+-	T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
++	for (; i < 16; ++i)
++		T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+ 
+ 	/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
+-	T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
++	for (; i < 20; ++i)
++		T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+ 
+ 	/* Round 2 */
+-	T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
++	for (; i < 40; ++i)
++		T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+ 
+ 	/* Round 3 */
+-	T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
++	for (; i < 60; ++i)
++		T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+ 
+ 	/* Round 4 */
+-	T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
+-	T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
+-	T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
+-	T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
+-	T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
+-	T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
++	for (; i < 80; ++i)
++		T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+ 
+ 	digest[0] += A;
+ 	digest[1] += B;
+diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
+index 025f0cbf6d7a7..b4055b1cc2f67 100644
+--- a/lib/siphash.c
++++ b/lib/siphash.c
+@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
+ #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define SIPROUND \
+-	do { \
+-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
+-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
+-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
+-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
+-	} while (0)
++#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+ 
+ #define PREAMBLE(len) \
+-	u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
+-	u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
+-	u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
+-	u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
++	u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
++	u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
++	u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
++	u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
+ 	u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
+ 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
+ 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
+@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
+ #else
+-#define HSIPROUND \
+-	do { \
+-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
+-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
+-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
+-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
+-	} while (0)
++#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+ 
+ #define HPREAMBLE(len) \
+-	u32 v0 = 0; \
+-	u32 v1 = 0; \
+-	u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
+-	u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
++	u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
++	u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
++	u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
++	u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
+ 	u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
+ 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
+ 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
+diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
+index 8ade1a86d8187..daf32a489dc06 100644
+--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
++++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
+@@ -756,14 +756,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
+ 
+ static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
+ 
+-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
++static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
++			       unsigned long action, void *data)
+ {
+ 	/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
+ 	queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+-	.func = fill_random_ptr_key
++static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
++	.notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+@@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
++	ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
+ 	if (!ret) {
+ 		return 0;
+ 	} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
+index 8904727607907..ba9643de689ea 100644
+--- a/mm/util.c
++++ b/mm/util.c
+@@ -331,6 +331,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
++ * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
++ * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
++ *		random address must fall.
++ *
++ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
++ *
++ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
++ * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
++ *
++ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
++ * @start is returned.
++ */
++unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
++{
++	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
++		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
++		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
++	}
++
++	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
++		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
++
++	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
++
++	if (range == 0)
++		return start;
++
++	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
++}
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
+ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+index b8a33c841846f..7131cd1fb2ad5 100644
+--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
++++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
+ 
+-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
++u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ 			       __be16 dport)
+ {
+ 	const struct {
+@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_tcp_seq);
+ 
+-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
++u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+ {
+ 	net_secret_init();
+ 	return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+index 915b8e1bd9efb..44b524136f953 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ not_unique:
+ 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ }
+ 
+-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
++static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+ {
+ 	const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ 
+@@ -722,8 +722,19 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
+ 
++/* RFC 6056 3.3.4.  Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
++ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
++ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
++ * property might be used by clever attacker.
++ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
++ * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
++ * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
++ */
++#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
++static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
++
+ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+-		struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
++		struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
+ 		int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
+ 			struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
+ {
+@@ -735,8 +746,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ 	struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
+ 	u32 remaining, offset;
+ 	int ret, i, low, high;
+-	static u32 hint;
+ 	int l3mdev;
++	u32 index;
+ 
+ 	if (port) {
+ 		head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
+@@ -763,7 +774,12 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
+ 		remaining &= ~1U;
+ 
+-	offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining;
++	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
++	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
++
++	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
++	offset %= remaining;
++
+ 	/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
+ 	 * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
+ 	 */
+@@ -817,7 +833,7 @@ next_port:
+ 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ 
+ ok:
+-	hint += i + 2;
++	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
+ 
+ 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
+ 	inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
+@@ -840,7 +856,7 @@ ok:
+ int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ 		      struct sock *sk)
+ {
+-	u32 port_offset = 0;
++	u64 port_offset = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
+ 		port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+index 0a2e7f2283911..40203255ed88b 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ not_unique:
+ 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ }
+ 
+-static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
++static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+ {
+ 	const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ 
+@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+ int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ 		       struct sock *sk)
+ {
+-	u32 port_offset = 0;
++	u64 port_offset = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
+ 		port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);
+diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
+index d9d42d64f89f2..360706cdababc 100644
+--- a/security/security.c
++++ b/security/security.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
++	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
++	[LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
+ 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
+diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
+index f8ac96cf38a43..06775519dab00 100644
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 			    | ((IEC958_AES3_CON_FS_48000) << 24))
+ 
+ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k1_list[] = {
++	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0021, "SB046x", CTSB046X),
+ 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0022, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
+ 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x002f, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
+ 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0029, "SB073x", CTSB073X),
+@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k2_list[] = {
+ 
+ static const char *ct_subsys_name[NUM_CTCARDS] = {
+ 	/* 20k1 models */
++	[CTSB046X]	= "SB046x",
+ 	[CTSB055X]	= "SB055x",
+ 	[CTSB073X]	= "SB073x",
+ 	[CTUAA]		= "UAA",
+diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
+index 9e6b83bd432d9..b50d61a08e283 100644
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
+@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ enum CHIPTYP {
+ 
+ enum CTCARDS {
+ 	/* 20k1 models */
++	CTSB046X,
++	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB046X,
+ 	CTSB055X,
+-	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB055X,
+ 	CTSB073X,
+ 	CTUAA,
+ 	CT20K1_UNKNOWN,