net-misc/openssh: Version bump to 7.8_p1

Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.49, Repoman-2.3.10

5 files changed, 586 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..989dc6cee68d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 9a3bc96f..fc2c3620 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -733,120 +733,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
+  * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index f71a0856..3e162d8c 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index db5f2d54..67feffa5 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -202,9 +203,11 @@ static struct {
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ # else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -977,6 +980,10 @@ parse_time:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1818,6 +1825,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1964,6 +1972,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index c5688781..af809cc8 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index f499396a..be758544 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -722,6 +722,16 @@ The default is
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 10e4f0a0..4f7d49e3 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -657,6 +657,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int r, ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -669,7 +676,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-X509-no-version.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-X509-no-version.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..66641c27473e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-X509-no-version.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+--- a/openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4.diff	2018-08-24 14:55:19.153936872 -0700
++++ b/openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4.diff	2018-08-24 14:55:58.116677254 -0700
+@@ -63643,16 +63643,6 @@
+  		    setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "POSIX.UTF-8") != NULL))
+  			return;
+  		setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
+-diff -ruN openssh-7.8p1/version.h openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4/version.h
+---- openssh-7.8p1/version.h	2018-08-23 08:41:42.000000000 +0300
+-+++ openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4/version.h	2018-08-24 20:07:00.000000000 +0300
+-@@ -2,5 +2,4 @@
+- 
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.8"
+- 
+--#define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	PACKAGE_STRING ", " SSH_VERSION "p1"
+ diff -ruN openssh-7.8p1/version.m4 openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4/version.m4
+ --- openssh-7.8p1/version.m4	1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200
+ +++ openssh-7.8p1+x509-11.4/version.m4	2018-08-24 20:00:00.000000000 +0300
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-X509-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-X509-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c76d454c92f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-X509-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+--- temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff.orig	2018-09-12 15:58:57.377986085 -0700
++++ temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff	2018-09-12 16:07:15.376711327 -0700
+@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
+ +++ b/Makefile.in
+ @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CC=@CC@
+  LD=@LD@
+- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ $(CFLAGS_EXTRA)
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -788,8 +788,8 @@
+  ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+  {
+  	struct session_state *state;
+--	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+-+	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
++-	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none();
+++	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none();
+  	int r;
+
+  	if (none == NULL) {
+@@ -933,9 +933,9 @@
+  	/* Portable-specific options */
+  	sUsePAM,
+ +	sDisableMTAES,
+- 	/* Standard Options */
+- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
++ 	/* X.509 Standard Options */
++ 	sHostbasedAlgorithms,
++ 	sPubkeyAlgorithms,
+ @@ -626,6 +630,7 @@ static struct {
+  	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+  	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+--- temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff.orig	2018-09-12 16:38:16.947447218 -0700
++++ temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff	2018-09-12 16:32:35.479700864 -0700
+@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
+ @@ -822,6 +822,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+  	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+  	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+- 	int r, first_kex_follows;
++ 	int r, first_kex_follows = 0;
+ +	int auth_flag;
+ +
+ +	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
+@@ -1125,15 +1125,6 @@
+ index a738c3a..b32dbe0 100644
+ --- a/sshd.c
+ +++ b/sshd.c
+-@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+- 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+- 
+- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+--	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+-+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+- 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+- 	    options.version_addendum);
+- 
+ @@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
+  	int ret, listen_sock;
+  	struct addrinfo *ai;
+@@ -1213,14 +1204,3 @@
+  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+  #Match User anoncvs
+  #	X11Forwarding no
+-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+-index f1bbf00..21a70c2 100644
+---- a/version.h
+-+++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.8"
+- 
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+-+ 
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0561e3814067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+--- temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff.orig	2018-09-11 17:19:19.968420409 -0700
++++ temp/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff	2018-09-11 17:39:19.977535398 -0700
+@@ -409,18 +409,10 @@
+ index dcf35e6..da4ced0 100644
+ --- a/packet.c
+ +++ b/packet.c
+-@@ -920,6 +920,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
++@@ -920,6 +920,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+  	return 0;
+  }
+  
+-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
+-+int rekey_requested = 0;
+-+void
+-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
+-+{
+-+	rekey_requested = 1;
+-+}
+-+
+ +/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
+ + * and none cipher switch */
+ +int
+@@ -434,20 +426,6 @@
+  #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+  static int
+  ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+-@@ -946,6 +964,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+- 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+- 		return 0;
+- 
+-+	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
+-+         * cipher switch methods -cjr */
+-+        if (rekey_requested == 1) {
+-+                rekey_requested = 0;
+-+                return 1;
+-+        }
+-+
+- 	/* Time-based rekeying */
+- 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+- 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+ diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
+ index 170203c..f4d9df2 100644
+ --- a/packet.h
+@@ -476,9 +454,9 @@
+  /* Format of the configuration file:
+  
+ @@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ typedef enum {
+- 	oHashKnownHosts,
+  	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+  	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
++ 	oDisableMTAES,
+ +	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
+ +	oNoneEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
+  	oVisualHostKey,
+@@ -615,9 +593,9 @@
+  	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+  	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+ @@ -111,7 +115,10 @@ typedef struct {
+- 
+  	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+  	int64_t rekey_limit;
++ 	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
+ +	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
+ +	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
+  	int	rekey_interval;
+@@ -673,9 +651,9 @@
+  	/* Portable-specific options */
+  	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ @@ -391,6 +400,43 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+- 	}
+- 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+  		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++ 	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++ 		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
+ +	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
+ +		options->none_enabled = 0;
+ +	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
+@@ -1092,7 +1070,7 @@
+  	xxx_host = host;
+  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+  
+-@@ -412,6 +423,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
++@@ -412,6 +423,27 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+  
+  	if (!authctxt.success)
+  		fatal("Authentication failed.");
+@@ -1117,10 +1095,9 @@
+ +			fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
+ +		}
+ +	}
+-+
+- 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+- }
+  
++ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ 	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
+ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+ index a738c3a..b32dbe0 100644
+ --- a/sshd.c
+@@ -1217,11 +1194,10 @@
+ index f1bbf00..21a70c2 100644
+ --- a/version.h
+ +++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
++@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
+  #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.8"
+  
+  #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ -#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_HPN         "-hpn14v16"
+ +#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+ + 
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-sctp-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-sctp-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a7d51ad94839
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.8_p1-hpn-sctp-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- dd/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff.orig	2018-09-12 18:18:51.851536374 -0700
++++ dd/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff	2018-09-12 18:19:01.116475099 -0700
+@@ -1190,14 +1190,3 @@
+  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+  #Match User anoncvs
+  #	X11Forwarding no
+-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+-index f1bbf00..21a70c2 100644
+---- a/version.h
+-+++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.8"
+- 
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+-+