net-wireless/wpa_supplicant: Removing old, unsecure versions now that 2.5 is marked stable

Package-Manager: portage-2.2.28

13 files changed, 0 insertions, 928 deletions

diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de1964ca7697..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
- 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
- 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- 	if (msg.ssid &&
-+	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
- 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
- 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
- 	     != 0)) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 36b4ca294699..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- 						goto bad;
- 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+							   h->chunk_size);
-+						goto bad;
-+					}
- 					/* throw away chunk header
- 					 * so we have only real data
- 					 */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 79c5af8906fa..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (left < 0)
-+		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
- 	/* extract the tspec info element */
- 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
- 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 91627fb7b7f6..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	u16 offset;
- 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
- 	 *	prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5dca20b2771b..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- 	int res = 0;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
- 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
- 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
- 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d2f9d8aefeb..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index a629437..1d2079b 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
- 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7edef099eb59..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * the first fragment has a total length
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
- 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a601323f14da..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-
-The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
-whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
-fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
-for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
-triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
-due to invalid buffer allocation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
- 	 */
-+	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
- 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
- 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d03eb484fc28..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From fc880b11ed70ff9dcf8be48621f75d354cc5094d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:33:55 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Avoid misaligned read of an NDEF field
-
-The 32-bit version of payload length field may not be 32-bit aligned in
-the message buffer, so use WPA_GET_BE32() to read it instead of ntohl().
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/ndef.c |    2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
-index 8d1ce1e..5604b0a 100644
---- a/src/wps/ndef.c
-+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
- 	} else {
- 		if (size < 6)
- 			return -1;
--		record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
-+		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
- 		pos += sizeof(u32);
- 	}
- 
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f624c8dad46..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
-
-It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
-wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
-length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
-2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
-payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
-bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
-This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
-heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
-same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
-In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
-would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
-infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
-
-Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
-attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
-sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
-the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
-received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
-that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
-hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
-here.
-
-Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
-detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
-index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
---- a/src/wps/ndef.c
-+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
- 		if (size < 6)
- 			return -1;
- 		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
-+		if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
-+			return -1;
- 		pos += sizeof(u32);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
- 	pos += record->payload_length;
- 
- 	record->total_length = pos - data;
--	if (record->total_length > size)
-+	if (record->total_length > size ||
-+	    record->total_length < record->payload_length)
- 		return -1;
- 	return 0;
- }
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-dbus-path-fix.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-dbus-path-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 976d71b0ec39..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-dbus-path-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff -aurp a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in
---- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in	2012-05-15 09:00:03.048545044 +0000
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in	2012-05-15 09:01:19.759550509 +0000
-@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- [D-BUS Service]
- Name=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant
--Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
-+Exec=/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -u
- User=root
- SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
-diff -aurp a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in
---- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in	2012-05-15 09:00:03.048545044 +0000
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in	2012-05-15 09:01:28.727551913 +0000
-@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- [D-BUS Service]
- Name=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1
--Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
-+Exec=/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -u
- User=root
- SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bbff73e13d42..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-do-not-call-dbus-functions-with-NULL-path.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-diff -aurp a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c
---- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c	2012-05-15 07:28:37.616150164 +0000
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_helpers.c	2012-05-15 07:30:21.904157611 +0000
-@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ void wpa_dbus_mark_property_changed(stru
- 	const struct wpa_dbus_property_desc *dsc;
- 	int i = 0;
- 
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	dbus_connection_get_object_path_data(iface->con, path,
-diff -aurp a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_old.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_old.c
---- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_old.c	2012-05-15 07:28:29.502149373 +0000
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_old.c	2012-05-15 07:30:48.859162441 +0000
-@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ void wpa_supplicant_dbus_notify_scan_res
- 	DBusMessage *_signal;
- 
- 	/* Do nothing if the control interface is not turned on */
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || wpa_s->dbus_path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	_signal = dbus_message_new_signal(wpa_s->dbus_path,
-@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ void wpa_supplicant_dbus_notify_state_ch
- 	if (wpa_s->global == NULL)
- 		return;
- 	iface = wpa_s->global->dbus;
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || wpa_s->dbus_path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	/* Only send signal if state really changed */
-@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ void wpa_supplicant_dbus_notify_scanning
- 	dbus_bool_t scanning = wpa_s->scanning ? TRUE : FALSE;
- 
- 	/* Do nothing if the control interface is not turned on */
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || wpa_s->dbus_path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	_signal = dbus_message_new_signal(wpa_s->dbus_path,
-@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ void wpa_supplicant_dbus_notify_wps_cred
- 	if (wpa_s->global == NULL)
- 		return;
- 	iface = wpa_s->global->dbus;
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || wpa_s->dbus_path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	_signal = dbus_message_new_signal(wpa_s->dbus_path,
-@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ void wpa_supplicant_dbus_notify_certific
- 	if (wpa_s->global == NULL)
- 		return;
- 	iface = wpa_s->global->dbus;
--	if (iface == NULL)
-+	if (iface == NULL || wpa_s->dbus_path == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	_signal = dbus_message_new_signal(wpa_s->dbus_path,
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-generate-libeap-peer.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-generate-libeap-peer.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6f3605713353..000000000000
--- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-generate-libeap-peer.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
-diff -Naurp a/src/eap_peer/Makefile b/src/eap_peer/Makefile
---- a/src/eap_peer/Makefile	2012-05-15 08:23:17.152386964 +0000
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/Makefile	2012-05-15 08:23:57.403389760 +0000
-@@ -1,11 +1,192 @@
--all:
--	@echo Nothing to be made.
-+LIBEAP_NAME = libeap
-+LIBEAP_CURRENT = 0
-+LIBEAP_REVISION = 0
-+LIBEAP_AGE = 0
-+
-+LIBEAP = $(LIBEAP_NAME).so.$(LIBEAP_CURRENT).$(LIBEAP_REVISION).$(LIBEAP_AGE)
-+LIBEAP_SO = $(LIBEAP_NAME).so.$(LIBEAP_CURRENT)
-+
-+.PHONY: all clean install uninstall
-+
-+all: $(LIBEAP)
-+
-+ifndef CC
-+CC=gcc
-+endif
-+
-+ifndef CFLAGS
-+CFLAGS = -MMD -O0 -Wall -g
-+endif
-+
-+CONFIG_TLS=openssl
-+
-+INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR=/usr/include/eap_peer
-+
-+# Got to use override all across the board, otherwise a 'make
-+# CFLAGS=XX' will kill us because the command line's CFLAGS will
-+# overwrite Make's and we'll loose all the infrastructure it sets.
-+override CFLAGS += -I. -I.. -I../crypto -I../utils -I../common
-+
-+# at least for now, need to include config_ssid.h and config_blob.h from
-+# wpa_supplicant directory
-+override CFLAGS += -I ../../wpa_supplicant
-+
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/os_unix.o
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/wpa_debug.o
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/base64.o
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/wpabuf.o
-+OBJS_both += ../utils/eloop.o
-+ifneq ($(CONFIG_TLS), openssl)
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/md5.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/sha1.o
-+endif
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/sha1-tlsprf.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/aes-encblock.o
-+ifneq ($(CONFIG_TLS), openssl)
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/aes-wrap.o
-+endif
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/aes-ctr.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/aes-eax.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/aes-omac1.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/ms_funcs.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/sha256.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/random.o
-+
-+
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/eap_peap_common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/eap_psk_common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/eap_pax_common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/eap_sake_common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/eap_gpsk_common.o
-+OBJS_both += ../eap_common/chap.o
-+
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_tls.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_peap.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_ttls.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_md5.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_mschapv2.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/mschapv2.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_otp.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_gtc.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_leap.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_psk.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_pax.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_sake.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_gpsk.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_common/eap_common.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_methods.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../eap_peer/eap_tls_common.o
-+
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_TLS
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_PEAP
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_TTLS
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_MD5
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_MSCHAPv2
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_GTC
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_OTP
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_LEAP
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_PSK
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_PAX
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_SAKE
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_GPSK -DEAP_GPSK_SHA256
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_TLS_FUNCS
-+
-+override CFLAGS += -DIEEE8021X_EAPOL
-+
-+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TLS), openssl)
-+override CFLAGS += -DEAP_TLS_OPENSSL
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/tls_openssl.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/crypto_openssl.o
-+LIBS += -lssl -lcrypto
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_SHA256
-+endif
-+
-+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TLS), internal)
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/tls_internal.o
-+OBJS_both += ../tls/tlsv1_common.o ../../tls/tlsv1_record.o
-+OBJS_both += ../tls/tlsv1_cred.o
-+OBJS_both += ../tls/asn1.o ../../tls/x509v3.o
-+OBJS_both += ../crypto/crypto_internal.o ../../tls/rsa.o ../../tls/bignum.o
-+
-+OBJS_peer += ../tls/tlsv1_client.o
-+OBJS_peer += ../tls/tlsv1_client_write.o ../../tls/tlsv1_client_read.o
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_TLS_INTERNAL_CLIENT
-+
-+OBJS_server += ../tls/tlsv1_server.o
-+OBJS_server += ../tls/tlsv1_server_write.o ../../tls/tlsv1_server_read.o
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_TLS_INTERNAL_SERVER
-+
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_TLS_INTERNAL
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CRYPTO_INTERNAL
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_INTERNAL_X509
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_AES
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_SHA1
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_SHA256
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_MD5
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_MD4
-+override CFLAGS += -DINTERNAL_DES
-+ifdef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH
-+override CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH
-+else
-+LIBS += -ltommath
-+endif
-+endif
-+
-+ifndef LDO
-+LDO=$(CC)
-+endif
-+
-+
-+OBJS_lib=$(OBJS_both) $(OBJS_peer)
-+
-+ #$(OBJS_server)
-+
-+override CFLAGS  += -fPIC -DPIC
-+LDFLAGS += -shared
-+
-+$(LIBEAP): $(OBJS_lib)
-+	$(LDO) $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS_lib) -Wl,-soname -Wl,$(LIBEAP_SO) -o $(LIBEAP) $(LIBS)
-+
-+
-+UTIL_HEADERS = ../utils/includes.h ../utils/common.h \
-+	../utils/wpabuf.h ../utils/build_config.h \
-+	../utils/os.h ../utils/wpa_debug.h
-+COMMON_HEADERS = ../common/defs.h 
-+EAP_COMMON_HEADERS = ../eap_common/eap_defs.h 
-+MAIN_HEADERS = eap.h eap_methods.h eap_config.h
-+CRYPTO_HEADERS =  ../crypto/tls.h  
-+
-+install: 
-+
-+	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib
-+#	copy the lib file to std lib location
-+	cp $(LIBEAP) $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib
-+	ln -fs $(LIBEAP_SO) $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/$(LIBEAP_NAME).so
-+	ln -fs $(LIBEAP_NAME).so.0.0.0 $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/$(LIBEAP_NAME).so.0
-+
-+#	copy the headers reqd by apps using eap peer library in its own subfolder under /usr/include
-+	mkdir -p \
-+		$(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/eap_common \
-+		$(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/common \
-+		$(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/util \
-+		$(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/crypto
-+	install -m 0644 $(EAP_COMMON_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/eap_common
-+	install -m 0644 $(COMMON_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/common
-+	install -m 0644 $(CRYPTO_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/crypto
-+	install -m 0644 $(UTIL_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/util
-+	install -m 0644 $(MAIN_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)/
-+
-+	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/pkgconfig
-+	cp libeap0.pc $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/pkgconfig
-+
-+uninstall: 
-+
-+	rm $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/$(LIBEAP)
-+	rm -fr $(DESTDIR)/$(INCLUDE_INSTALL_DIR)
-+	rm -f $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/pkgconfig/libeap0.pc
- 
- clean:
--	rm -f *~ *.o *.so *.d *.gcno *.gcda *.gcov
-+	rm -f *~ *.o *.so *.d *.gcno *.gcda *.gcov libeap.a $(LIBEAP) $(OBJS_lib)
- 
--install:
--	if ls *.so >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
--		install -d $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/wpa_supplicant && \
--		cp *.so $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/wpa_supplicant \
--	; fi
-diff -Naurp a/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.c
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.c	2012-05-15 08:23:17.151386999 +0000
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.c	2012-05-15 08:23:57.403389760 +0000
-@@ -336,6 +336,120 @@
- 
- 
- /**
-+ * eap_peer_register_methods - Register all known EAP peer methods
-+ *
-+ * This function is called at program start to register all compiled
-+ * in EAP peer methods.
-+ */
-+int eap_peer_register_methods(void)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_MD5
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_md5_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_MD5 */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_TLS
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_tls_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_TLS */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_MSCHAPv2
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_mschapv2_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_MSCHAPv2 */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_PEAP
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_peap_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_PEAP */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_TTLS
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_ttls_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_TTLS */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_GTC
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_gtc_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_GTC */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_OTP
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_otp_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_OTP */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_SIM
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_sim_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_SIM */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_LEAP
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_leap_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_LEAP */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_PSK
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_psk_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_PSK */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_AKA
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_aka_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_AKA */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_aka_prime_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_FAST
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_fast_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_FAST */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_PAX
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_pax_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_PAX */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_SAKE
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_sake_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_SAKE */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_GPSK
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_gpsk_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_GPSK */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_WSC
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_wsc_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_WSC */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_IKEV2
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_ikev2_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_IKEV2 */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_VENDOR_TEST
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_vendor_test_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_VENDOR_TEST */
-+
-+#ifdef EAP_TNC
-+	if (ret == 0)
-+		ret = eap_peer_tnc_register();
-+#endif /* EAP_TNC */
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/**
-  * eap_peer_unregister_methods - Unregister EAP peer methods
-  *
-  * This function is called at program termination to unregister all EAP peer
-diff -Naurp a/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.h
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.h	2012-05-15 08:23:17.151386999 +0000
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_methods.h	2012-05-15 08:23:57.404389735 +0000
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- const char * eap_get_name(int vendor, EapType type);
- size_t eap_get_names(char *buf, size_t buflen);
- char ** eap_get_names_as_string_array(size_t *num);
-+int eap_peer_register_methods(void);
- void eap_peer_unregister_methods(void);
- 
- #else /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
-diff -Naurp a/src/eap_peer/libeap0.pc b/src/eap_peer/libeap0.pc
---- a/src/eap_peer/libeap0.pc	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/libeap0.pc	2012-05-15 08:23:57.404389735 +0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+prefix=/usr
-+exec_prefix=/usr
-+libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib
-+includedir=${prefix}/include/eap_peer
-+
-+Name: libeap0
-+Description: EAP Peer Library API
-+Version: 0.7.2
-+Libs: -L${libdir} -leap
-+Cflags: -I${includedir}