net-misc/openssh: add missing patches

Package-Manager: Portage-3.0.13, Repoman-3.0.2
Signed-off-by: Quentin Retornaz <gentoo@retornaz.com>

13 files changed, 852 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa33af3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+the last nibble of the openssl version represents the status.  that is,
+whether it is a beta or release.  when it comes to version checks in
+openssh, this component does not matter, so ignore it.
+
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2212
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+ 	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+ 	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+-	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
++	mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ 	lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ 	if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5647ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Disable conch interop tests which are failing when called
+via portage for yet unknown reason and because using conch
+seems to be flaky (test is failing when using Python2 but
+passing when using Python3).
+
+Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/605446
+
+--- a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
++++ b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
+@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
+ 
+ tid="conch ciphers"
+ 
++# https://bugs.gentoo.org/605446
++echo "conch interop tests skipped due to Gentoo bug #605446"
++exit 0
++
+ if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then
+ 	echo "conch interop tests not enabled"
+ 	exit 0
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5697c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
+index b05d6d6f..d1f42f04 100644
+--- a/auth-options.c
++++ b/auth-options.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <ctype.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+diff --git a/hmac.c b/hmac.c
+index 1c879640..a29f32c5 100644
+--- a/hmac.c
++++ b/hmac.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index 8e2d5d5d..c32e147a 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
+index 51dc11d7..3d11eba6 100644
+--- a/mac.c
++++ b/mac.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "hmac.h"
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe3be24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 09:05:09 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
+
+New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
+in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 840c5232b..39dc289e3 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,15 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_stat64
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_shmget
++	SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_shmat
++	SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_shmdt
++	SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Syscalls to permit */
+ #ifdef __NR_brk
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4310aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Make sure that host keys are already accepted before
+running tests.
+
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/493866
+
+--- a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
++++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
+@@ -10,11 +10,17 @@ fi
+ 
+ for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do
+ 	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
++	rm -f ${COPY}
+ 	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+ 	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+ 	echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+ 
+-	rm -f ${COPY}
++	env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c \
++	    -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit"
++	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++		fail "failed to pre-cache host key"
++	fi
++
+ 	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+ 	    cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+--- a/regress/putty-kex.sh
++++ b/regress/putty-kex.sh
+@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do
+ 	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+ 	echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+ 
++	env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load kex_$k \
++	    -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit"
++	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++		fail "failed to pre-cache host key"
++	fi
++
+ 	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true
+ 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ 		fail "KEX $k failed"
+--- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh
++++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do
+ 	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+ 	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
+ 	echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
++
++	env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
++	    -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit"
++	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++		fail "failed to pre-cache host key"
++	fi
++
+ 	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
+ 	    -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+ 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..167adfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:49:15.746095444 -0800
++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:49:54.181853707 -0800
+@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
+ +++ b/Makefile.in
+ @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CC=@CC@
+  LD=@LD@
+- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ $(CFLAGS_EXTRA)
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -803,8 +803,8 @@
+  ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+  {
+  	struct session_state *state;
+--	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+-+	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
++-	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none();
+++	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none();
+  	int r;
+  
+  	if (none == NULL) {
+@@ -948,9 +948,9 @@
+  	/* Portable-specific options */
+  	sUsePAM,
+ +	sDisableMTAES,
+- 	/* Standard Options */
+- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
++ 	/* X.509 Standard Options */
++ 	sHostbasedAlgorithms,
++ 	sPubkeyAlgorithms,
+ @@ -643,6 +647,7 @@ static struct {
+  	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+  	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:41:42.512910357 -0800
++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:56:40.323299499 -0800
+@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
+ @@ -884,6 +884,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+  	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+  	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+- 	int r, first_kex_follows;
++ 	int r, first_kex_follows = 0;
+ +	int auth_flag;
+ +
+ +	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
+@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@
+  	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
+  	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
+ @@ -954,6 +958,14 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+- 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+- 			goto out;
++ 			else
++ 				fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
+  		}
+ +		debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
+ +		if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
+@@ -1169,15 +1169,3 @@
+  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+  #Match User anoncvs
+  #	X11Forwarding no
+-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+-index 6b3fadf8..ec1d2e27 100644
+---- a/version.h
+-+++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.1"
+- 
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_HPN         "-hpn14v20"
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+-+ 
+diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:41:42.512910357 -0800
++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 16:02:42.203023609 -0800
+@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
+  static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
+  static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
+ @@ -127,6 +129,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
++ 	off_t bytes_left;
+  	int cur_speed;
+- 	int hours, minutes, seconds;
+- 	int file_len;
++ 	int len;
+ +	off_t delta_pos;
+  
+  	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+@@ -33,12 +33,12 @@
+ @@ -166,7 +173,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
+  
+  	/* filename */
+- 	buf[0] = '\0';
+--	file_len = win_size - 36;
+-+	file_len = win_size - 45;
+- 	if (file_len > 0) {
+- 		buf[0] = '\r';
+- 		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
++ 	if (win_size > 36) {
++-		int file_len = win_size - 36;
+++		int file_len = win_size - 45;
++ 		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s ",
++ 		    file_len, file);
++ 	}
+ @@ -191,6 +198,15 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
+  	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
+  	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37905ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 34808b5c..88d7ccac 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ 	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
+ 		version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-	   PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++	   PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6aba6f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index ca450f4e..2994a4e4 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -723,120 +723,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
+  * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index f78b4d6f..747287f7 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -203,9 +204,11 @@ static struct {
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ # else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -992,6 +995,10 @@ parse_time:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1864,6 +1871,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -2011,6 +2019,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index 8e36bf32..c9e4718d 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 02a87892..95de538b 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -762,6 +762,16 @@ The default is
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 87fa70a4..a6ffdc96 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int r, ok = 0;
+ 	gss_OID mech = NULL;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -711,7 +718,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+-		    mech, authctxt->host)) {
++		    mech, gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			authctxt->mech_tried++;
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67a93fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in	2019-06-17 10:59:01.210601434 -0700
++++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in	2019-06-17 10:59:18.753485852 -0700
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I../.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48cce79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+Only in b: .openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff.un~
+diff -ur a/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff b/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff
+--- a/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff	2019-10-14 11:33:45.796485604 -0700
++++ b/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff	2019-10-14 11:39:44.960312587 -0700
+@@ -35343,12 +35343,11 @@
+  
+  install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
+  install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
+-@@ -339,6 +360,8 @@
++@@ -339,6 +360,7 @@
+  	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
+  	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+  	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+ +	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sshcadir)
+-+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(piddir)
+  	$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
+  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -83536,16 +83535,6 @@
+ +	return mbtowc(NULL, s, n);
+ +}
+ +#endif
+-diff -ruN openssh-8.1p1/version.h openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.h
+---- openssh-8.1p1/version.h	2019-10-09 03:31:03.000000000 +0300
+-+++ openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.h	2019-10-13 09:07:00.000000000 +0300
+-@@ -2,5 +2,4 @@
+- 
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.1"
+- 
+--#define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	PACKAGE_STRING ", " SSH_VERSION "p1"
+ diff -ruN openssh-8.1p1/version.m4 openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.m4
+ --- openssh-8.1p1/version.m4	1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200
+ +++ openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.m4	2019-10-13 09:07:00.000000000 +0300
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90fa248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 14:55:30.408567718 -0800
++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 15:16:14.646567224 -0800
+@@ -409,18 +409,10 @@
+ index 817da43b..b2bcf78f 100644
+ --- a/packet.c
+ +++ b/packet.c
+-@@ -925,6 +925,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
++@@ -925,6 +925,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+  	return 0;
+  }
+  
+-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
+-+int rekey_requested = 0;
+-+void
+-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
+-+{
+-+	rekey_requested = 1;
+-+}
+-+
+ +/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
+ + * and none cipher switch */
+ +int
+@@ -434,20 +426,6 @@
+  #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+  static int
+  ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+-@@ -951,6 +969,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+- 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+- 		return 0;
+- 
+-+	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
+-+         * cipher switch methods -cjr */
+-+        if (rekey_requested == 1) {
+-+                rekey_requested = 0;
+-+                return 1;
+-+        }
+-+
+- 	/* Time-based rekeying */
+- 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+- 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+ diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
+ index 8ccfd2e0..1ad9bc06 100644
+ --- a/packet.h
+@@ -476,9 +454,9 @@
+  /* Format of the configuration file:
+  
+ @@ -167,6 +168,8 @@ typedef enum {
+- 	oHashKnownHosts,
+  	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+  	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
++ 	oDisableMTAES,
+ +	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
+ +	oNoneEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
+  	oVisualHostKey,
+@@ -615,9 +593,9 @@
+  	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+  	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+ @@ -112,7 +116,10 @@ typedef struct {
+- 
+  	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+  	int64_t rekey_limit;
++ 	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
+ +	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
+ +	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
+  	int	rekey_interval;
+@@ -700,9 +678,9 @@
+ +			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ +	}
+ +
++ 	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++ 		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
+  	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+- 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
+- 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+ @@ -486,6 +532,8 @@ typedef enum {
+  	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+  	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -1079,11 +1057,11 @@
+  	xxx_host = host;
+  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+  
+-@@ -422,6 +433,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
++@@ -422,7 +433,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+  
+  	if (!authctxt.success)
+  		fatal("Authentication failed.");
+-+
++ 
+ +	/*
+ +	 * If the user wants to use the none cipher, do it post authentication
+ +	 * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands
+@@ -1105,9 +1083,9 @@
+ +		}
+ +	}
+ +
+- 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+- }
+- 
++ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ 	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
++ 		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
+ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+ index 11571c01..23a06022 100644
+ --- a/sshd.c
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f5c7a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 14:55:30.408567718 -0800
++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff	2020-02-04 16:36:51.394069720 -0800
+@@ -1191,15 +1191,3 @@
+  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+  #Match User anoncvs
+  #	X11Forwarding no
+-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+-index 6b3fadf8..ec1d2e27 100644
+---- a/version.h
+-+++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
+- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.1"
+- 
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+-+#define SSH_HPN         "-hpn14v20"
+-+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+-+ 
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..505e34d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+index 86ea6250..844adabc 100644
+--- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
++++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ test_one() {
+ test_one "user-certificate"	failure "-n $HOSTS"
+ test_one "empty principals"	success "-h"
+ test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-h -n foo"
+-test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
++test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-h -V20300101:20320101"
+ test_one "cert expired"		failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
+ test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
+ test_one "cert has constraints"	failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
+diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+index 38c14a69..5cd02fc3 100644
+--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh
++++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ test_one() {
+ test_one "correct principal"	success "-n ${USER}"
+ test_one "host-certificate"	failure "-n ${USER} -h"
+ test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-n foo"
+-test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
++test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101"
+ test_one "cert expired"		failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
+ test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
+ test_one "wrong source-address"	failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"