proj/gentoo: Initial commit

This commit represents a new era for Gentoo:
Storing the gentoo-x86 tree in Git, as converted from CVS.

This commit is the start of the NEW history.
Any historical data is intended to be grafted onto this point.

Creation process:
1. Take final CVS checkout snapshot
2. Remove ALL ChangeLog* files
3. Transform all Manifests to thin
4. Remove empty Manifests
5. Convert all stale $Header$/$Id$ CVS keywords to non-expanded Git $Id$
5.1. Do not touch files with -kb/-ko keyword flags.

Signed-off-by: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org>
X-Thanks: Alec Warner <antarus@gentoo.org> - did the GSoC 2006 migration tests
X-Thanks: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org> - infra guy, herding this project
X-Thanks: Nguyen Thai Ngoc Duy <pclouds@gentoo.org> - Former Gentoo developer, wrote Git features for the migration
X-Thanks: Brian Harring <ferringb@gentoo.org> - wrote much python to improve cvs2svn
X-Thanks: Rich Freeman <rich0@gentoo.org> - validation scripts
X-Thanks: Patrick Lauer <patrick@gentoo.org> - Gentoo dev, running new 2014 work in migration
X-Thanks: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org> - scripts, QA, nagging
X-Thanks: All of other Gentoo developers - many ideas and lots of paint on the bikeshed

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sys-auth/skey/metadata.xml b/sys-auth/skey/metadata.xml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..31fc6f43a7dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-auth/skey/metadata.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE pkgmetadata SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/metadata.dtd">
+<pkgmetadata>
+<maintainer>
+  <email>ulm@gentoo.org</email>
+</maintainer>
+<longdescription lang="en">
+  From RFC2289:
+  One form of attack on networked computing systems is eavesdropping on
+  network connections to obtain authentication information such as the
+  login IDs and passwords of legitimate users. Once this information is
+  captured, it can be used at a later time to gain access to the system.
+  One-time password systems are designed to counter this type of attack,
+  called a "replay attack."
+
+  The authentication system described in this document uses a secret
+  pass-phrase to generate a sequence of one-time (single use) passwords.
+  With this system, the user's secret pass-phrase never needs to cross the
+  network at any time such as during authentication or during pass-phrase
+  changes. Thus, it is not vulnerable to replay attacks. Added security
+  is provided by the property that no secret information need be stored on
+  any system, including the server being protected.
+
+  The OTP system protects against external passive attacks against the
+  authentication subsystem. It does not prevent a network eavesdropper from
+  gaining access to private information and does not provide protection
+  against either "social engineering" or active attacks.
+</longdescription>
+</pkgmetadata>