app-emulation/qemu: security fixes, bug #598772

    CVE-2016-9102, bug #598328
    CVE-2016-9103, bug #598328
    CVE-2016-9104, bug #598328
    CVE-2016-9105, bug #598328
    CVE-2016-9106, bug #598772

Package-Manager: portage-2.3.0

1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f1aec55c228b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
+originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
+the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
+Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
+calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
+guest to cause OOB access anyway.
+
+Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
+both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
+to read or write.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index ab18ef2..7705ead 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1637,20 +1637,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     ssize_t err;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+-    int read_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t read_count;
+     V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
+     VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    read_count = xattr_len - off;
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
++        read_count = 0;
++    } else {
++        read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    }
+     if (read_count > max_count) {
+         read_count = max_count;
+-    } else if (read_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * read beyond XATTR value
+-         */
+-        read_count = 0;
+     }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+@@ -1979,23 +1976,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     int i, to_copy;
+     ssize_t err = 0;
+-    int write_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t write_count;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+ 
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    write_count = xattr_len - off;
+-    if (write_count > count) {
+-        write_count = count;
+-    } else if (write_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
+-         * xattrcreate
+-         */
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
+         err = -ENOSPC;
+         goto out;
+     }
++    write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    if (write_count > count) {
++        write_count = count;
++    }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+         return err;
+-- 
+2.7.3
+