diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files')
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.3 | 172 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch | 141 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch | 79 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.5-test-memcmp.patch | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.7-x509-CVE-2022-3996.patch | 35 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch | 137 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-p11-segfault.patch | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch | 137 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch | 79 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-riscv.patch | 70 |
11 files changed, 734 insertions, 234 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.3 b/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.3 deleted file mode 100644 index 0662f72b6d80..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.3 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env bash -# Copyright 1999-2020 Gentoo Authors -# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 -# -# Openssl doesn't play along nicely with cross-compiling -# like autotools based projects, so let's teach it new tricks. -# -# Review the bundled 'config' script to see why kind of targets -# we can pass to the 'Configure' script. - - -# Testing routines -if [[ $1 == "test" ]] ; then - for c in \ - "arm-gentoo-linux-uclibc |linux-generic32 -DL_ENDIAN" \ - "armv5b-linux-gnu |linux-armv4 -DB_ENDIAN" \ - "x86_64-pc-linux-gnu |linux-x86_64" \ - "alpha-linux-gnu |linux-alpha-gcc" \ - "alphaev56-unknown-linux-gnu |linux-alpha+bwx-gcc" \ - "i686-pc-linux-gnu |linux-elf" \ - "whatever-gentoo-freebsdX.Y |BSD-generic32" \ - "i686-gentoo-freebsdX.Y |BSD-x86-elf" \ - "sparc64-alpha-freebsdX.Y |BSD-sparc64" \ - "ia64-gentoo-freebsd5.99234 |BSD-ia64" \ - "x86_64-gentoo-freebsdX.Y |BSD-x86_64" \ - "hppa64-aldsF-linux-gnu5.3 |linux-generic32 -DB_ENDIAN" \ - "powerpc-gentOO-linux-uclibc |linux-ppc" \ - "powerpc64-unk-linux-gnu |linux-ppc64" \ - "powerpc64le-linux-gnu |linux-ppc64le" \ - "x86_64-apple-darwinX |darwin64-x86_64-cc" \ - "powerpc64-apple-darwinX |darwin64-ppc-cc" \ - "i686-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ - "i386-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ - "powerpc-apple-darwinX |darwin-ppc-cc" \ - "i586-pc-winnt |winnt-parity" \ - "s390-ibm-linux-gnu |linux-generic32 -DB_ENDIAN" \ - "s390x-linux-gnu |linux64-s390x" \ - ;do - CHOST=${c/|*} - ret_want=${c/*|} - ret_got=$(CHOST=${CHOST} "$0") - - if [[ ${ret_want} == "${ret_got}" ]] ; then - echo "PASS: ${CHOST}" - else - echo "FAIL: ${CHOST}" - echo -e "\twanted: ${ret_want}" - echo -e "\twe got: ${ret_got}" - fi - done - exit 0 -fi -[[ -z ${CHOST} && -n $1 ]] && CHOST=$1 - - -# Detect the operating system -case ${CHOST} in - *-aix*) system="aix";; - *-darwin*) system="darwin";; - *-freebsd*) system="BSD";; - *-hpux*) system="hpux";; - *-linux*) system="linux";; - *-solaris*) system="solaris";; - *-winnt*) system="winnt";; - x86_64-*-mingw*) system="mingw64";; - *mingw*) system="mingw";; - *) exit 0;; -esac - - -# Compiler munging -compiler="gcc" -if [[ ${CC} == "ccc" ]] ; then - compiler=${CC} -fi - - -# Detect target arch -machine="" -chost_machine=${CHOST%%-*} -case ${system} in -linux) - case ${chost_machine}:${ABI} in - aarch64*be*) machine="aarch64 -DB_ENDIAN";; - aarch64*) machine="aarch64 -DL_ENDIAN";; - alphaev56*|\ - alphaev[678]*)machine=alpha+bwx-${compiler};; - alpha*) machine=alpha-${compiler};; - armv[4-9]*b*) machine="armv4 -DB_ENDIAN";; - armv[4-9]*) machine="armv4 -DL_ENDIAN";; - arm*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - arm*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - avr*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - bfin*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - # hppa64*) machine=parisc64;; - hppa*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - i[0-9]86*|\ - x86_64*:x86) machine=elf;; - ia64*) machine=ia64;; - loongarch64*) machine="generic64 -DL_ENDIAN";; - m68*) machine="latomic -DB_ENDIAN";; - mips*el*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - mips*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - powerpc64*le*)machine=ppc64le;; - powerpc64*) machine=ppc64;; - powerpc*le*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - powerpc*) machine=ppc;; - riscv32*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - riscv64*) machine="generic64 -DL_ENDIAN";; - # sh64*) machine=elf;; - sh*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - sh*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; - # TODO: Might want to do -mcpu probing like glibc to determine a - # better default for sparc-linux-gnu targets. This logic will - # break v7 and older systems when they use it. - sparc*v7*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - sparc64*) machine=sparcv9 system=linux64;; - sparc*v9*) machine=sparcv9;; - sparc*v8*) machine=sparcv8;; - sparc*) machine=sparcv8;; - s390x*) machine=s390x system=linux64;; - s390*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; - x86_64*:x32) machine=x32;; - x86_64*) machine=x86_64;; - esac - ;; -BSD) - case ${chost_machine} in - alpha*) machine=generic64;; - i[6-9]86*) machine=x86-elf;; - ia64*) machine=ia64;; - sparc64*) machine=sparc64;; - x86_64*) machine=x86_64;; - *) machine=generic32;; - esac - ;; -aix) - machine=${compiler} - ;; -darwin) - case ${chost_machine} in - powerpc64) machine=ppc-cc; system=${system}64;; - powerpc) machine=ppc-cc;; - i?86*) machine=i386-cc;; - x86_64) machine=x86_64-cc; system=${system}64;; - esac - ;; -hpux) - case ${chost_machine} in - ia64) machine=ia64-${compiler} ;; - esac - ;; -solaris) - case ${chost_machine} in - i386) machine=x86-${compiler} ;; - x86_64*) machine=x86_64-${compiler}; system=${system}64;; - sparcv9*) machine=sparcv9-${compiler}; system=${system}64;; - sparc*) machine=sparcv8-${compiler};; - esac - ;; -winnt) - machine=parity - ;; -mingw*) - # special case ... no xxx-yyy style name - echo ${system} - ;; -esac - - -# If we have something, show it -[[ -n ${machine} ]] && echo ${system}-${machine} diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 b/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 index 573a97de3543..d32ce877a34a 100644 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Copyright 1999-2020 Gentoo Authors +# Copyright 1999-2023 Gentoo Authors # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 # # Openssl doesn't play along nicely with cross-compiling @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ if [[ $1 == "test" ]] ; then "i686-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ "i386-apple-darwinX |darwin-i386-cc" \ "powerpc-apple-darwinX |darwin-ppc-cc" \ + "arm64-apple-darwinX |darwin-arm64-cc" \ "i586-pc-winnt |winnt-parity" \ "s390-ibm-linux-gnu |linux-generic32 -DB_ENDIAN" \ "s390x-linux-gnu |linux64-s390x" \ @@ -77,7 +78,9 @@ fi # Detect target arch machine="" +submachine="" chost_machine=${CHOST%%-*} +[[ ${CC} == *clang* ]] && submachine="-clang" case ${system} in linux) case ${chost_machine}:${ABI} in @@ -86,6 +89,10 @@ linux) alphaev56*|\ alphaev[678]*)machine=alpha+bwx-${compiler};; alpha*) machine=alpha-${compiler};; + arc64*b*) machine="generic64 -DB_ENDIAN";; + arc64*) machine="generic64 -DL_ENDIAN";; + arc*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; + arc*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; armv[4-9]*b*) machine="armv4 -DB_ENDIAN";; armv[4-9]*) machine="armv4 -DL_ENDIAN";; arm*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; @@ -95,7 +102,7 @@ linux) # hppa64*) machine=parisc64;; hppa*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; i[0-9]86*|\ - x86_64*:x86) machine=x86;; + x86_64*:x86) machine=x86${submachine};; ia64*) machine=ia64;; loongarch64*) machine="loongarch64 -DL_ENDIAN" system=linux64;; m68*) machine="latomic -DB_ENDIAN";; @@ -109,7 +116,9 @@ linux) powerpc64*) machine=ppc64;; powerpc*le*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; powerpc*) machine=ppc;; + riscv32be*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; riscv32*) machine="generic32 -DL_ENDIAN";; + riscv64be*) machine="riscv64 -DB_ENDIAN" system=linux64;; riscv64*) machine="riscv64 -DL_ENDIAN" system=linux64;; # sh64*) machine=elf;; sh*b*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; @@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ linux) s390x*) machine=s390x system=linux64;; s390*) machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";; x86_64*:x32) machine=x32;; - x86_64*) machine=x86_64;; + x86_64*) machine=x86_64${submachine};; esac ;; BSD) @@ -147,6 +156,7 @@ darwin) powerpc) machine=ppc-cc;; i?86*) machine=i386-cc;; x86_64) machine=x86_64-cc; system=${system}64;; + arm64) machine=arm64-cc; system=${system}64;; esac ;; hpux) diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fff4fb72837b --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cc9ece9118eeacccc3571c2ee852f8ba067d0607 + +From b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) + +(cherry picked from commit 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -3736,9 +3736,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -152,16 +152,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -285,6 +280,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From cc9ece9118eeacccc3571c2ee852f8ba067d0607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) + +(cherry picked from commit c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -531,6 +531,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, + ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73b131ab7928 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328 +https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ad6cbe4b7f57a783a66a7ae883ea0d35ef5f82b6 + +From ad6cbe4b7f57a783a66a7ae883ea0d35ef5f82b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private + "classic" keys" + +This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5. + +The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves +responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated +as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting +non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD. + +The workaround has caused more problems than it solved. + +Fixes #22945 + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063) + +(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380) +--- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c ++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c +@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + return NULL; + } +- /* We enforce check for legacy key */ +- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) { +- case EVP_PKEY_RSA: +- { +- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); +- RSA_free(rsa); +- } +- break; +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +- case EVP_PKEY_SM2: +- case EVP_PKEY_EC: +- { +- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); +- EC_KEY_free(ec); +- } +- break; +-# endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +- case EVP_PKEY_DSA: +- { +- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa); +- DSA_free(dsa); +- } +- break; +-#endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +- case EVP_PKEY_DH: +- { +- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh); +- DH_free(dh); +- } +- break; +-#endif +- default: +- /*Do nothing */ +- break; +- } +- + return pkey; + } + + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.5-test-memcmp.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.5-test-memcmp.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fc84d82e87da..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.5-test-memcmp.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18719 - -From 7f58de577c05ae0bbd20eee9b2971cfa1cd062c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gregor Jasny <gjasny@googlemail.com> -Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:57:06 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Add missing header for memcmp - -CLA: trivial ---- - test/v3ext.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/test/v3ext.c b/test/v3ext.c -index 926f3884b138..a8ab64b2714b 100644 ---- a/test/v3ext.c -+++ b/test/v3ext.c -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ - */ - - #include <stdio.h> -+#include <string.h> - #include <openssl/x509.h> - #include <openssl/x509v3.h> - #include <openssl/pem.h> diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.7-x509-CVE-2022-3996.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.7-x509-CVE-2022-3996.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 079a4f508ccb..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.7-x509-CVE-2022-3996.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/885797 - -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7725e7bfe6f2ce8146b6552b44e0d226be7638e7 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19643 - -From 7725e7bfe6f2ce8146b6552b44e0d226be7638e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> -Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 09:40:19 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] x509: fix double locking problem - -This reverts commit 9aa4be691f5c73eb3c68606d824c104550c053f7 and removed the -redundant flag setting. - -Fixes #19643 - -Fixes LOW CVE-2022-3996 - -Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19652) - -(cherry picked from commit 4d0340a6d2f327700a059f0b8f954d6160f8eef5) ---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_map.c -+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_map.c -@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ int ossl_policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps) - - ret = 1; - bad_mapping: -- if (ret == -1 && CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) { -- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY; -- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); -- } - sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(maps, POLICY_MAPPING_free); - return ret; - diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c5b7dfe449f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96 + +From 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -3737,9 +3737,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -154,16 +154,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -287,6 +282,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -533,6 +533,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, + ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-p11-segfault.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-p11-segfault.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..50bc63ef2d14 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-p11-segfault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328 +https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0058a55407d824d5b55ecc0a1cbf8931803dc238 + +From 0058a55407d824d5b55ecc0a1cbf8931803dc238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private + "classic" keys" + +This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5. + +The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves +responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated +as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting +non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD. + +The workaround has caused more problems than it solved. + +Fixes #22945 + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063) + +(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380) +--- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c ++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c +@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + return NULL; + } +- /* We enforce check for legacy key */ +- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) { +- case EVP_PKEY_RSA: +- { +- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); +- RSA_free(rsa); +- } +- break; +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +- case EVP_PKEY_SM2: +- case EVP_PKEY_EC: +- { +- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); +- EC_KEY_free(ec); +- } +- break; +-# endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +- case EVP_PKEY_DSA: +- { +- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa); +- DSA_free(dsa); +- } +- break; +-#endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +- case EVP_PKEY_DH: +- { +- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh); +- DH_free(dh); +- } +- break; +-#endif +- default: +- /*Do nothing */ +- break; +- } +- + return pkey; + } + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d5b40447d745 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6 + +From e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -4457,9 +4457,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -127,16 +127,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -265,6 +260,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2445,9 +2445,8 @@ CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From 4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -519,6 +519,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..59e785caac7c --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328 +https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65 + +From 934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private + "classic" keys" + +This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5. + +The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves +responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated +as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting +non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD. + +The workaround has caused more problems than it solved. + +Fixes #22945 + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063) + +(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380) +--- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c ++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c +@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + return NULL; + } +- /* We enforce check for legacy key */ +- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) { +- case EVP_PKEY_RSA: +- { +- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); +- RSA_free(rsa); +- } +- break; +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +- case EVP_PKEY_SM2: +- case EVP_PKEY_EC: +- { +- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); +- EC_KEY_free(ec); +- } +- break; +-# endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +- case EVP_PKEY_DSA: +- { +- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa); +- DSA_free(dsa); +- } +- break; +-#endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +- case EVP_PKEY_DH: +- { +- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh); +- DH_free(dh); +- } +- break; +-#endif +- default: +- /*Do nothing */ +- break; +- } +- + return pkey; + } + + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-riscv.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-riscv.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51256cf434e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-riscv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +# Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/923956 +# Upstream PR: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23752 +--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_hw.c ++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_hw.c +@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static const PROV_GCM_HW aes_gcm = { + # include "cipher_aes_gcm_hw_armv8.inc" + #elif defined(PPC_AES_GCM_CAPABLE) && defined(_ARCH_PPC64) + # include "cipher_aes_gcm_hw_ppc.inc" +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 + # include "cipher_aes_gcm_hw_rv64i.inc" +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 + # include "cipher_aes_gcm_hw_rv32i.inc" + #else + const PROV_GCM_HW *ossl_prov_aes_hw_gcm(size_t keybits) +--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_hw.c ++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_hw.c +@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ const PROV_CIPHER_HW *ossl_prov_cipher_hw_aes_##mode(size_t keybits) \ + # include "cipher_aes_hw_t4.inc" + #elif defined(S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE) + # include "cipher_aes_hw_s390x.inc" +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 + # include "cipher_aes_hw_rv64i.inc" +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 + # include "cipher_aes_hw_rv32i.inc" + #else + /* The generic case */ +--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb_hw.c ++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb_hw.c +@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static const PROV_CIPHER_HW aes_t4_ocb = { \ + if (SPARC_AES_CAPABLE) \ + return &aes_t4_ocb; + +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 + + static int cipher_hw_aes_ocb_rv64i_zknd_zkne_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *vctx, + const unsigned char *key, +@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static const PROV_CIPHER_HW aes_rv64i_zknd_zkne_ocb = { \ + if (RISCV_HAS_ZKND_AND_ZKNE()) \ + return &aes_rv64i_zknd_zkne_ocb; + +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 + + static int cipher_hw_aes_ocb_rv32i_zknd_zkne_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *vctx, + const unsigned char *key, +--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts_hw.c ++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts_hw.c +@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static const PROV_CIPHER_HW aes_xts_t4 = { \ + if (SPARC_AES_CAPABLE) \ + return &aes_xts_t4; + +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 + + static int cipher_hw_aes_xts_rv64i_zknd_zkne_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, +@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static const PROV_CIPHER_HW aes_xts_rv64i_zknd_zkne = { \ + if (RISCV_HAS_ZKND_AND_ZKNE()) \ + return &aes_xts_rv64i_zknd_zkne; + +-#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 ++#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 32 + + static int cipher_hw_aes_xts_rv32i_zknd_zkne_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, |